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CIS

Colonia Libertad,

Avenida Bolívar # 103

San Salvador, El Salvador

Centroamérica

Teléfonos:

(503) 2226-5362              

(503) 2235-1330

e-mail: cis_elsalvador@yahoo.com

www.cis-elsalvador.org

May-June 2001

1. Two Years of Francisco Flores

2. Government Fails to Kick Out Venezuelans but the Right is on the Attack

3. Grassroots Organizing for Reconstruction

Two Years of Francisco Flores

In El Salvador, the second year of Francisco Flores’ administration is recognized as a failure. Considerable rises in unemployment, poverty, and violence were recorded. The recent earthquakes that occurred on January 13th and February 13th, far from provoking political unity and concerted efforts in favor of reconstruction, have given the government a chance to spout nice rhetoric and impressive statistics. President Flores’ report regarding his second year in office is a cosmetic exaggeration full of exacerbated optimism and fantasy. President Flores, after two years in power, has not known how to successfully carry out his famous “alliances” that he promised during his candidacy and today he postulates with a degree of populism.

Overview of the events and outstanding measures of this period

In economic matters: the expansion of the VAT (Value Added Tax) to include basic food basket and medicines; a rise in electrical energy prices and a cutback in subsidies for poor families; an increase of over 37% in combustibles; a rise in telephone taxes; an increased of over 30% in external debt; the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, clearly disadvantageous to El Salvador; dollarization and the future impossibility of monetary policy; an increase in prices of all products; and a national disaster in the agrarian sector.

In social matters: an epidemic of dengue fever; methanol intoxication; an epidemic of rotavirus; distinct cases of contamination from toxic residues; a lowered supply of medicine to the Social Security Hospital (ISSS) and to the public hospital system; poor service in the area of Social Security; increased drop out rates and a worsened education crisis; the sale of false professional degrees; a grave housing situation partially provoked by the earthquake (a housing deficit of 500,000 houses before the earthquake and 800,000 after the earthquake); destruction of highways and roads; governmental refusal to revalue pensions (pensions are less than $100 dollars, when the minimum salary is $147 dollars and the amount to cover basic needs rose to $605 dollars); emigration of over 160,000 Salvadorans (and the resulting crisis of family values, youth, quality of life, and control of education, etc.); greater scarcity of drinking water and profound environmental damage.

In labor matters: over 8,000 firings from Public Works, Treasury, and the Salvadoran version of the IRS; a deterioration of income and buying power of workers; deregulation of labor markets; lowered protection of labor rights for maquila workers.

In public security matters: increase in common crime; increase in organized criminal activity; greater number of PNC members involved in criminal acts; no results in the investigation of money laundering and narcotic trafficking; no results in the investigation of notable crimes and murders such as that of Katia Miranda and others; the failure of Penal Codes and Penal Process reforms.

Concerning corruption: the sale of passports abroad; the conflicts of interest of cabinet members in cases such as batteries and rice; sale of oil donated by Spain; stolen fertilizer donated by Japan; phone tapping with commercial and political goals; corruption in the deliveries of diesel to those working in transport.

In international matters: the failure to recuperate Rabbit Island; involvement of government functionaries hiding the terrorist Posada Carriles; confrontation between president Francisco Flores and president Fidel Castro; a treaty permitting the North American military base in Comalapa; pressures and declarations about the departure of the Venezuelan military brigade; inadequate treatment of the European Union delegation; and pressure from the international community around the lack of political will in the election of the Procurator of Human Rights.

In political matters: authoritarianism on the part of president Flores and the exclusion of the mayors in the design and execution of the reconstruction plan; bureaucracy and slowness in the delivery of international aid; attacking means of communication that are critical of his government; lack of transparency and political will for cooperation; changes in the cabinet and an advertising campaign taking advantage of the earthquakes.

The economic ends that the government pursues

At the beginning of his term, president Flores announced that in the economic field he would propose as his principle objectives: the reactivation of the agrarian sector, the elimination of exchange rate risk, the strengthening of public finances and the fomentation of competition for small and medium sized businesses. Immediately after, a series of concrete measures such as the elimination of the VAT exemption on basic grains, milk, vegetables and medicines, lines of credit for the coffee growing sector and dollarization followed. These measures did not touch any of the macroeconomic factors in crisis, such as the low growth rates, the imbalance in commerce, the economic dependence on family remittances from abroad and the rising national debt. On the contrary, it has come to touch only the pocketbooks of the city dwellers. Currently, there is no defined policy in the third ARENA administration to reactivate the agrarian sector and to increase the competitiveness of micro-enterprise. On the contrary, they pretend to resolve the problem of national debt by charging a new tax on the poorest sector: the informal sector.

During the last two years of governmental management, one does not find major changes in the Salvadoran economy: the GDP grew 2.4% in 2000, while in 1999 it grew 3.4% (one must take into consideration that it was the smallest growth rate in the past 7 years); the agrarian GDP declined by 0.8% in 2000, though it had grown 6.9% in 1999; the commercial balance was 1.956 billion dollars in 2000, while in 1999 it was 1.587; and the financial debt increased from 3 to 3.9% of the GDP. In short, the indicators show a deepening of the stage of slow growth and of the possible macroeconomic imbalance. In fact, this did not translate into greater chronic crisis like in Ecuador thanks only to family remittances. Nevertheless, it is a clear sign that the only alternative (being left open by current economic policies) for the country, in economic matters, consists of emigrating to the US. And the president encourages this in his governmental report.

The elimination of the exemption of the VAT on include basic grains, milk and vegetables is supposed to stimulate agrarian growth and, at the same time, increase fiscal taxes. In practice it does not happen this way: the agrarian sector contracted 0.8% and the fiscal earnings only increased 6% during the year 2000. The other repeatedly publicized measure that the government took was the creation of credit lines to fund the renovation of the coffee growers park. Nevertheless, the yield of this sector is questionable due to the decline of international coffee prices since 1989. Moreover, it would be fit to say that the “Integral Rescue and Maintenance Program of the Coffee Growers Park" that Flores launched after the earthquakes is no more than the relaunching of the “Renovation of the Coffee Growers’ Park” announced about the middle of the year 2000 despite the fact that the majority of those affected by the earthquakes were not coffee producers.

The various tax reforms since the Cristiani government (elimination of a patrimony tax and exportation tax, rent reduction for business and the creation of the VAT to substitute all the fore mentioned) have not been able to stop (in essence have created) the fiscal deficit that now is about 3.9% of the GDP. In the recent changes in the cabinet, Flores has placed Juan José Daboub as Minister of Finance with the hopes that he could resolve the problem. There are rumors of raising the VAT and the IR (Rent Tax) even though ARENA deputies have already made statements saying they would not touch the VAT. However, a new type of tax is coming for the micro-businesses: the Simplified Tax, a flat tax placed on the informal sector (the poorest sector) of the economy. The tax will not only go to the mayor's office but also directly to the Minister of Finance. This tax will punish the poorest sector of the population, those Salvadorans that work in the market, that sell tortillas, used clothes, or food in the street and will not touch the large commercial and industrial businesses.

On the other side, the dollarization continues to be affected by two forces: rejection by the population (80% of the population prefers the colon) and the stubbornness of the national bank and the government who continue to force through the "monetary integration". It is truly an imposed effort because after 5 months of dollarization, only 30% of the people regularly use dollars when, by this time, the desired result was total conversion. Furthermore, the 30% that use dollars is due to the fact that all the cash machines in the country only give out dollars and the colones line in the banks are considerably much longer than the dollar line. These tactics have given more legitimacy to rejecting the governments insistence of the dollarization. The dollarization, as we will see, has been unnecessary.

For example, Argentina and Ecuador implemented "dollarization" in order to combat hyper-inflation. However, 10 years after starting the conversion plan, there are no perceivable positive affects on Argentina's ability to compete, (which continues to go down), the well-being of the people (unemployment is devastating), or in their buying power (inflation stopped but the prices stayed sky high). These three points (competitively, well-being, and buying power) were all arguments used by President Flores to justify the dollarization. In the case of Ecuador, the dollarization was to halt inflation and activate the economy by lowering interest rates. Interest rates dropped (not necessarily due to the dollarization) but credit has not expanded to levels higher than the past decade because the economy continues to be stagnated and the dollarization has not reactivated it. In conclusion, there are no precedents to support Flores' optimism. His optimism is for his public image and not due to real economic factors. President Flores and his cabinet do not know exactly where dollarization will bring El Salvador. If with dollarization they pretended to eliminate risk in the exchange rate and introduce reductions in the interest rates you have to note that the exchange rate has maintained stable since 1992 and the interest rates have been falling since the second half of 2000. Therefore, dollarization is more than unnecessary, it intends to and will reduce the future possibilities of monetary policies. The government mistakenly believes that depending on the US Federal Reserve will bring benefits to El Salvador. During this year the US Federal Reserve has lowered interest rates by 5 points and the interest rates in El Salvador have not dropped accordingly.

The fundamental role of the Minister of Economy has been to hurriedly negotiate free trade agreements. The first was the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. Free trade agreements in the Caribbean basin, with the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Canada, and the United States will follow. The government hopes to generate 75,000 jobs in the next three years. Our vision of free trade agreements is that it is not a solution to the problems of under development and poverty. El Salvador is not in any condition to compete with distinct markets, including those of the United States and Canada. The recent example of the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico has demonstrated that Salvadoran business and industry is at a disadvantage. El Salvador imports 3 times as many Mexican products as Mexico imports Salvadoran products. Bigger economies eat the smaller economies. In addition, the profit from manufacturing never stays in the country, it is flying capital that lands in other countries.

In summary, there are no positive or substantial changes in the macroeconomy of the country, but rather a deepening period of stagnation has hit the country. Economic stability in El Salvador continues to depend on family remittances sent from abroad. The government is stubbornly continuing to force dollarization and the free trade agreements as methods to fix the economy but there is no proof that it will. Meanwhile, the government imposes new types of taxes (VAT on the basic food basket and the Simplified Tax on the informal sector), electric prices are rising (prices in general are rising), there are no incentives for the agricultural sector, and the external debt has increased by 30%. This situation causes, at a microeconomic level, families to have less buying power and less for daily survival.

Political Games in the Second Year of Government

The first year of Flores was marked by heavy tensions with many distinct sectors: the general population, the opposition parties and even his own party. Little by little he survived being able to govern with an ARENA, PCN and PDC alliance. The alliance modified the internal rules of the Legislative Assembly in order to take the legislative presidency away from the FMLN. The combined votes of ARENA, PCN and PDC made the FMLN votes irrelevant and Flores did not hesitate in continuing with his neoliberal initiatives. However, Flores was not expecting the bad rating he received from the public in addition to the critical oppository stance that the FMLN took regarding the government's initiatives. As a result, after his first year in office, Flores needed to call for "cooperation" with the hopes of "building bridges" in order to be able to govern. The so called "cooperation" attempt, along with "building bridges" is quite questionable. The "cooperation" meetings with all the heads of the each party did not even last two months, when President Flores announced the dollarization. A resentful FMLN assured that the theme of dollarization was never brought up by Flores at the meetings. The FMLN feeling manipulated, immediately retreated from the meetings in the Presidential Palace. Flores, assured that the dollarization would resolve the problems that the FMLN brought to the table (lower interest rates, and access to credits and housing). Then came the earthquakes. The FMLN, recently deceived, did not support Flores' initiatives including the dollarization as well as the government's earthquake strategy. It had to be clear that Flores' procedures were full of mystery and the government did not assure the political will or the cooperation that they had offered.

The government's scheme to exclude the FMLN started to crumble when Ciro Cruz Zepeda, general secretary of the PCN, finished his term as Assembly President. The PCN wanted to continue with the presidency but ARENA did not share their vision: "Francisco Flores already has the economic base (the 1.3 billion for reconstruction) and the judicial base for his government, for the next year, he does not need the votes of the PCN "¹

Walter Araujo, General Secretary of ARENA, took the presidency of the Assembly. Araujo is an individual who breaks from the traditional sector of ARENA and who is also well recognized and supported by the financial sector.

As a result, the PCN, who feels resentment because ARENA does not value their "role as stabilizer in the country", has approached the FMLN. A close alliance, however, is still unthinkable due to the lack of credibility shown by the PCN. The PCN, without a doubt, would have to pass a testing period before gaining trust from the FMLN. The internal affairs of the PCN are ambiguous: there are some who say they have to scare ARENA, but always be their ally for future elections; and there are those who say because of ARENA's constant and surprising betrayal, they should separate themselves from ARENA. Now, if the FMLN and PCN vote together, Flores will have no other option but to return to use the presidential veto like he did when he started his period as president.

On the other hand, President Flores is not sitting around without taking measures. At the end of May he implemented strategic changes in his cabinet. The two key personalities that have his total trust are: Juan José Daboub and Francisco Bertrand Galindo. Juan José Daboub will now be the Minister of Finance (which is similar to the IRS). His placement there has two points: resolve the fiscal deficit, by way of the Simplified Tax on the country's informal sector; and to run the distribution of the 1.3 billion dollars (in loans and donations) that the country will receive over the next three years. It is interesting that in the meeting in Madrid, the businessmen Murray Mesa, Roberto Simán and Jorge Sablas were representing El Salvador. The "development" companies, together in CASALCO, have a clear understanding of their interests in the reconstruction of El Salvador: a housing policy is needed to assure that the private sector reconstructs El Salvador. In fact there are such declarations as, "the private sector will reconstruct El Salvador." Surely, Daboub also has the responsibility of protecting foreign interests. The Assembly can have a role investigating fiscal matters but their effort can only go as far as making recommendations to the corresponding entities. Auditing and correction will stay once again in the hands of the Public Minister, the District Attorney's Office, and the Treasury. It is enough to remember that the president of the Treasury is Rutilio Aguilera of the PCN.

The other significant change in cabinet was to combine the Minister of Public Security with that of the Minister of Interior to form the Minister of Governance which will be under the control of Francisco Betrand Galindo. Francisco Flores in this manner rids the government of Mario Acosta Oertel who immediately resigned as Minister of Interior. This change is important. Mario Acosta Oertel represents the agricultural right and the traditional sector of ARENA who have felt excluded from the new neoliberal design. The silent exit of Acosta Oertel definitely is important. One must remember the irregularities in the Minister of Interior regarding illegal passport sales to Chinese, Hindu, and Ecuadorian peoples. It appears that his exit has to do with pressure from the United States in relation to migratory crime. The case is reminiscent of Juan José Domenec's quiet exit from COENA. It is a confusing situation and no one knows with exact science what is happening. What is Flores' goal with uniting the Minister of Interior with the Minister of Public Security? Taking everything into consideration, what is evident is that the political power of Flores is growing.

We cannot leave aside the fact that corruption, organized crime, money laundering, narco-trafficking, and the network of kidnappers live and develop in the environment of institutional deficiencies, which thrives in El Salvador. In this context, the lack of political will to elect the Human Rights Procurator is comprehensible since it is the Procurator's responsibility to struggle for institutional transparency and democracy so that human rights are respected.

In conclusion, President Flores has proceeded in his second year with little transparency and political will for cooperation. Having the majority in the Assembly, thanks to the PCN and the PDC, ARENA did not need the FMLN to approve the dollarization, or the FTA with Mexico. Once Flores had the financial and judicial bases covered it didn't matter jeopardizing the alliance with the PCN in order to have ARENA obtain the presidency in the Assembly. In this context, the FMLN has had dialogues with the PCN, resentful of ARENA, on specific issues. Two key personalities in the new cabinet are: Juan José Daboub, who is in charge of the fiscal situation of the country and administering the Hacienda which includes the respective $1.3 billion reconstruction dollars; and Francisco Bertrand Galindo who will administer the newly created Minister of Governance, a combination of the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Public Security. The clear result is that Flores has gained more political power.

The earthquakes, aid, the external debt and the image of the government

In addition to the human costs - more than 1,200 deaths, 8,964, injured and 1.3 million homeless - the country had million dollar losses in all sectors: $210.5 million in education; 616.7 in social services; 72.4 in health; 333.8 in housing; 16.4 in electricity; 23.1 in water and sanitation; 472.3 in infrastructure; 93.1 in the agricultural and fishing sectors; 246.2 in industry, tourism, and trade; 102.5 in the environment; 73 in other damages and emergencies. This makes a total of 2.26 billion dollars in losses.

El Salvador needs around 3.5 billion dollars for reconstruction. The government obtained 1.3 billion. However, only 300 million came from international aid and the other billion came in the form of loans that the next three governments will have to pay. The new loans will make El Salvador's external debt grow by 30% and reach 3.3 billion dollars (24% of the GDP). This situation ties the hands of future governments. The government was not interested in having the debt forgiven so that it could maintain itself on the "solvent list" and therefore receive future loans.

The greatest recognized accomplishment of the government was the extension of the TPS (Temporary Protection Status) through which 165,000 Salvadorans were given temporary protection and employment rights in the US. Supposedly this will increase the family remittances to 1.75 billion dollars, which directly end up in the pocket of many Salvadorans. Once again, the remittances save the Salvadoran economy.

In addition, the president and his office have taken advantage of the earthquakes to improve his image of being disconnected and uncaring of the reality of the people. He did better his image, but it was only his image that improved. There was no real improvement. The president and his cabinet are already in the distinct media. The president's office of communication and his public advisors have worked to create a Francisco Flores that is tied to the people. For that reason, the president has distanced himself from the Legislative Assembly and the political parities, including his own. That explains why the president has a better public opinion rating than his economic policies. In addition that explains the campaign against the Assembly and the political parties. The campaign has produced results, 83% of the population said that they feel little represented by their corresponding deputy (done by region). It is also worth mentioning that the president has attacked freedom of press by accusing a TV station of ruining the image of the country because the station questioned the management of international aid. The above information leads one to believe that in El Salvador the failure of Flores' second year is well recognized. The people have judged him on the effects that his policies have caused.

1. Diálogo con Eugenio Chicas del FMLN, CIS 5/6/2001.

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Government Fails to Kick Out Venezuelans but the Right is on the Attack¹

With the rains starting and in the midst of serious social criticism the Salvadoran government had given the Venezuelan aid mission until May 15 to leave the country. The Venezuelan earthquake reconstruction team is made up of about 127 individuals, including military officers and medical personnel. The Venezuelans have dedicated themselves to building houses, constructing the town's infrastructure, giving free medical treatment, and donating food aid, among other things.

According to the delegation leader, Douglas Loaiza, on April 27th the Salvadoran government informed them to prepare to leave on May 15th, 45 days earlier than projected.² From that date until May 2nd, the central government maintained silence. On May 2, the Minister of Interior, Mario Acosta Oertel, tried to justify the government's decision by saying "Venezuela did not complete the reconstruction".³ It is hard to understand this statement as anything but sinister and ridiculous since the Venezuelans have practically reconstructed the entire town of Comasagua while many other towns under the Salvadoran government's responsibility lay in shambles. According to the Venezuelan paper "El Nacional" the aid given to Comasagua has totaled $7 million dollars.⁴ Their voluntary donated contribution efforts include:

Channel 12 and the Venezuelan daily "El Nacional" have reported that the true underlying reason behind the government's action is probably the political desires of the United States. El Nacional reported that the demanded retreat came one month after the Republican Senator Jesse Helms declared being against what he calls "Venezuelan interference" in El Salvador. Senator Helms' own statements support the theory that the US government's interests are behind the action: "The United States has avoided ousting President Hugo Chavez so as not to strengthen nationalist support."⁵ In other words, the United States government wants to forcibly oust yet another democratically elected president but has not yet done so for strategic reasons. It is believed that the US government is reacting to what it sees as a possible regional threat to their economic interests - a possible FMLN government in El Salvador, a possible Sandinista government in Nicaragua (who are ahead in the polls for the November elections), the guerrilla movements in Colombia and Mexico, the Venezuelan government, and always, Cuba. A block of cooperating leftist governments in the region could prove to be a wrench in the plan that US capital has for the region, expressed by the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

However, due to mass popular protest in support of the Venezuelan mission, the Salvadoran government has backed down and will allow the Venezuelans to continue their work. During the International Workers Day march on May 1st, 50,000 marchers chanted slogans and carried banners supporting the Venezuelans and demanding that they be allowed to stay. In addition, the townspeople of Comasagua protested in front of the town church and marched to the Chancellor's office to protest the action. Furthermore, there was an outpouring of protest comments in the two Salvadoran dailies. The people wrote such things as: "It is a national embarrassment"; "They (the Venezuelans) have done everything for Comasagua, the central and municipal government (ARENA) have not done anything for our municipality"; and "It is shame that the government shares the strategy of not accepting aid, that it lets itself be manipulated by the United States."⁶The general disgust over the action was undeniable and unable to be hidden.

On May 3rd, the government tried to change its story by saying that they never ordered the Venezuelans to leave and that "It was all due to a lack of communication and information" according to the Chancellor of El Salvador, Maria Eugenia de Avila. This can only be interpreted as a cover up since the Minister of the Interior, the Mayor of Comasagua, and military officials have all made statements regarding the decision to demand the retreat of the Venezuelans. The mayor of Comasagua first tried to justify the action by saying that the Venezuelans never consulted him regarding the projects (Douglas Loaiza, the mission director, quickly refuted by stating that the mayor had been in all the meetings regarding the reconstruction plans and that he had written documents signed by the mayor to prove so). The Minister of Interior then tried to justify the government's position by saying that the Venezuelans were too slow. This statement is particularly odd since the Salvadoran government has yet to give temporary reconstruction materials to various towns while the Venezuelan team has almost completed constructing permanent structures. To date, May 3, the Salvadoran government has given the Venezuelans until June 15th to finish their reconstruction projects that are so desperately needed.

Demanding the exit of the Venezuelan reconstruction team for political purposes is only the most recent in a long line of strategic maneuvers carried out by the government during the last 10 months. The government of El Salvador, along with the United States, are apparently planning for and trying to halt the probable future electoral gains of the FMLN. Last summer the government signed an agreement allowing the United States military to set up a military base in El Salvador which essentially gives the United States military unlimited power over the country.⁷ Then, at the end of November, President Flores announced the dollarization of the economy which eliminates the possibility for governments to create its own economic policies.⁸ Also, during the same time period, there were numerous attacks and assaults on NGO's which fortunately has decreased due to the earthquakes. On the media front, the government and private business have come to an agreement to boycott Channel 12 (independent of the right-wing channels 2, 4, and 6 all of which are owned by Telecorporación Salvadoreña) by not placing ads on the station . Because of the boycott, Channel 12 finds itself in financial troubles and may possibly go bankrupt. In addition to the above tactics, ARENA manipulated the rules regarding the Legislative Assembly's Directive and President positions in order to maintain control even though the presidency of the Assembly along with the majority of the seats in the Directive should have went to the FMLN as the largest fraction in the Assembly. Furthermore, ARENA has stalled the election of Human Rights Ombudsperson since last year and some fear that the institution might be manipulated into collapsing. Considering that the center and left only need to gain 4 more seats in the Assembly to have a majority and indicators point to discontent with the ruling party, the government considers the upcoming days extremely crucial. Never in the history of El Salvador has the opposition been allowed to win the majority of seats in the Assembly or win the presidency and it appears as if the elite are taking steps so that it will not happen in the future either.

1. Article was written in May of 2001

2. Prensa Grafica, Sunday, April 29, 2001.

3. El Diario de Hoy, Wednesday, May 2, 2001

4. El Nacional, Wednesday, May 2, 2001

5. Unofficial translation from Prensa Grafica, Tuesday, May 1, 2001

6. Prensa Grafica, Wednesday, May 2, 2001 and El Diario de Hoy, Thursday, May 3, 2001

7. See September Action Alert - the open letter to President Clinton, and the September and October CIS bulletins.

8. See January/February CIS Bulletin

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Grassroots Organizing for Reconstruction

Through donations from dozens of individuals and institutions in El Salvador, the US, Canada, England, Norway, Italy, and Japan, the CIS has been able to respond to emergency needs, reconstruction, development, and organizing efforts in over 22 municipalities in El Salvador, largely in Cuscatlan, La Paz, Usulutan, and La Libertad. This aid has included corrugated tin and nylon tarp for emergency shelter; purchasing land and a brick making machine for more permanent reconstruction; and support for wells, a bridge, a community center, and a reconstruction office for community development.

The CIS mission has always been to promote people-to-people solidarity in order to support grassroots organizing for social and economic justice. In this regard, an important part of the CIS' efforts has been to support community organizing in the above projects in an immediate and ongoing manner. As one of the Venezuelan reconstruction brigade members said in response to criticism from the ARENA Mayor of Comasagua for going to a community meeting, "Look, without the participation of the people, Comasagua will never be rebuilt." The Salvadoran Government has limited its efforts to providing corrugated tin to less than 1/2 of those in need. They have no further projections to help people build permanent shelter or to revitalize the economy for the poor. As a result, one of the only solutions people see is migrating to the US to earn money to rebuild their homes or to settle permanently. So indeed, people working together from the grassroots in an organized manner will be the only way to rebuild El Salvador.

The CIS efforts to support community organizing are integrated with the emergency, reconstruction, and development projects mentioned above. First, members of the communities participated in a process to define how funds would be used. Second, the CIS has supported community assemblies, the construction of an office for the Citizen's Roundtable in San Pedro Perulapan to institutionalize their reconstruction efforts, a community center in the Canton of Asuchillo in Zaragoza, organizing efforts of the Committee for Reconstruction in San Juan Tepozontes, a caravan with emergency food supplies in the Department of Usulutan, medical brigades in San Francisco Chinameca, the formation and training to make community plans to prevent disasters in the Coastal Zone of La Paz, and other organizing efforts.

The CIS is also funding a stipend and mobilizing costs for 6 organizers for one year working in the following municipalities: San Pedro Perulapan and San Rafael Cedros in Cuscatlan; Zaragoza, Comasagua, and Tepocoyo in La Libertad; and San Pedro Masahuat in La Paz. The role of these organizers varies depending on the needs of the community they are working in. For example, Jose Valencia is working in coordination with the City Hall of San Rafael Cedros to develop community participation in reconstruction, which includes starting a small business to help generate funds to build permanent homes with a brick-making machine donated by the CIS. The brick making machine will generate funds through selling the bricks and at the same time be the primary material for reconstruction. Jose has also supported organizing and helped get aid from the CIS and the Comandos de Salvamento (Life Saving Brigade) for the resettled community of San Benito in Cojutepeque. 295 families displaced from no longer inhabitable marginal zones in Cojutepeque got together to resettle on government lands. They are now struggling to get the land legalized where they have resettled and hope to rebuild.

Rafael Vasquez "Lito" has not only organized reconstruction committees in Comasagua but also has organized political pressure to defend efforts of reconstruction that the Salvadoran Government has attempted to sabotage. The Venezuelan Reconstruction Brigade arrived one day after the earthquake with the intention of building 800 homes for all of the families living in Comasagua. Unfortunately, only 100 families owned the land they were on. Neither the local government nor the central government made any attempt to legalize the land or purchase land so that the people of Comasagua could have permanent homes for free. Instead, at the request of the Salvadoran Government, the Venezuelans rebuilt the city's infrastructure including schools, roads, the clinic, and 2 churches.

The communities who organized themselves into Committees for Reconstruction were not in agreement with this decision, saying that the Salvadoran Government has the funds and the responsibility to rebuild infrastructure. The Committees for Reconstruction asked the Venezuelans to build as many houses as possible and the Committee would make the effort to get legal title to the land. Due to the request from reconstruction committees, the Venezuelans committed to building 120 permanent homes, after they finished with the town's infrastructure. As mentioned above, the Municipal and Central Government complained that the Venezuelans developed a relationship directly with the people through the Committees of Reconstruction. When the Venezuelans started to build the homes, the Salvadoran Government asked them to leave. The Comasaguans were very upset, so Lito pulled together demonstrations in Comasagua and to the Foreign Relations Department in San Salvador to protest the Salvadoran Government's decision to kick out the Venezuelan Reconstruction Brigade. The strong outcry forced the Salvadoran Government to retract its decision.

Delmy Valencia has helped facilitate a participatory development process with the Citizens Roundtable for the past 2 1/2 years with 10 villages in San Pedro Perulapan with the support of Social Initiative for Democracy, ISD. The earthquake hit all of San Pedro's 17 villages hard. Because of the emergency, Delmy visited all 17 villages and has incorporated 7 new villages into the Citizen's Roundtable. The Citizen's Roundtable, with the support of CIS, ISD and their organizer, Delmy, has been able carry out a diagnosis of the impact of the earthquake and people's priority needs. This detailed study will help the municipality generate funds for reconstruction. Delmy is organizing a forum so that the Citizen's Roundtable can present the report to the city's ARENA Mayor, who has not evaluated the effects of the earthquake on the villages. A CIS delegation with 11 volunteers from Colorado Mountain College will participate in the meeting as well as 10 days of community service repairing roads, living with families in their temporary shelters, and sharing the daily lives and reality of the people of San Pedro.

The CIS will continue to facilitate supporting community organizers and activities for reconstruction and development. We will issue periodic reports on the developments and the activities in other municipalities. Grassroots organizing and community participation is essential not only in reconstruction but in order to overcome and challenge the crisis left by the earthquake of the neo-liberal economic model being imposed on El Salvador. The participation of community members as well as the accompaniment and support from international solidarity is critical for El Salvador's reconstruction. If you would like more details or would like to support this project, please let us know.

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