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CIS
Colonia Libertad,
Avenida Bolívar # 103
San Salvador, El Salvador
Centroamérica
Teléfonos:
(503) 2226-5362
(503) 2235-1330
e-mail: cis_elsalvador@yahoo.com
August 2001
Drought, the Environment and Globalization
According to the World Food Program (WFP) the drought has left 600,000 affected in Nicaragua, 1,000,000 in Honduras, 200,000 in El Salvador, and 65,000 in Guatemala.11 WFP, Press Release, 8/02/01 The drought and following famine has been considered the gravest tragedy to affect Central America as a whole since Hurricane Mitch. This is yet another disaster to add to El Salvador's already long list.
After so many repeated disasters of such magnitude it becomes quite pertinent to ask, what is the relationship between the environment and the current process of neoliberal globalization? Why is Central America so susceptible to these "natural" events? In what way are the government's policies responsible in this constant human tragedy?
The National Meteorology Center explained that the drought is due to the presence of an anticyclone in the Caribbean. This anticyclone has re-routed the rains that were supposed to fall over the region, thus inflicting great damage upon the thousands of farmers that work the earth in order to survive and do business. This year's drought is not an isolated case but rather it has been occurring since the 1950s and has become intensified during the 1990s. A drought has come during the past decade in almost a systematic 3-year pattern: 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2001. When in 1972, 57.7% of the corn crop, 42.2% of the bean crop, and 56.1% of the rice crop were all lost, it was though that the drought was an eventual and unlikely phenomenon therefore it didn't require much attention in policy making. History has shown otherwise. We know that it is a recurring phenomenon, especially in the recent years when in 1991, 1994, and 1997, respectively, 20.3%, 32%, and 24.1% of the corn crop was lost (Proceso 960, julio18). This year has been worse yet, reporting 1.4 million of the region's people affected - 700,000 of which lost 50-100% of their crops (EDH, 15/08/2001). Such figure is much higher than the statistics of 1972. Honduras has been the most affected losing 80% of their crops in 12 of the 16 departments (EDH, 1/08/2001). After Honduras follows Nicaragua which has experienced three tragedies at the same time: 12,000 unemployed families due to the coffee crises. The coffee crises is a problem that affects all of Central America and is a result of World Bank policy to promote coffee growing in places such as Vietnam. As a result, the Central American coffee has become unprofitable thus aggravating the already difficult economic situation. (many of which emigrated to Matagalpa to solicit food); 6,500 Miskitos affected by heavy rains that flooded crops and houses along the Prinzapolka river on the Atlantic Coast; and the famine that affects 49 municipalities or 600,000 people (LPG, 4/08/2001).
The case of Nicaragua is quite relevant from both a circumstantial and structural analysis. Specifically speaking, it is quite interesting that Arnoldo Alemán, president of Nicaragua, did not declare a state of emergency but instead publicly stated that "there is no famine here" (LPG, 3/08/2001). There could be three reasons behind such an arbitrary and uncompassionate decision: The first reason is that by declaring a state of emergency the Nicaraguan government - one of the most corrupt in Latin America - would be responsible for administering the aid which would reveal their lack of organization, efficiency, and transparency as such was the case with hurricane Mitch. The second reason has to do with the next elections. By declaring a state of emergency many NGOs would receive direct aid from their counterparts in the exterior and President Alemán thinks that this aid could be utilized by the Sandanistas to persuade votes. Alemán himself has ironically pointed out that the famine had hit only Sandanista municipalities, arguing that God doesn't like Sandanista mayors (LPG, 3/08/2001). The third reason is simple; President Alemán doesn't really care about the people but rather only cares about his own economic interests. Ulrich Epperlein tells us that the last reason is a general opinion shared by most Nicaraguans (Interview with Ulrich Epperlein, Lutheran pastor that resides on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua). That makes Arnoldo Alemán one of the most recalcitrant presidents that Central America has known, but he's not the only one.
A structural analysis presents a more serious matter, not only in the case of Nicaragua but also for the whole region. Many years ago Nicaragua was called "the granary of Central America" and was used as a "barn" of reserves for the rest of Central America. What happened to the granary of Central America that makes it now a land of famine? If we abstract the Nicaraguan reality, only for pure analytical exercise, and we leave aside their physical vulnerability (earthquakes, monsoons, hurricanes, floods, and droughts) and their social vulnerability (a liberation war and a later self-defense against the contras who were deliberately financed by the United States) could we formulate a relationship between agricultural activity and neoliberal globalization? What does the relationship consist of? For example, if we would imagine, in Nicaragua, the best president possible, the ideal, could he/she raise the Nicaraguan economy, principally agricultural, and at the same time take part in the current process of globalization? Never, because neoliberal globalization presupposes profits in the shortest time possible with such a clear disregard of the environment that Salvador Arias Peñate says, "in regard to the environment all market logic is intrinsically an extracting logic of destruction and contamination as the result of maximizing profits in the shortest time period possible" (in "El desarrollo humano sostenible: un reto social, ecológico, político y económico para la sociedad salvadoreña" PRODERE-EL SALVADOR, mayo 1995). This is obviously because even in industrialized countries such as the United States and Canada the agricultural sector, whose production is industrialized, is a subsidized sector. Therefore, it is a lie that the invisible hand of he market regulates the economy, especially in these countries, which are particularly agricultural. Principally this is the case in Honduras and Nicaragua, not to mention the entire region. Guatemala and Costa Rica are partially saved due to the diversification of agriculture and tourism. El Salvador is also saved in some manner but because of family remittances, fruit of emigrating human capital. The principal factor in the Salvadoran economy is the exportation of labor with the benefit of being "competitive labor" (which means to say very hard workers).
The crises in Argentina is another reason to demystify the false presumptions which neoliberal globalization bases itself on, especially the myth of invisible market regulation and the benefits of wild speculation. The crisis in Argentina manifests something elementary: a country that does not produce will economically succumb. It is the same thesis that Carl Marx brilliantly coined and it continues to be accurate due to the adaptability of capitalism: without production there is no economic advance.
Let's turn our analysis on El Salvador. To start with there are irregularities in the sources of information. For example, according to Graciela Colunga of the Foundation for Cooperation and Development of Rural Communities (CORDES), once again the department of Chalatenango - a department where 60% of the families are farmers and where they have reported 50% of their crop lost, denounced being left out of the MAG (Ministry of Agriculture) estimations. A similar situation occurred during Mitch. Another example is the numeric game between the MAG, the central government and WFP. On August 2, the MAG reported 37,000 families affected in 44 municipalities in the eastern part of the country; six days later the central government only recognized 12,000 families; on August 10, the WFP pointed out that there are 40,000 families affected, about 200,000 people111 LPG 2/08/2001; LPG 8/08/2001; y LPG 10/08/2001, respectivamente.1. It is a numbers game that in the case of the MAG excludes 3,000 families (15,000 people), while the central government excludes 28,000 families (140,000 Salvadorans).
This numeric difference is not casual nor is it the product of an administrative inefficiency, but rather it intentionally responds to the logic of down-playing the situation and giving immediate solutions in order to cover up the situation. The reality is that the central government, once again, is not interested the primary sector of the economy, agriculture. In this manner the Emergency Plan adopted by the government to resolve the agricultural crises (distribution of seeds, restructuring the debts, and nutrition in critical areas) is no more than a farce that provokes laughter and sadness at the same time. Furthermore, this "plan" is financed primarily by CENTA (National Center of Agricultural Technology) and the United Nation's Fund For Nutrition. Each one of these organizations is funding 40% of the "plan" and the MAG-central government only contributes the remaining 20%.
In El Salvador, there is talk of a recognized agricultural collapse (LPG, 7/08/20012). Official sources such as the MAG documented $290 million dollars of agricultural losses due to the first earthquake and $6.3 million due to the second. Since July 6, there has been $157 million dollars of losses in the coffee sector alone. The real effects of the drought will not be known until October when it will be known who has replanted and who has not. Camagro points out that there is a lack of a much-needed long-term plan, the lack of which is one of the reasons for the loss of profitability of the sector (LPG, 16/08/20013). The lack of such a long-term plan is evident in the evolution of the agricultural GDP (LPG 16/08/2001).
A more profound analysis of the agricultural collapse shows what place the sector has in the Salvadoran economy, not only regarding the lack of profitability in macroeconomic terms, but above all, it points out the social and vocation background to which it pertains. As Camagro points out, the lack of profitability of the sector is due to the fact that the government does not pay any attention to the sector and consequently there is a lack of agricultural activity (Cf. Aquiles Montoya, La realidad agraria en El Salvador de fines de siglo, In: Rafael Guido Béjar/Stefan Roggenbuck (eds.), El Salvador a fin de siglo, Konrad-Adenauer/UCA, San Salvador 1995. pp. 89-1354). But if the reality of the agricultural sector doesn't say anything to this government that only looks towards neoliberal globalization (which we affirmed only uses the natural resources in a pragmatic and immediate manner, looking for the maximization of profits in the shortest time period possible) it does have a lot to explain to the 52.3% of the rural population - 66.8% of which is economically active (Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples, citado en Aquiles Montoya, Op Cit, p. 1265) and such activity represents 61.7% of the basic rural food basket (Miplan 1996, citado en Aquiles Montoya, Op. Cit. p. 129). To be more critical, such activity only represents 14.7% of the monthly market basket (Montesino, M. y Góchez, R., Política Salarial y Productividad en El Salvador, citado en Aquiles Montoya, Op. Cit. p. 128). Of course this data is within a context of "normal" behavior. The situation becomes worse when nature is added to the socio- historic reality (lack of political interest, irresponsibility towards the environment, deforestation, contamination etc.) which is to say that when events such as Mitch, the earthquakes, the floods, the droughts, take place they cause great deficit in the pockets of the farmers. The WFP points out that the drought "has affected the poor whose crops are of a subsistence nature and their plots are only about an acre" (LPG, 10/08/20018). For example, a farmer that planted 2 acres of corn lost 840 colones in 4 sacks of fertilizer and 360 in poison against plagues did not harvest anything (EDH 22/07/2001). Another farmer invested ¢1,000 colones in planting an acre, hoping to obtain 13 sacks at ¢200 colones each one which would be a net gain of ¢1,600 colones, did not harvest anything either (LPG 7/08/2001). Yet another farmer invested ¢8,000 colones in planting two and a half acres expecting a profit of ¢6,000 colones and due to the drought only obtained a profit of ¢3,500 (LPG 7/08/2001). The average investment for each acre is between ¢2,000 and ¢ 2,500 colones, which is money that in converted into debt of the harvest is lost (US$1 = ¢8.75).
There is also to consider the type of land that El Salvador has. Aquiles Montoya points out: "From a natural perspective El Salvador has been very generous given that the land not apt for agricultural or forestall purposes only represents 5.79% of the national territory. Had we used the land in a rational manner with long-term vision we would have had resources for many, many years. Instead, in a little less than a century we have caused more destruction than any other time in the history of our land" (Aquiles Montoya, Op. Cit., p. 99.9). Much land that is apt for foresting is used for agriculture, cattle raising, or it simply isn't used because it is much too eroded. Land that is apt for agriculture is used for cattle raising and other non- agricultural uses. 80% of the natural vegetation of El Salvador has been eliminated. Furthermore, El Salvador has only 2% of its natural forests. According the to the OAS, 77% of the country has been seriously affected by erosion. The annual deforestation rate is estimated at about 4,500 hectares. Of the land apt for foresting there is only a miserable 14% remaining (Aquiles Montoya, Op. Cit., p. 97 y 100). What does the central government say about all of this?
In conclusion, the drama of the drought is something more than an isolated natural event. First, the neoliberal governments have not taken care of the agricultural sector. And second, there is no sign from the government of an agricultural reactivation. There is no hopeful plan or action for the rural population of the country. On the contrary, there is evidence that there are no doors or windows in the globalization for this poor sector of impoverished Central America.
The first rains fell on May 13. Ten days later it stopped raining. On that day Central America was not thinking about how long the "drought" was going to last. The next time it rained was on August 21, 91 days later and as a result of hurricane Chantal that hit the south of Mexico. In addition to causing a 50% loss in the harvests, the drought has caused: debts in the pockets of farmers; hunger for 1.4 million and malnutrition for half a million Central Americans (as a result minors suffer stunting of physical and mental growth which then affects their possibilities at economic activity); a 23.1% increase in the electric bills; a 90% increase in the price of basic grains; ¢9 million colones in losses in the cattle sector and a 10% daily reduction of the production of milk (50,000 liters a day); and at least eleven deaths in Nicaragua and six in Honduras. The WFP argues that they have the capacity to cover only 405,000 of the 1.4 million for a month and that would include taking resources from other projects. According to the WFP they need an additional $7.5 million dollars in order to meet the demand. Meanwhile, the donor countries (US and Japan) play deaf to the call and the expected drought of 2002.
Flores in the G-8: Globalization, a Natural Process?
The presence of President Francisco Flores in the meeting with the seven most powerful countries of the world, plus Russia, (the G-8) has come to fortify our appraisal of his ideological position and his manner of thinking. The arguments that sustain the thesis of a blind insertion into the globalization are simply laughable and ethically incorrect. In the first place, Flores has been saying that the globalization is something that escapes the decision making process and something natural and irreversible; the only thing he hasn't said is that it is a natural event such as an earthquake or hurricane. And how incorrect it is because globalization is precisely in the hands of the powerful statesmen of the G-8. Furthermore, such "leaders" have to be constantly meeting to define the destiny and type of globalization they want. Let's be clear, (neoliberal) globalization is not a natural process that is imposed in spite of human decisions. On the contrary, it is a historic reality that depends on many factors. Above all it depends on those that have the political, military and economic power to make the decisions. And in the world, it is clear that these seven countries (United States, Germany, England, France, Italy, Canada and Japan), that make only 15% of the world's population possess 50% of the world's wealth, are those that have such power. For that reason the "globalization" is in fact the "globalization" that these powerful neoliberal executives want. And Francisco Flores has not made any difference but rather he has religiously contributed to the discourse of privatization, market liberalization and free trade agreements.
It is a lie that at the meeting in Genoa the world's powerful "leaders" were going to listen to the poor countries and it is more ridiculous to think that they would truly open the summit to the poor countries. Condoning the external debt of the highly indebted countries and the creation of a World Fund for AIDS and Health (estimated at $1.2 billion dollars) received little consideration in comparison to the issues of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (which Bush opposes), the US proposals of developing a missile "defense" system in Europe and intervention in region conflicts such as the Balkans and the Middle East. However the principal worry of the G-8 was the destiny of the world economy and the crises in Argentina and Turkey. Actually the United States, Germany and Japan, three of the biggest economies in the world, are experiencing a prolonged deceleration. In fact, the world economic growth rate is estimated to be around 5% this year when in 2000 it was 13% (Proceso 961, 25/07/2001). For many, it is far too optimist to say that the United States will grow 2.5% (LPG, 27/07/20012).
So then, what was Flores doing in the G-8 meeting? In theory you could say that Flores had been invited to the G-8 meeting because President Bush, Prime Minister Blaire, Berlusconi and the Prime Minister of Japan "are convinced that El Salvador is one of the few models of how a country can be successful" and that "El Salvador can be one of the few examples in the world of how to carry out a model of liberty (neoliberal) at the same time as combating poverty" as Flores says himself (EDH, 23/07/2001). Our parenthesis: when Flores speaks of liberty he apparently is referring to the neoliberal model. 3. Unfortunately the reality is far from that discourse. In reality Flores had been invited to the G-8 solely because of his neoliberal conviction which he has defended time and again at the international encounters. But what Flores forgets in his discourse and his conviction is the crudeness with which the daily lives of Salvadorans are crushed. In El Salvador a real model of development doesn't exist, much less a plan to combat poverty. The past earthquakes confirm it: they were utilized to present a false image, throw out invented numbers and beautiful words, and hide the center of a centralized response. In effect, the country has been divided between those departments with greater development and those where survival is a bitter struggle. The earthquakes aggravated this situation even further. The recent UNDP report on human development in El Salvador states the same and adds that the presence of disparities explains the fact that El Salvador continues to present one of the highest levels of inequality in the world: in 1999, the richest 20% received 56.2% of the country's income while the poorest 50% only received 16.4% (Informe de Desarrollo Humano para El Salvador 2000, citado en Proceso 961, 25/07/2001). The intrinsic reality of El Salvador simply an accurate reflection of the globalization: wealth at the cost of social and economic exclusion. We can conclude that El Salvador will play an ambiguous role in the process of globalization: it will go with a triumphant financial and business sector (until the wealthy of other countries don't wipe them out) while in the backyard the crude reality of exclusion and inequality is hidden; in other words globalization in El Salvador will be the globalization that benefits the rich and powerful of El Salvador, and it will not be the globalization of hope which could help rebuild the impoverished lands.
Daboub's Worries
Juan José Daboub, the right hand man of President Flores, arrived at the head of the Ministry of Finances in June of this year with the intention of saving the public finances. Since the beginning changes were hoped for, but changes based on precise analysis and equitable policies. The government wanted changes that would balance the difficult financial situation, which started in 1996. The fiscal deficit in relation to the GDP has evolved in the following manner: -1.8% in 1997; -2.5% in 1998; -2.8 in 1999 and an alarming -3% in 2000. In 2001, a -5.0% deficit is expected. Facing this situation, the first thing the Daboub announced was his plan of modernizing the State. Such plan ambiguously dances between being a stronger State and at times a weaker State.
The reduction of the State referred to by Daboub consists of axing that "expensive bureaucratic weight" of institutions that offer social services, such as: the Salvadoran Institute for the Development of Women, Social Investment Fund for Local Development, National Pension Institute of Public Workers, Salvadoran Institute of Municipal Development, Superior Council of Public Health, Salvadoran Institute of Agricultural Facilitation, Salvadoran Institute of Professional Training, Executive Committee of the International Center of El Salvador, Salvadoran Institute of Tourism, National Registering Center, and the Salvadoran Institute of Agricultural Transformation. All of which were classified as "white elephants". We agree that many of these institutes should better their service, but the problem of institutional reorganization is the excuse in order to reduce the social responsibilities of the State. Such institutes are investment in the quality of life and therefore it is an erroneous argument to expect "profits" from these state institutions that are of a social investment nature, such as is the case with the Ministries of Health and Education.
Another of Daboub's initiatives is the plan to cut current spending by 15%. He initially asked this from all ministries, alleging that current spending represents between 63% and 75% of the budget. The ministers rejected the plan and after which Daboub retracted saying that his solicitation had been made without a previous diagnosis. Daboub said he would be flexible and accept budget reductions between 4% and 15%. President Flores supported the "austerity" measure with a firm hand. Once again there was Daboub was being ambiguous saying that the objective of the austerity plan was to prioritize social investment - but how can you achieve that by weakening social institutions?
With a tax system that receives 70% of its income base from the Value Added Tax (IVA), which is to say it comes from the final consumer, the only correct thing that Daboub could do is revise the entire system. Such a revision would include correcting the Christiani reform, which notably reduced the rent tax for businesses, eliminated tax on exportations, drastically reduced the tax on imports, eliminated the tax on inheritances and created the IVA. The last five years have demonstrated that the fiscal policies of ARENA have drastically failed. Meanwhile the current ARENA government is intending to shift even more responsibility on the population with the creation of the Simplified Tax on the informal sector (the poor that sell in the parks and plazas) without touching private business or transnational corporations.
The Reality of Emigration (Some Statistics)
Since the beginning of the 1980s the emigration to the United States has converted into an alternative to the harsh reality of thousands of Salvadoran families. The Salvadoran economy has been saved and stays afloat thanks to the family remittance sent by Salvadorans in the exterior. However, with emigration the social fabric has began to unravel and at the same time it has began to create a new culture of diverse shades. Those that achieve arrival and employment in the United States begin sending economic remittances and also cultural remittances (new forms of expression, different ways of thinking, and different parameters of life etc.). Many don't make it, and if they don't die on the way, they are deported. We write the following with much compassion for the emigrating compañer@s.
The emigrants
During the last five years the number of those immigrating to the United States has increased. In north triangle of Central America, the situation is similar. Honduras leads, followed by El Salvador, and then Guatemala. In 2000, there were 8,026 emigrants from El Salvador to the United States. (Note: the majority of Nicaraguans immigrate to Costa Rica. There are 800,000 Nicaraguans in Costa Rica, a country with only a little more than 3.5 million habitants.)
Looking for better living and working conditions, thousands of poor people leave their homes in search for the "American dream". You could almost say that there is no Salvadoran that doesn't have family in the United States. Which refers not only to the extremely poor families, but also to many families of the middle class whom are also obliged to emigrate. (There is also the case of the extremely rich who prefer to exploit the country as much as possible, which is the reason why conditions are so unbearable for the rest of the inhabitants, while living in the US). Unfortunately, there is no data on the flight of professional human capital, but according to CID-Gallup, 46% of all Salvadorans have a desire to emigrate from the country and according to the IUDOP it is 20%.
The challenge of emigration is very risky. So far this year the US Border Patrol has captured more than 8,000 Salvadorans that crossed the border illegally. And during the last month of May, more than 350 immigrants have died from heat and dehydration trying to cross the Mexican/US border. Temperatures in the desert can rise between 40 and 50 °C. On another occasion, coyotes in the county of Yuma, Arizona abandoned 28 immigrants (EDH, 11/06/20017).
The coyote's business
The history of the coyotes is more than two decades long and the mechanisms have changed an infinity of times. For example at the beginning of July a trailer containing 100 undocumented emigrants was detained in Tapachula. Inside there were 79 Salvadorans, 15 Guatemalans, and 6 Chinese. Each one of the Central Americans reported having paid $6,000 dollars while the Asians paid $10,000 (EDH, 5/07/2001). Other sources claim that coyotes charge between $1,000 and $1,500 dollars just to pass undocumented immigrants from Mexico to the United States while Central Americans have to pay around $4,000 dollars (LPG, 12/07/2001). There are no exact statistics, but from the contacts we have in the communities, we know that the prices and "payment plans" vary depending on the coyote and the "security" of the trip. For example, two young men from Nueva Trinidad, (a municipality in Chalatenango) had to pay ¢80,000 colones (US$9,142) in two parts, one in El Salvador and the other payment upon arrival in the United States. Their hope is that their family members in the United States would pay. However, if they didn't arrive in the United States the first payment would be lost to the coyotes. In addition to the risks at the border and with the immigration authorities, the emigrants are subject to the natural elements and hostilities of the coyotes: the emigrants are treated like merchandise, sometimes the coyotes kidnap the emigrants until the debt is paid; on other occasions some coyotes steal the clients of other coyotes; there are cases of theft, rape and other abuses inflicted upon the emigrants (committed by coyotes and US and Mexican authorities). In July, "The Washington Post" revealed that the Mexican police also were involved with the coyotes. Víctor Manuel Guerrero, who was captured four months ago, revealed information about mechanisms, photographs, names and telephone numbers of those police and coyotes involved in a vast network of corruption from Veracruz. The network let 30 - 60 immigrants pass each day, or in other words, between 11,000 and 22,000 undocumented immigrants a year (LPG, 6/07/20010).
The deported
I
n the first four months of 2001, the United States deported 94,786 Mexicans and 53, 800 Central Americans: 23,222 Guatemalans; 15,497 Hondurans; 14,401 Salvadorans; 674 Nicaraguans; 51 Costa Ricans and one Panamanian. In mid-July joint operations between the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala detained, only on the Guatemalan-Mexican border, 3,666 undocumented emigrants: 1,642 Salvadorans, 1,777 Hondurans, 98 Nicaraguans; the rest of were from Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, India, Nigeria, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Syria, China and Mexico. In addition, they captured 78 coyotes (LPG, 29/06/2001).The United States, under the program Crossroads International and in collaboration with a dozen of Central American, South American, and Caribbean countries, is dedicated to detaining undocumented emigrants at the various departure points. The program has a budget of $620,000 dollars in comparison to the $30,000,000 dollars it would have cost to deport (LPG, 28/06/2001).
El Salvador has not been left out of this operation. On July 3, the border's division of the National Civilian Police (PNC) captured 29 Ecuadorians without documents, among them 6 women. During this year, over 3,000 undocumented immigrants have been detained in El Salvador: 2,212 Hondurans; 636 Ecuadorians; 293 Nicaraguans and 127 Peruvians. $360,000 dollars was spent in airline tickets to return to the emigrants to the respective countries. In addition, Mexico has captured 100,000 undocumented emigrants in the first trimester of the year. Mexican authorities have pointed to an alarming increase, in all of 2000 they captured 150,000 undocumented immigrants and only in the first three months of this year they captured 100,000 (LPG, 12/07/2001).
One of the complaints of the US government is that the undocumented immigrants are criminals. In El Salvador, a study conducted by FESPAD (Applicability of Law Studies Foundation) and the "Welcome Home" program revealed that many of the illegal acts cited in the US legislation do not have their equivalent counter-part in the Salvadoran legislation. According to the study, of the 2,915 deportation cases due to committing an offense, 75% had not committed a serious offense, 4.6% committed a misdemeanor, 5.1% minor offense, 1.6% serious offense and 14% committed serious crime. Furthermore, of the 8,444 deported Salvadorans that the Welcome Home program attended to since 1999, 7% had a few days of being in the US, 40% had less than five years, 21% had between 5-10 years, 27% between 10-20 years and 20% over 20 years (LPG, Departamento 15, 5/07/2001).
United States Policy
First, let's look at the new configuration of the US population. According to the census, the Hispanic population increased by 50% since 1990, becoming to represent an important economic, consumer and electoral potential.
Meanwhile, the US congress is not offering a new amnesty law similar to that of 1986 when more than three million undocumented immigrants obtained US residence. However, they are thinking about a series of reforms to the NACARA law. Under this law, 75,000 Salvadorans have applied for permanent residency in the United States and another 150,000 could be benefited (LPG, 16/07/2001). In the same manner, the Temporary Protection Status could benefit 107,000 Hondurans and 300,000 Salvadorans. Already, in the March 9 - July 9 period, 217,000 Salvadorans have applied for the TPS status (LPG, 23/07/2001).
If illegal immigration is a business for the coyotes, in the same way, legal immigration is a business for the United States Embassy. The consulate says to process 200,000 applications for tourist visas in one year. Each day 800 people apply for these visas (LPG, 23/07/2001). The procedure includes a payment of US$45.00 just to apply for the tourist visa and even if one meets the economic, work, and study requirements, the visa is not guaranteed. Many people apply three or four times before receiving the visa. If we multiply $45 dollars by 800 people, we get a total of $36,000 each day, just in tourist visa applications.
As we have said in other bulletins, the United States is involved in free transit of merchandise in the mesoamerican region, however, they do not allow the free travel of people. In this regard, they use a clear policy of militarization and control over the countries south of its border (the International Crossroads program) in such a way so as to minimize deportation costs (shifting this cost to the country where the undocumented emigrant is captured), utilize the police forces of other countries, and maintain a strategic military domination by using the discourse of fighting drugs and illegal immigration.
If the neoliberal policies are not substituted for policies that include the most marginalized population, like the farmers and the informal sector, the tendency to emigrate from the south to the north will continue to increase.