“Coffee” Crisis in El Salvador

 

Coffee, the most prominent crop of El Salvador for the last 150 years, is in a severe structural crisis.  However, this statement along with the title could be deceiving, hence the quotation marks - because coffee in itself is not in crisis, it is growing fine.  In fact, too much of it is growing. The real crises is yet another economic and social crisis produced by the neoliberal export model.  The crisis is hard to ignore. The current international market price for coffee is around US $50 dollars per quintal.  According to Salvadoran plantation owners the cost of production runs between US $60 and $80 dollars per quintal.[1]  As a result, the region has lost an income of US $1.5 billion dollars.[2]  Consequently, plantation owners have eliminated 21% of the temporary jobs and 54% of the permanent jobs.[3]  There has also been a reduction of 18.3% in the value of salaries paid to the pickers in addition to the coffee plantation owners offering coffee pickers payment in kind.[4]

 

However, superficially trying “fix” the crisis of the capitalist cash-crop export based economy is still not a beneficial solution for the majority of the Salvadoran population.  For even during coffee’s heyday as the primary export cash crop, which was the “backbone” of the Salvadoran economy, the reality for the majority of Salvadorans was horrific, even when market prices were high. Throughout the past century the life of the rural coffee picker was characterized by poverty, hunger, and a lack of education, healthcare, potable water, and electricity.  The modes of production and division of labor concentrated land and produced a vicious oligarchy, which protected their interests from the exploited majority with repression.  In addition, the cash crop export-based economy has always been vulnerable to the abrupt fluctuations of the market.  After the rural peasantry had been stripped of their land in a process which started in February 1881, the Great Depression caused prices to fall dramatically and  peasants even lost their right to work – even if it was for wages and conditions that kept them in misery.  There was no other option.  This situation was one of the major factors that gave rise to the peasant uprising of 1932.  

 

Recently, coffee plantation owners paid US $ 0.70 per 25 pound bag collected. The average worker collected about 5 of these bags, making an average daily income of US$3.50 - when there is work, which is on average only 5 months of the year (the lack of other opportunities during the “off season” is another result of the cash crop export model since the local economy and agriculture in general are not developed).  As a result, the overwhelming majority of the rural population is  locked into a poverty that violates its basic human rights.  This said, the coffee sector still does give employment to 2 million people in the region and an abrupt end to this employment would cause a even more horrific situation for the coffee pickers given it is the only sure source of income for this population.  It would also have serious consequences on the economy in general, starting a chain reaction of negative effects.

 

The over saturation of coffee in the international market is due to three principal reasons, which have their base in the neoliberal “model”.  First, in 1989 the fixed system of export quotas created by the International Coffee Organization (ICO) was terminated.  Second, the U.S. abandonment of  the ICO also contributed to falling coffee prices and the expansion of production.  Third, the World Bank/IMF advised and financially supported Vietnam to become a coffee export, which contributed to the over saturation of the market. 

 

The response of the international financial institutions has been to deny their role in the coffee crisis.  In the first week of April 2002 the World Bank, the Multilateral Investment Bank and the U.S. Agency of International Development (AID) held a conference in Antigua, Guatemala to analyze the “coffee problem”.  At the conference, the coffee producers proposed the creation of a “stabilizing fund” intended to stabilize international prices.  The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and AID rejected such an intervention in the “free” market.  The institutions stated, in summary, they have never financed such an initiative and they will not start now either.[5] 

 

The solution proposed by the international financial institutions was to largely forget about coffee (only concentrate on gourmet coffee) and concentrate on exporting other products.  There are several problems with this “solution”.  First, gourmet coffee only grows in high altitudes and only constitutes 10% of El Salvador’s production.[6]  Second, the problem is not superficial but rather structural - the crisis could take 5-8 years to overcome, which means a simple conversion over to the production of fruit (which is what the institutions suggested) in itself will not solve the immediate crises given that it takes 3-5 years to reap the profits of fruit production.[7]  In addition, AID has only offered US $6 million dollars to Central America and the Dominican Republic for the conversion project.  Roberto Inclán, President of Asociación Cafetalera, put it quite simply, “Six million for the whole region…is not enough.”[8]

 

Given the mess that the government’s economic “model” has created, the immediate crisis is no small matter to overcome.  Granted, it is not the early 30s and El Salvador is not as totally dependent on coffee as it was during this era.  Still, over 2 million Central Americans make their living from coffee and one would think the Salvadoran governments would have learned their lesson that when you abrubtly take away the sole source of employment for a large portion of the population it causes severe social and economic crisis.  Sharply increased unemployment would also mean a decline in local spending which could trigger another chain of economic problems. 

 

However, the current ARENA government appears to care less about the agricultural sector.  As the University of Central America points out, “...the last two governments – despite their rhetoric – have not implemented reactivation plans for the agricultural sector, but rather, on the contrary their policies have favored urban activities and marginalized rural ones..."  In addition to marganilizing rural activities, ..."the policies of commercial liberalization have created conditions so that in El Salvador the new insertion in the world economy is based on the expulsion of the labor force to the United States and the reorientation of the export economy in function of the textile maquila and not in the agricultural or manufacturing exports.”[9] 

 

There are several lessons that can be learned from the “coffee crises”.  One, the “free” market is not in fact free.  Second, neoliberal, “free-trade” export model based on the market is not a sustainable economic path.  Last, it is precisely this model that must be replaced in order to avoid such crises, which is a responsibility of all governments, (the protection against unemployment is a human right established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and given that even when “times are good” for the owners, the majority are prohibited from fulfilling their most basic human rights such as the right to remuneration which assures human dignity, the right to health care, proper nourishment, clothing, housing, social services, in addition to security in case of disability, becoming too elderly to work, etc.[10]

 

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The Coup in Venezuela and the Response of El Salvador

 

What was the response of the Salvadoran government to the recent failed coup in Venezuela?  What was the response of the opposition?  What is the significance of their responses?  Before we answer these questions, given the corporate media’s role in the coup, it is necessary to give a brief overview of a more accurate sequence of the events than what has generally been given to date. 

 

Reasons For the Coup

 

Why was there a coup attempt carried out against Hugo Chávez?  The corporate media tell us because he is an “undemocratic and unpopular dictator” that rules “unsuccessfully”.  With half an effort at a closer look these excuses fall quite short of  reality.  First, Chávez was a democratically elected president who won with 60% of the vote.  Second, the majority of the Venezuelan population showed themselves to be dedicated to the social-economic project of the Chávez government, as represented in the new political constitution, which was approved by national referendum.  Third, the Chávez government has made successful gains in favor of the poor majority of Venezuelans.  The Chávez government has lowered unemployment from 18% to 13%.  In the past two years Venezuela advanced four places on the UN Human Development Index.  The number of children in school has increased by 25% and infant mortality has fallen.  The questions are then: With whom is Chávez unsuccessful? With whom is he unpopular?  What are the real reasons behind the coup?

 

The two “civil society” groups that organized the protests against the Chávez government are Fedecamaras and the CTV.  Fedecamaras is the national association of business owners, which is the Venezuelan equivalent of the Salvadoran ANEP (National Association of Private Enterprise).[11]  The CTV, the trade union federation, “has traditionally been an organ of the Democratic Action party, one of the two parties of the traditional Venezuelan elite.”[12]  The United States has poured, through the National Endowment for Democracy, hundreds of thousands of dollars into anti-Chávez organizations such as the CTV.[13]  In fact, the CTV has generally sided with the elite, as it did when the CTV leaders were among the first to condemn the Chávez government’s oil deal with Cuba. 

 

What did Chávez do to become so unpopular within the national elite and the U.S. elite as represented by the U.S. government?  Chávez’s crime was launching a series of social reforms passed through the national assembly: micro-credit for small business, constructing schools in forgotten neighborhoods, projects to aid indigenous people, improvements to the country’s infrastructure outside of Caracas, housing projects, etc.[14] However, his two biggest crimes were passing a law which ordered big plantation owners to turn over uncultivated land to the landless, and increasing royalties for extracting Venezuelan oil from 16% to 30%.  Some of the Chávez government’s other deeds include: maintaining good relations with Cuba and selling them oil at a fair price; condemning the US attack on Afghanistan, demanding an end to the “slaughter of innocents”; staying out of Washington’s intervention in Colombia; and promoting a regional economic bloc and uniting Latin American oil operations so as to free themselves, and the region, from US economic dominance.  With these measures, which are termed the Bolivarian Revolution (inspired after Simón Bolivar and his unifying vision for Latin America), Chávez has gained the support of much of the poor and working class while from the Venezuelan and U.S. elite has provoked fury, a public relations campaign against him, and eventually a coup attempt.

 

The Coup Strategy and a More Accurate Account of the Events

 

As Marcos Roitman Rosenmann, Professor at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, has outlined in his article entitled, “El lenguaje de la desestabilización” (The Language of Destabalization), the gains made in favor of the poor majority of Venezuela and the democratic process underway (This process is symbolized by Chávez winning the elections with 60% of the vote, his popular consultations, the impressive endorsement of the new socio-economic project designed in the new political constitution which was approved by 88% of the Venezuelans in referendum, and finally the mass popular uprising which helped restore Chávez to power.) required a strategy by the elite to restore power back into traditional hands and re-condition the masses back into apathy and uninterest for politics.  The calculated and well-planned strategy started with a media campaign designed to deligitimize and destabilize a democratically elected president.  The national and international corporate media started with “…the construction of a prototype personality, character, and political ideology from which to interpretate the life and work of Hugo Chávez Frías.”  The goal was to create a “generalized ill will” within the international political community towards Chávez.  They created a figure that is crazy, far from understanding international events, irreverent, authoritarian, populist, egocentric, messianic etc.  After creating that figure, Chávez’s political actions and policies were presented “…as part of an absurdity anchored in invalid and outdated principles, the results of which can only be bankruptcy, discredit, and the loss of confidence in the country by the international community."  So then, if the stereotype of Chávez is a crazy dictator then in times of "democracy"  the ousting of such a dictator is seen as a democratic process.  “The idea is to present the military coup as a product of an exacerbated conflict motivated by the arbitrary character of decision making by an 'enlightened' president who has no contact with reality and where, as a result, the entire society rises up against him.  There is no turning back. The fall of the dictator is necessary and asked for by the 'most noble' of the Venezuelan society."

 

After the plan was in motion, there was no turning back and on 9 April the Venezuelan elite, with the advising and help of the US, launched the first action of the coup plan.  Chávez, with clarity, denounced the coming events, “The April 9 general strike was only a stage in the great North American offensive against me and against the Bolivarian revolution.  And they will keep concocting any number of things…”[15]  Despite the corporate media’s depiction of the strike, the reality was different, as independent media pointed out, “In the downtown area and western district of the capital, generally poorer than the east, business continued almost as normal with most people ignoring the strike call.  Traffic jammed the streets as usual and most shops opened.”[16] 

 

The next stage of the coup plot was to provoke violence and disorder so as to then “establish” order by ousting the fabricated initiator: Chávez.  The anti-Chávez group directed itself towards the presidential palace to initiate violence.  The media attempted to egg on the manufactured coup by reporting, as did CNN and the New York Times, that “Chávez ordered soldiers to fire on a crowd”.  However, eyewitnesses reported otherwise, in fact,  “…Eyewitnesses without ties to any faction who said the shooting began from a roadway overpass controlled by the anti-Chávez Metropolitan Police, and the first to fall were pro-Chávez demonstrators.”[17]  Sharpshooters fired into the pro-Chávez crowd killing the first two victims.  The majority of those killed, and the overwhelmingly number of those injured were in fact Chávez supporters. 

 

After the media collaborated in manufacturing this event and the US Navy jammed communications between Venezuela and those countries which supported Chávez, a group of military officers and other coup leaders captured Chávez and took him to Fuerte Tiuna military headquarters.  The coup executioners began rounding up pro- Chávez government officials and Chávez supporters in general.  The coup leaders tried to force Chávez into renouncing as President of Venezuela.  After Chávez repeatedly refused and pro-Chávez masses began to organize, the coup leaders decided to fabricate Chávez’s resignation.  Chávez's refusal to resign and the dissolving of the Assembly proved to be two points of division among the coup forces.

 

International and national media towed the line of the coup leaders that Chávez had resigned without asking for any proof and consequently the world was deceitfully informed that Chávez had resigned.  Chávez managed to sneak out, reportedly through the trash, a hand-written note in which he stated that he had not renounced.  Within hours of his capture, the pro-Chávez masses began to organize throughout the country. 

 

Response of the Masses

 

The international corporate media’s creation of an unpopular and authoritarian Chávez backfired as mass mobilizing restored Chávez to power.  An estimated 2 million people mobilized throughout the country and some 200,000 descended upon the presidential palace to demand his return.  Even some of the conservative media was forced to admit the farce, “The interm president Pedro Carmona resigned yesterday, the day after he had took power, in face of the protests of thousands of supporters of the ousted President Chávez.”[18]  There could be no greater demonstration of democratic support for Chávez than the mass uprising of people to reinstall their president in the face of an international campaign by the wealthiest and most powerful (in terms of military and control of information) owners of the means of production. 

 

Role of the United States Government

 

The United States once again aided a coup to overthrow a democratically elected president in Latin America.[19]  On 16 April, the Bush administration admitted that Otto Reich[20], Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, had contact with the coup leaders, but denied that it supported or aided the coup.  Reich stated that he had only advised the coup leaders not to dissolve the Assembly so as to facilitate U.S. support of the interim government, which furthered the appearance that he was “stage-managing the takeover”.  In reference to the coup, Bush stated “It is very important that President Chávez does what he said he was going to do to address the causes (of the coup)…”  He added, “And if there is a lesson to learn, it is important that he (Chávez) learns it.”  As stated above, the causes for the coup are obvious (after a closer examination of the media’s propaganda): the Chávez government attempted to act justly by redistributing the unused land of the Venezuelan elite to the landless and by increasing royalties for extracting Venezuelan oil in order to use the increased revenue for social programs.  So, the “lesson to be learned” is not to mess with private U.S. oil company profits. The Venezuelan government has also declared that it has found documents of the “Plan Boca Raton” which outlined the use of U.S. planes and helicopters in the coup operation.  A 15 April Reuters report documented Chávez’s account of a U.S. civilian plane parked near the military headquarters where he was held.  Furthermore, The Guardian ran an article entitled “American Navy helped ‘Venezuelan Coup’” on 29 April, which detailed accusations made by a former U.S. intelligence officer and by Congressman Roger Rondon that the U.S. military and members of the Bush administration aided the coup in Venezuela.  According to comments made by ex-intelligence officer, Wayne Madsen, the U.S. assistant military attaché, now based in U.S. embassy in Caracas, had first went to Venezuela last June “to set the ground.” In addition, the U.S. Navy had helped in logistical operations.  The article also detailed Roger Rondon’s comments; Rondon declared that U.S. military officers had been at the Fuerte Tiuna military headquarters during the nights of April 11-12.  In reference to the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, Mr. Shapiro, Congressman Rondon stated that his “participation in the coup d’état was evident”. 

 

Reaction of the Salvadoran Government

 

The Salvadoran government once again demonstrated to the international community that it is one of the world’s most reactionary, conservative, and intolerable servers of big capital in the world.  The Flores government was the only government in the world to officially recognize the intern government.  Flores decision to recognize the government resulting from the failed coup attempt was particularly embarrassing since the Chávez government was the first to respond to the earthquakes that devastated El Salvador a little over a year ago.  The Chávez government sent aid and a brigade that rebuilt the entire town of Comasagua.  Even after the details of the coup had been released (and it was obvious that Chávez had not in fact resigned) and Chávez returned to power, Flores still refused to make an official apology, stating: “I have nothing to apologize for, our position is very clear.”[21]  Even in a poll conducted by the right-wing La Prensa Gráfica, when asked if the Salvadoran government did the right thing by recognizing the government of Pedro Carmona, 89% of the participants said no.[22]

 

Another noteworthy point is that in Congressman Rondon’s declarations he claimed that two foreign gunmen - one from the U.S. and one Salvadoran - were detained by Chávez security forces before the coup.  After the Carmona government took power, the two gunmen “were nowhere to be found” and presumably were given safe passage to leave the country.  Such claims are reminiscent of the history of right-wing Salvadoran and U.S. mercenary activities in many countries throughout Latin America.

 

Response of the FMLN

 

The FMLN immediately denounced the coup stating that it was another example of the sad historical fact that the majority of armed forces of Latin American have been instruments of big capital.[23]  The FMLN also recognized the important democratic and economic gains made by Chávez in favor of the poor majority.[24]  After Chávez returned to power, FMLN leaders traveled to Venezuela to talk with him, give their official support, and “regain the dignity of the people of El Salvador”.

 

What this Means For El Salvador

 

For the all those sympathetic to social change in El Salvador, international solidarity and the national social movement this should be a lesson that in order to maintain power, an organic tie between the FMLN and the masses is essential, given the hostile measures that will surely come.  A strong government committed to structural change is necessary and a holistic movement, containing both political and social arms, as one movement is needed.  The distinction between the two, in the context of El Salvador, aids the divide and conquer strategy of the elite.  For those involved in international solidarity this should be a lesson that the elite and big capital interests – represented by the local government along with the U.S. government - will use any and all measures to prohibit progressive governments from taking power, and if they do take power, they will use any and all measures to try to cripple and topple them. 

 

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Divisions in Arena

 

Internal political differences and fights for personal interests have been pulling apart the seams of the ARENA party over the past couple of months.  The internal fighting and differences have become so great that despite ARENA’s control of the media, the evidence and results of such internal fighting have become apparent to the public. 

 

The latest series of waves within ARENA started with Roberto Murray Meza, director of La Constancia (brewery and importer of all beer into E.S., president of Star Motors, CESSA – Salvadoran cement company -, among others), abruptly announced on 18 March that he was resigning as ARENA president after only six short months at the helm.  Meza was replaced by Archie Baldocchi, president of Banco Agricola.  Baldocchi is another extremely wealthy businessman, of the financial sector, who in the past was not a public political figure but rather stayed behind the scenes letting politicians represent his interests.  He has now come in to take directly the reigns of the party.  The public and even party members were surprised by this move, which reflects the authoritarian and undemocratic nature of the ARENA party.  Members of the political opposition suspect that Meza’s resignation is due to a combination of a dispute between Flores and Meza and the need to attend the family businesses.  Reportedly, the Meza family never supported Roberto taking on a public position within the party but rather, encouraged him to continue to operate the ship from behind the scenes and let others give their face to deal with the public debates, fights, and scandals.

 

One of the founders of the ARENA party, and ex-member of the League of ARENA Founders, Gloria Salguero-Gross totally split with the ARENA party and formed a new party, the Popular Republican Party (PPR).  When asked if there was democracy and liberty within the ARENA party, Salguero-Gross responded, “No…the will of the directors should not be imposed but rather amply discussed.”  Salguero-Gross represents the former coffee/agricultural oligarchy of El Salvador.  The new ARENA party’s lack of interest in agro and the direction of the new neoliberal model have this sector excluded.  The formation of the PPR could seriously divide vote among the right in the next elections.  For example, 6-8 ARENA departmental coordinators have gone with the PPR.  

 

On 11 April a conflict of interest in the financial relations between the President of the Salvadoran Federation of Volleyball, the ARENA deputy Norman Quijano, and Colonial Casino was made public.[25]  Quijano publicly denounced, in his own words, “disloyalty” within the ARENA party.  “The deputy of ARENA (Quijano) is convinced that within the legislative fraction there is a deputy that is attempting to put into question his reputation and honor”.[26]  Quijano reported to the dailies that his intention was to denounce the conspirator to COENA, the maximum authority of the ARENA party.  This marks the first time that an ARENA deputy has publicly denounced a fellow ARENA deputy. 

 

Quijano’s denouncement caused further problems within ARENA.  El Diario de Hoy wrote, “The President of the Republic, Francisco Flores, and the Vice-President of the Assembly, among others, questioned, in a subtle tone, the decision of the ARENA deputy Quijano, not because he accepted the donation of a casino (evidently conflicts of interest are not a problem for ARENA) but because he publicly denounced that his colleagues betrayed him.”[27]

 

The scandal unearthed yet another possible profound division within ARENA,  “…They (members of ARENA leadership) want to eliminate the deputies that, in their moment, were titled ‘Calderonistas’ for their close relationship with ex-President Armando Calderón Sol.”[28]

 

On 18 April, El Diario de Hoy reported that President Flores accepted that Francisco Bertrand Galindo would not continue as the Minister of Governance.  Flores himself recently created the Ministry of Governance by combining the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of the Interior, by which Flores eliminated numerous positions, including firing ex-Minister of the Interior, and long time ARENA figure Mario Acosta Ortel.  Flores and Galindo both stated that the reason for the change was due to the need for Galindo as Vice-President of Ideology in the ARENA party to dedicate more time to party matters in preparation for the coming elections.  In fact, some suspect that Galindo may be Flores’ successor to run for president.  The creation of new ministries, eliminating others and creating new positions only to quickly change the functionary, is yet another sign of the instability within the ARENA party and the Flores administration.

 

ARENA is splitting apart.  The image of a unified ARENA is no longer as the long time divisions, internal groupings, and fights for personal power have come to public light.  Large portions of the party have left and have joined forces to form a new political party and criticism from a variety of factions has ARENA in crisis.  Many party members are in the dark as to what the next decision will be, provoking strong sentiments of discontent for the anti-democratic secretive top-down model of ARENA.

 

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The Continuation of the Legislative Coup

 

Two years ago the Right block in the Legislative Assembly carried out a legal coup preventing the FMLN from taking the presidency of the Legislative Assembly.  The Internal Functioning Code of the Assembly established that the political party with the most deputies would conduct the Assembly through the presidency of the legislative organism.  However, when in 2000 the FMLN won according the Right’s rules, the Right block changed the rules once again by establishing a rotating presidential system and weakening the representation of the FMLN on the Legislative Board.

 

Two years later the Right block is firm in its ways and the “attack” on the FMLN continues.   The offensive against the FMLN is an open “war” against those who could bring about structural changes in the country.  On 28 April, the National Executive Council of ARENA (COENA), declared “war” on the FMLN and ordered their bases to attack.[29]  The Legislative Assembly is another front of the war where the Right has been “maneuvering” to prevent the FMLN from establishing power in the State institution.  La Prensa Gráfica itself recognizes the strategy, “The FMLN will face an offensive prepared in the board of the Assembly, which is laying the ground work to take away some of the posts of the FMLN that include the presidency of the parliament.”[30]

 

The Board of the Assembly’s offensive against the FMLN includes: 1) Taking away the positions of the three “high level” advisors of the FMLN; 2) Announcing the elimination of the rotating presidency of the Assembly after the number of FMLN deputies was reduced; 3) Eliminating one of the FMLN votes in each of the 19 Assembly commissions; 4) Taking away the presidency of two commissions from the FMLN; and 5) Dividing the representation on the Assembly Board among the Right (ARENA, PCN, and PDC), excluding the Left and the smaller parties.

 

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