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CIS

Colonia Libertad,

Avenida Bolívar # 103

San Salvador, El Salvador

Centroamérica

Teléfonos:

(503) 2226-5362              

(503) 2235-1330

e-mail: cis_elsalvador@yahoo.com

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FMLN Presidential Campaign Reflections and Political Prognoses

University Students Commemorate 1975 Massacre

Progressive coverage of the 2004 Presidential Elections in El Salvador focused mainly on the thinly veiled threats of Bush administration Cold Warriors regarding the future of United States-El Salvador relations in the event of an FMLN victory. The resonant propaganda campaign waged by the right-wing ARENA party, costing untold millions and reaching impressive saturation levels, was also a point of major discussion. This was done with good reason: these factors undoubtedly informed the electoral outcome. The ultimate fate of the FMLN, however, is dependent on the party's ability to assess and redress the mistakes made during the campaign. On this count, differences of opinion within the party are informed largely by historical affiliation. Of the two camps that have emerged, one is led by former presidential candidate Schafik Handal, the other headed by Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz. The internal FMLN elections, to be held on November 7, will determine the next Secretary General, the future trajectory of the party, and thus the nature of the Salvadoran political climate.

Students of all ages gathered at the University of El Salvador (UES) on the evening of July 30 to commemorate the student massacre that occurred on that day 29 years earlier. On July 30, 1975 the military brutally repressed a march organized by university and high school students, killing at least 25 and wounding many more. Recent police excesses at a student march in Santa Ana make clear why this incident continues to hold relevance in the present. At the vigil, the names of those students killed in 1975 were invoked in calling current students to continue struggling for the creation of a more just society.

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Nearly the entire façade of an apartment building in the San Salvador suburb of Mejicanos is covered with the enormous visage of former Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) presidential candidate Schafik Handal. Its very scale represents the once eager expectation of the Salvadoran left that their party would assume control of the executive.

Motor-oil and paint marring the mural’s surface (presumably thrown there by a party detractor) serve as a public reminder of the FMLN's March 21 defeat. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) official count showed Handal losing by more than twenty percentage points to Elias Antonio Saca of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), who took office on June 1.

The pre-election period was host to numerous violations of the electoral code, and marked by thinly veiled threats from U.S. government officials regarding the future of relations with El Salvador in the event of an FMLN victory. While these factors inevitably contributed to the electoral outcome, the ultimate fate of this guerrilla movement turned political party depends on FMLN officials’ identification of errors they committed during the campaign. Differences of opinion within the party are informed both by present circumstance and historical affiliation.

Eugenio Chicas is the former FMLN campaign director, and current magistrate on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Chicas identifies the FMLN’s lack of understanding of "Salvadoran-ness" as central to their electoral defeat. By way of an example, he points to the breach between the FMLN’s anti-imperialist stance, and the perspective of many Salvadorans.

"Our anti-imperialist policy, which is correct from a conceptual and historical point of view, does not fit with the aspirations of the people and with their perception of the United States, in terms of remittances, of migration, of what have you," says Chicas.

The 25 points that made up the FMLN electoral platform were, in retrospect, excessive. Chicas opines that it would have been more effective to choose five points that set attainable goals and were of greatest relevance to the voter base. He contrasts this with the effectiveness of the ARENA propaganda, which was more focused in scope, stressed concepts that had greater resonance with young people, and was more congruent with national concerns as defined in the mainstream media.

"In that sense I think that ours was a more rational campaign. Very rational, very understandable to middle class sectors, very understandable for people that study government programs, but not understandable for broad popular sectors, who hope for a message that is more concise, more simple, more motivational," says Chicas.

Hugo Martinez, FMLN legislative deputy and former director of communications for the presidential campaign, affirms Chicas’ assertion but adds another dimension. "Not only did we have problems listening to the people, to know exactly what they were thinking and what they were saying, but the party leadership also had problems listening to the scientific studies that we conducted around possible electoral tendencies."

At once light-hearted a serious, Martinez draws an analogy to the film The Last Samurai to illustrate his point about the party’s failure to adopt new electoral tactics. "Until the final moment the samurai fight with their swords, their spears, etc, against an army with cannons and different kinds of modern weapons. I point to this example because it’s essentially the same: the party cannot continue fighting with methods, with tools from 20 or 30 years ago." He says that some within the leadership did not want to give any weight to the survey results obtained by the party, preferring to rely on their political intuition. "There was a certain kind of triumphalism. Several claimed that ‘well, with my experience, I know that we are going to win."

Martinez is quick to note the reasonableness of that perception given the index used to measure support. The FMLN won more than 800,000 votes in the final count (more than double the number received in the 1999 elections), which prior to Election Day translated into impressive turnout at FMLN campaign events. For him, this only underlines the need for more systematic means of gauging voter support.

Martinez says that the party's same rejection of statistical data also contributed to its failure to neutralize the accusations leveled in ARENA propaganda. "If I would have had the same studies at my disposal [as ARENA], I would have said, rather my surveys would have said to me, ‘Hugo, there is an exposed flank and it’s called remittances," says Martinez. He says that earlier assessment of the danger would have enabled to party to respond more effectively.

Chicas adds that the very studies that would have helped the FMLN to identify its exposed flank, would likely have helped them to identify ARENA’s weak points.

Among the external challenges faced by the FMLN was the political orientation of the country's dominant media outlets. The general content and editorial pages of the two dailies with the widest circulation, La Prensa Grafica and El Diario de Hoy, tend to reflect a greater sympathy for ARENA. "I think that as it relates to the news media, it has been a weakness of ours not to invest. In the years that have passed since '92, we could have made a substantial investment in communications and news media (including the print press, radio, and television) to be able to have an impact, to compete in some fashion with the capacity and volume of the right," says Chicas.

A question raised both within and outside of the party has been whether the FMLN’s choice of candidate contributed to their electoral loss. Chicas rejects this notion. "The electorate had the opportunity to chose between two opposition projects," he says, referring to the staunchly centrist Christian Democratic Party-United Democratic Center (PDC-CDU) coalition as well as the FMLN. The fact that coalition candidate Hector Silva did not receive even the six percent of the votes necessary to maintain the member parties’ legal status—while the FMLN, in contrast, doubled their votes with Schafik Handal as candidate—means to Chicas that the candidate was not the issue.

Chicas says that any platform that included opposition to privatization, the revision and possible reversal of privatizations carried out to date, as well as opposition to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would have provoked a similar reaction from the right. "As a friend said, we could have run Mother Teresa as a candidate, and they would have suggested that she was a prostitute."

The candidate question has evolved into a major point of contention within the FMLN, some questioning not only the sagacity of choosing Handal, but also the process by which that choice was made. (Television journalist Mauricio Funes was highly popular among the party base, but barred from candidacy after the leadership decided that a history of membership was necessary in order to be considered). It highlights a historical and generational divide within the party, the dominant side of which 73-year-old Handal leads with other veterans of El Salvador's Communist Party (PC). The much younger Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz heads the other camp, drawing substantial support from the former ranks of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), which--like the PC--was one of five guerrilla groups that made up the FMLN. Despite the frequent overlap in their identification of mistakes and vision for the future of the party, Martinez and Chicas have chosen different sides, the former aligning himself with Ortiz, and the latter identifying with the faction led by Handal.

By way of explaining the roots of this schism within the party, long-time FMLN affiliate Delmy Valencia points to the difficulties of synthesizing the different political visions of the five guerrilla groups. "There are differences about how to run a government, there are philosophical differences, there are even difference about how to initiate generational change," she says.

In a nod to the positions that he does share with Chicas, Martinez points to the mainstream media’s reduction of this debate within the party to a battle between traditional "orthodox" members and young "reformers." He interprets this as an attempt to confuse the party’s base, and insists that principles and objectives of the FMLN are not coming into question, but rather methods and work styles.

Martinez and Chicas coincide on the importance ensuring future FMLN leadership in social as well as political circles. "We have to place attention on various factors of power, not just the factor of political-electoral power. I believe that the strategy that the party adopted in 2001 was correct, because it is an electoral strategy as well as a strategy in relation to the social movement," says Martinez. Chicas agrees that it is important to maintain party involvement in both electoral politics and social struggles, but notes his belief that in recent years the FMLN has placed excessive emphasis on the electoral component.

Valencia is more critical. "They are putting personal interests above the interests of the majority," she says of the party leadership. For her, part and parcel of that is a tendency towards verticalism, and a consequent weakening of democratic structures within the party.

Martinez points to one manifestation of that verticalism. He says that the party is failing to effectively train new leaders to take the place of old. "There is a lot of maintaining of positions within the Frente," he says, "and an inflated self esteem, above all among those who were commanders during the war, whom I respect and admire a great deal, but I believe that they need to understand that they have to give space, about all to the youth."

Chicas instead emphasizes the importance of maintaining the confidence of people that voted for the FMLN, and achieving a better positioning and perception of the model for change that they are promoting in the country. "I think that is the bottom line, that the people have security that change is going to benefit them, and that change is not dangerous, that change is not a threat." He adds that surveys have since revealed that the campaign slogan, "El Cambio es Hoy" (Change is now), was not complemented by sufficient party platform information, leaving many confused about the kind of "change" the FMLN was promoting.

Chicas obviously believes that the continued strengthening of the FMLN will benefit Salvadorans. He also maintains, however, that the accompanying political and social polarization will not. "There is a virtual bipartisanism within the country. From my point of view bipartisanism does not help, nor fertilize Salvadoran society." He asserts that the ideal would be for El Salvador to gradually grow more pluralistic, with ideas other than those of the FMLN and ARENA dominating. Chicas asserts that, in the name of placing national well being above party interests, the FMLN and ARENA need to commit themselves to the collaborative development of a national agenda.

"It is completely incompatible with history to suppose that there could be a third option," opines Human Rights Ombudswoman of El Salvador Dr. Beatrice Alamanni de Carrillo, regarding the absence of a political center in the country. "It is a naïve and ridiculous dream, because there is no third option, because there are no petit bourgeois, there are no small property owners, there are no people in the middle, or at least not enough to dictate their own leadership. It’s like a sandwich, pressed between two extremes that each day become more powerful," she told a group of election observers in late January.

Just days before the election, Dr. de Carrillo stated that the real danger for El Salvador lay in the period following Election Day. She asserted that the two blocs represented by ARENA and the FMLM continue to consolidate their respective power bases, endangering the possibility of bipartisan cooperation. The current FMLN leadership's decision to not attend Antonio Saca’s inauguration speaks to her prescience. President Saca, for his part, has chosen to adopt a conciliatory stance during the initial months of his term, at least superficially seeking cooperation among the two parties. In the case of the FMLN, much will no doubt hinge on the results of the internal party elections, to be held November 7 of this year. Among the positions to be filled is that of Secretary General, for which the base will have a choice between "orthodox" Medardo Gonzalez, or "reformer" Oscar Ortiz.

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The stage erected in the National University's Law Department parking lot had a backdrop that read "July 30: Cannot be Forgotten." The image was a haunting one: of the human silhouettes painted in between the banner's imposing block letters, one raised its fist in the air, while others labored in the foreground.

The image paid subtle homage to the students killed in the 1975 massacre. On July 30, 1975, high school and university student marched in San Salvador to protest the military government's raiding of the National University's western campus in the city of Santa Ana. The military's violent reaction to the march resulted in the death or disappearance of at least 25 students, and the wounding of many more. Every year students of all ages and institutions observe the July 30 anniversary of the massacre.

Current students and faculty swayed in their seats, some on their feet dancing, as the musicians atop the stage pounded out an infections rhythm. Some focused their attention on the performers, others forming circles with their chairs to talk among themselves. Many nursed small styro-foam cups of free coffee, a necessary element at any all night vigil.

"It was a very historically important moment for this country," said one UES alumnus, present at the 1975 march, who took the stage in between musical acts. "Because from that moment forward, bloody and heroic for those who perished as well as those who survived, the form of struggle that would be realized in subsequent years was defined." She noted how many students died, disappeared, or were wounded, and yet the movement continued to grow.

The speaker related how, when the march passed by the Social Security Hospital, the anti-riot police came into view. To date, soldiers and police had perpetrated massacres in the countryside, but not in the city. The students had prepared themselves for repression, assuming that the police would use tear gas, rubber bullets, and fire hoses to break up the march. They obviously did not anticipate the use of live ammunition.

"It truly was a surprise that they used real bullets, and that our comrades, mostly those that were carrying megaphones, fell dead in that moment," she said. "I fell unconscious. I fractured my left kneecap, and I would not have been able to get out of there if some comrades had not come to carry me, because immediately after they took me away, the army brought their ambulances, and gathered all the wounded and the dead."

While substantial, one might have expected a larger turnout, given the National University's student and faculty population of nearly 32,000. A popular explanation within more politically active circles is that the UES student body had grown more apathetic as it had grown more middle class. Many claim that the University is admitting more and more students from private high schools, with an eye on eventually privatizing the nation's only public university. The greatly improved condition of the campus (left for many years in a state of disrepair following the end of the Civil-War) only fuels this argument, many subscribing to the logic that the government would not pay to improve facilities for poor students.

That said, the students that did gather at the vigil made clear the significance that the 1975 student massacre continues to have for them. Students in the western city of Santa Ana had organized a march on July 24, 2004 to protest the recent hike in bus fare. Several Student representatives from Santa Ana took the stage, relating the circumstances surrounding the "disappearance" of four protest participants. While all eventually reappeared, the incident fueled painful memories of the student "disappearances" common during the 1980's.

The annual march preceding the vigil, just as an original event that it commemorates, is a platform to express opposition to current government policies. The students that took to the streets on July 30 did so to commemorate the 1975 massacre, as well as to protest the Free Trade Area of the America (FTAA), Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) and the sending of Salvadoran troops to Iraq.

In closing her presentation, the Alumnus underlined the particular responsibility of university students to continue struggling to build a just society:

Penal Laws Revised, Anti-Gang Plan Inaugurated: Approved by the Legislative Assembly on July 28, new revisions to the penal law took effect on August 9. Billed as part of President Antonio Saca’s promised "Plan Supermano Duro" (translated as "Super Heavy Hand") the revisions are intended to supplant the punishments codified in the now-expired and highly controversial Anti-Gang Law. "Plan Supermano Duro" was officially inaugurated on Monday, August 30.

Among the new penalties are the three to five years in prison for gang membership, and six to nine for gang leadership (specified in Article 345-A). In addition, revisions to Article 348 of the Penal Code prescribe two to four years in prison for individuals or groups that alter public order, block streets, or invade/occupy buildings. Included in the package of reforms were changes to the Penal Process Code, and the Under-age Criminal Law (now known as the Juvenile Penal Law), as well as harsher penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol.

While there was some dissention among Legislative Deputes representing the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), it was not sufficient to block implementation. President Saca presented the proposed reforms to the Legislative Assembly on July 21. They were formulated prior by 'work groups' comprised of police, judges, politicians, and civil society, presumably to defuse criticism of the previous anti-gang law. Ten youth captured by police on August 13 were the first to be detained under the auspices of the revised code. They will be tried for membership to an "illicit group," for which the law prescribes 3 to 5 years of prison.

Following the reforms' passing, the National Civilian Police (PNC) formed five special police units to investigate and break up the gang "cliques" that dominate certain areas. Of the units, each comprised of 9 police agents, one will operate in the eastern region, one in the west, and three in the center. The PNC hopes is that in the future, each of El Salvador's 14 Departments will have an anti-gang unit at their disposal. (Sources: La Prensa Grafica, 8/18/04, 8/10/04, 7/29/04, 7/22/04; El Diario de Hoy, 8/31/04, 8/14/04, 7/29/04, 7/20/04).

Fired Social Security Workers Rehired: On August 9, the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS) rehired 44 workers that had been fired during the 9-month strike of 2002-2003. According to the new contracts, workers have the right to a month of back pay, and access to a loan of up to $1000 from the ISSS Protection Fund. Workers were initially hesitant to sign, given that the new contracts do not recognize a history of work with ISSS. Director Mariano Pinto asserts that labor law stipulates that the workers must be "rehired," as opposed to "reinstated," because they were officially fired from the institution. Thirty of the 44 workers still have lawsuits pending against the Social Security Institute for severance pay.

The cases of 60 other ISSS workers, fired during the strike but seeking reinstallation, were the point of discussion in a new round of negotiations beginning August 23. ISSS management agreed to reinitiate the process after union representatives staged a protest outside a Social Security hospital to denounce the delay in negotiations. (Sources: La Prensa Grafica, 8/24/04, 8/10/04, 7/28/04; El Diario de Hoy, 8/10/04)

Bush Campaign Seeks Votes in El Salvador: The Movement of Republicans living Abroad, as of July 29, is seeking to register the estimated 19,000 eligible U.S. voters in El Salvador to participate in the November elections. The organization has set a goal of 9,000 registrations, of which they hope 5,000 will vote for the incumbent George Bush. (Sources: Colatino, 7/28/04; El Diario de Hoy, 7/29/04)

Supreme Electoral Tribunal Stalemate: The five Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) magistrates that should have assumed their posts on August 1, did not formally do so until August 26. The Legislative Deputies of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the United Democratic Center (CDU), as well as 3 of those representing the Democratic Christian Party (PDC), refused to participate in the election of three remaining magistrates after the appointment of Julio Moreno Niños of the National Conciliation Party (PCN).

Electoral law dictates that the three parties that obtain the most votes in an election are granted a seat on the TSE, but the 2004 presidential election results showed the PCN in fourth place. The CDU-PDC Coalition, despite securing the third largest number of votes, was unable to gain consensus around a candidate (nominations by the CDU were rejected by the Legislative Assembly for lack of support from the PDC). President of the Legislative Assembly and Secretary General of the PCN Ciro Zepeda subsequently announced his party's interest in assuming the post. ARENA Legislative Deputy Rolando Alvarenga argued that the Coalition's failure to produce a candidate meant that the election of that magistrate fell to the Legislative Assembly. The move was denounced as unconstitutional by the CDU, FMLN, and the three PDC Deputies. The PCN's Niños was allowed to maintain his post, but only in exchange for a redistribution of geographical representation in the Legislative Assembly, severance payment for dismissed TSE workers, and a restructuring of the TSE that gives less administrative power to the magistrates. The FMLN reserved the right, however, to submit the case to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the PCN Magistrate's appointment was illegal. (Sources: CoLatino, 8/29/04, 8/28/04, 8/14/04; El Diario de Hoy, 8/20/04, 8/19/04; La Prensa Grafica, 8/27/04, 8/26/04, 8/20/04, 8/19/04, 7/15/04.)

MERCOSUR Proposes Trade Agreement with Central America: In a August 17 meeting in Santo Domingo, Presidents da Silva and Batalla of Brazil and Uruguay respectively--representing the Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR)--reached an agreement with the Presidents of Haiti, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Turcos and Caicos, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Dutch Antilles to create a commission to investigate a possible free trade agreement between the South American trade block and the nations of Central American and the Caribbean. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay are permanent members of MERCOSUR (Common Southern Market), while Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela are associate members. MERCOSUR is finalizing negotiations for a free trade agreement with Colombia and Ecuador, and may extend associate membership to Mexico as well. During the meeting, President da Silva spoke to the Central American and Caribbean leaders about the importance of combating hunger and poverty, and promoting sustainable development. (Sources: La Prensa Grafica, 8/18/04; El Diario de Hoy, 8/14/04.)

Prison Riot Claims 32 Lives: A riot in Mariona Prison on August 18 resulted in the death of 32 of the inmates, and the wounding of 36 others. The riot is reported to have taken place between unaffiliated inmates and members of the M-18 gang. The Human Rights Ombudswoman, Dr. Beatrice Alamanni de Carrillo, says that she issued a warning in mid 2003 regarding the tense climate in the prison, recommending that the gang members be transferred. Dr. Carrillo also cited the discovery of several grenades and a firearm two weeks prior as evidence that security was not sufficient to prevent weapons from entering the prison. For the 3,200 inmates in Mariona prison, there are only 70 security guards. Dr. Carrillo harshly criticized the National Civilian Police (PNC) for not taking appropriate steps to quell the violence once it had erupted.

President Antonio Saca disagrees that the violence arose because of the cohabitation of gang members with unaffiliated inmates, claiming that other factors were at work. Despite demands by human rights advocates that Penal System Director Rodolfo Garay Pineda be asked to resign, President Saca says that no public functionaries will be removed in response to the prison riot. (Sources: El Diario de Hoy, 8/20/04; La Prensa Grafica, 8/20/04)

Central America to Negotiate Trade Agreement with EU: The Economy and Trade Vice-Ministers of the Central American nations met in San Salvador on August 16 to discuss each country's interests in the free trade agreement to be developed with the European Union. Formal negotiation will begin in late September or early October in Brussels, Belgium. The EU has stipulated that the agreement--the fruit of which will be called Free Trade Zone--will be based on a significant level of economic integration. Central America's progress in achieving prior integration will be used to define dates in the negotiation process. (Source: El Diario de Hoy, 8/17/04)

Push to Ratify CAFTA: Salvadoran Government officials have declared that they would like the free trade agreement with the United States to be ratified before the end of the year. On August 10, and Ad-Hoc commission within the Legislative Assembly approved a pre-ratification agenda that includes: conducting a study about the impact of the trade agreement; publicizing the contents of the agreement in the four principal zones of the country; analyzing the ratification process in the United States Congress; and discussing complementary legislation for the agricultural sector. The study will take 3 months to complete, a period that will overlap with the two months necessary to distribute the contents of the agreement. The remaining time before the end of the year will be used to discuss possible legislative reforms. Of the 84 members of the Legislative Assembly, 43 must vote in favor of the trade agreement for it to be ratified. The FMLN has declared that they will abstain from voting. (Source: El Diario de Hoy, 8/14/04)

Tension Over Third Deployment to Iraq: The Mohammed Atta Brigade and Islamic Twahid are thought to be responsible for the terrorist threats leveled against El Salvador in response to the Saca Administration's decision to send a third contingent of troops to Iraq. In response, the government has stepped up domestic security, above all in Comalapa International Airport and a border crossings. A second threat attributed to the Mohammed Atta Brigades was publicized on August 16, giving El Salvador 20 days to withdraw their troops from Iraq, threatening to attack both civilians in El Salvador and troops in Iraq if their demands were not met. The most recent threat was issued on August 22. The Saca Administration has moved forward with the deployment of troops. President Saca, along with Minister of Governance René Figueroa, have suggested that the threats are domestic in origin, pointing to the FMLN opposition to sending a third contingent to Iraq. The FMLN has denied the accusations, dismissing them as absurd. (Sources: CoLatino, 8/23/04, 8/16/04, 8/12/04,; El Diario de Hoy, 8/17/04; La Prensa Grafica, 8/23/04, 8/22/04, 8/17/04, 8/7/04.)

Military Officer Convicted in Romero Case: The Center for Justice and Accountability filed a lawsuit with the California Supreme Court against retired Salvadoran Military Officer Alvaro Saravia, for his involvement in the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. The case was filed in the name of one of Oscar Romero's relatives, who for security reasons has remained anonymous. Among the principal witnesses were Amando Antonio Garay, who asserts that Saravia ordered him to drive the getaway vehicle for the assassin.

On September 3 Federal Judge Oliver Wagner found Saravia responsible for organizing the crime, ordering him to pay a total of $10 million in damages. Currently in hiding, Saravia was convicted in absentia. (Sources: La Prensa Grafica, 9/4/04, 8/25/04, 8/24/04; International Herald Tribune, 9/8/04.)

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