Final Report 2003

Final Report - May 1,2003:
Legislative & Municipal Election, El Salvador
International Observer Mission
Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS)

*If you choose to use material from this report, please cite Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS)

Table of Contents

• Introduction

• 2003 Campaign Phase   

                 Lack of implementation of electoral reforms

                 Violence

                 Vote-buying and influencing

                 Difficulty in getting accreditation

• March 16th observations

                 Lack of training of JRVs

                 Inadequate voting locations

                 Influencing of voters

                 Information Centers

                 Low proportion of TSE, PDDH and Fiscal officials

                 Closing procedures

• Post election observations

• Recommendations

Annexes

• Annex 1: List of Observer countries, regions & organizations

• Annex 2: List of observation municipalities

• Annex 3: Voter Registry problems

                               - Inconsistencies between registries and voting cards

          Annex 3.1: - Voters who appeared in other registries

• Annex 4: Lack of training of JRVs

• Annex 5: Inadequate voting locations

• Annex 6: Influencing of voters

• Annex 7: Information Centers

• Annex 8: Closing Procedures

• Annex 9: Other problems

Introduction

The CIS, on behalf of all the observers involved in the 2003 CIS Election Observer Mission, would like to extend a sincere thanks to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) for all of their efforts to carry out democratic elections in the 262 municipalities in El Salvador and facilitating our participation as international observers. We would also like to recognize the work of the political parties, the civic organizations, the Civilian National Police (PNC) and all of the election workers for their efforts to carry out participative and democratic elections. The Procuraduria de Derechos Humanos (PDDH) played an important role in monitoring the process, providing a neutral presence the day of the elections, and making recommendations for strengthening the process.

The 2003 legislative and municipal elections marked the 5th observer mission conducted by the Center for Exchange and Solidarity (CIS). This year, 140 observers from 15 countries and regions (see Annex 1) observed the elections in 30 municipalities in 10 departments (see Annex 2) which enabled us to observe in 75 voting centers.

As the CIS, our goal was to play a role observing the process and accompanying the Salvadoran people in their efforts to build true democratic participation. The CIS has been accompanying communities in El Salvador in their efforts to build democratic participation, human development, human rights, reconstruction, and implementation of the Peace Accords, through people-to-people exchanges. Many municipalities and local community groups invited international observers to be present for different reasons: some cited lack of implementation of electoral reforms agreed upon in 1994; violence, threats, and tension in their municipality; and reports of anomalies and violations of the electoral code including money being offered for electoral carnets, floating votes and inconsistencies with the Electoral Padron. The CIS Observer Mission was actively monitoring the electoral process beginning in January 2003. The week of the elections observers were oriented, trained and involved in the electoral process in the communities 2 days prior and the day of the elections. Due to this extensive presence, we were able to observe the process leading up to the elections and details on the day of the elections.

In preparation for the elections, the Mission met with national leadership of nine of the eleven political parties, as well as electoral institutions including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the Departmental Election Boards (JED), the Municipal Election Boards (JEM), the Election Oversight Board (JVE), the Procurator of Human Rights and the embassies and consulates of the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany and Great Britain. In addition, the Mission met with the majority of the political party representatives in each of the 30 municipalities covered.

Our observations, conclusions, and recommendations from January through March 2003 are included in this report. We sincerely hope that our presence contributed positively to the democratic process in El Salvador and that this report will further serve to strengthen the process for future elections.

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2003 Campaign Phase

Reflecting back on the 2003 campaign with the help of the Mission’s many conversations with political party leaders, electoral organs and Salvadoran citizens and the numerous newspaper articles published, reveals that the campaign closely resembles those of 1997 and 1999. Like these campaign periods, the 2003 campaign was marked by increased violence and social fear, a lack of confidence in the political parties and political solutions and concerns about the electoral process, and the lack of implementation of the reforms agreed upon in 1994. For example, Mission Observers received many more complaints this year about the manipulation of voting results through “floating votes” vote buying, and vote influencing through free lunches, handouts and promises to be included in future municipal projects. These campaign-phase irregularities are discussed below along with others and specific details can be found in the Annex section of this report.

Lack of implementation of the electoral reforms

As the 2003 campaign unfolded, Salvadoran society was once again reminded that key electoral reforms proposed and agreed to by the major political parties nearly 10 years ago have never been approved by the Legislative Assembly. The following campaign problems stemmed directly from the lack of electoral reforms:

Floating votes

The issue of “floating votes” – voters who live in one municipality, but register to vote in a different municipality, often several hours away – was a major issue in the 2003 elections. According to official TSE figures, 68,440 Salvadorans requested a change of residence. It is unknown how many of these requests were legitimate, but there can be little doubt that a portion of them were intentionally done to influence municipal and legislative outcomes.

Moving voters to influence electoral outcomes threatens two basic tenets of democracy: the right to directly elect political authorities in a manner free from manipulation and influence and the right of the people of a region to elect their own representatives to government. In addition to violating democratic principals, the CIS Election Observer Mission believes that moving voters is a violation of Article 22, point #9 of the Electoral Code which clearly states that voters must register in their “domicile” which is defined as the place where the citizen lives, works or is the principal location of their business.

The practice of moving votes is further deepened because the electoral reform to establish residence-based voting has never been approved by the Legislative Assembly. Given the fierce competition in the 2003 elections at the municipal level, in the run-up to the 2004 Presidential elections, most political parties, despite voicing strong protests against floating votes, attempted to exploit this legal loophole to their advantage. As discussed in the following section (Impacts of a politicized TSE), the DUI would greatly diminish this loophole.

It is also critical to note that the election process itself allows for the manipulation of votes through the JRV and vigilantes that work in the voting centers. The Electoral Code gives JRVs, vigilantes and their alternates the right to vote at their table independently of where they are registered. This opens the doors to enormous potential manipulation by the political parties because the Electoral Code does not state that JRVs and vigilantes must be residents of the municipality in which they work. This means that with over 9000 voting tables in the election and an average of 4 JRVs, 4 vigilantes and their alternatives working at each table, well over 100,000 people – more than 10% of the actual voting population - are potentially voting outside of their municipality. The consequences of this are staggering and must be addressed in future electoral reforms.

During the pre-election phase of the Mission, the national leadership of nearly every political party expressed grave concerns to Observers about the impact that floating votes would have on the outcome of municipal elections.

"From my perspective it's immoral, especially on the municipal level and it should be regulated." commented Colonel David Munguia Payés, President of the Party Accion Popular (AP).

Ruben Zamora of the Centro Democratico Unido (CDU) added that "the practice originates on the municipal level” due to" mayors that do the math and start to pull people in from other municipalities. "

Jorge Melendez, General Secretary of the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) stated that floating votes "are not desirable but they are legal,” revealing the legal basis of the problem.

Since the elections, many Salvadorans have provided the Mission with direct evidence of floating votes, evidence that leaves little room for doubt about the serious risk of undermining the democratic process that floating votes can have. The following is a partial list of the floating vote activity. In two of the five cases mentioned below, CIS believes the election outcome was altered by floating votes:

• San Rafael Cedros – The ARENA JEM member in San Rafael Cedros, Ricardo Tejada, told Mission Observers that ARENA had registered 800 people to vote in San Rafael Cedros that lived in other municipalities.

• San Matías – At 3pm on March 16, the PCN mayor brought in 307 people from the cooperatives of Las Marias, La Hacienda and Sitio de Los Nejapas in the municipality of Quezaltepeque and Las Annonas in San Pablo Tacachico on buses from his bus company. The PCN won the election with a margin of 228 votes.

• San Miguel - ARENA had Supervisors assigned for every five JRVs, instead of every 20 tables as specified in the Electoral Code. As a result, there were far too many ARENA representatives in the voting center; more people then were allowed to vote according to the ratio of one supervisor per 20 tables.

• Cinquera – It is estimated that political parties brought in the following number of people to vote in Cinquera:

                         o ARENA: 190 voters from San Juan Opico

                         o PCN: 40 voters from Tenancingo

                         o FMLN: 30 voters from San Salvador

                         o MR: 30 voters from San Salvador

           In other words, approximately 290 of 752 votes were cast from outside the

           municipality

• Estanzuelas – ARENA was detected bringing in voters on buses from Berlin, San Vicente, and La Peña with people who do not live in Estanzuelas. ARENA won the election by 2 votes.

Impacts of a TSE “partidizado” (TSE members represent political parties)

The TSE is composed of five magistrates: Three of the five TSE magistrates are selected from the political parties or coalitions that won the most votes in the previous Presidential election; the remaining two magistrates are nominated by the Supreme Court of Justice and then elected by a two-thirds vote of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, by its very nature, the TSE is NOT a neutral institution.. The obvious party influence in the nation’s maximum electoral organ facilitates the putting of party interests above the citizens’ right to elect their representatives. During the 2003 campaign, there were numerous denunciations made against the TSE which reflect, in many ways, this political bias:

• Problems with the voter registry – The accuracy of the list of registered voters was repeatedly questioned throughout the election. In a meeting on January 24, 2003, the Junta de Vigilancia reported to Mission Observers that there were 45,919 deceased people and 4,888 duplicates included in the registry, while an additional 22,810 voters were either added or taken out of the registry after the final deadline for making changes had passed (14,183 with birth certificates and 8,627 were excluded). In addition, on March 12th, four days before the election, the newspaper Diario de Hoy reported that 50,000 people who had applied for voting cards had not received them.

          A further significant problem is the accuracy of the voter information contained in

          the registry. Whether through direct manipulation of the voter registry or for a lack

          of good control mechanisms, two phenomena were either directly observed by or

          brought to the attention of the Mission on Election Day. A large number of

          voters:

                - were unable to vote due to inconsistencies between the registry

                  and their voting cards. (See Annex 3).

                - with carnets in one municipality appeared on the voter registry in

                  another municipality, meaning that they either had to travel to this other

                  municipality not vote. (See Annex 3.1).

• The unfinished process of issuing the DUI – In order to remedy the voter registry problem, the decision was taken in 2002 to rebuild the voter registry based on the national identity card (DUI) database. The registration of all Salvadorans and the issuance of DUI cards were supposed to be completed before the 2003 elections so that the DUI could be used as the voting card. However, the project is significantly behind schedule because of the burdensome and bureaucratic registration process and the card fee of $10.31 which many Salvadorans cannot afford. These continuing problems raise serious doubts that the DUI-based voting system will be ready for the 2004 Presidential elections.

• Lack of electoral code enforcement – During the campaign, there were several denunciations of the TSE for not enforcing the electoral code. Violations included the failure of parties to file necessary paperwork, the early commencement of campaign activities (before the official election period had begun), and the allowing of changes to the voter registry past the registration deadline. Further, the TSE should have declared Legislative Decree 669 inapplicable, that transitionally grants an elected official 60 days after taking power to present economic solvency in the use of public funds to the Accounting Court; this Legislative Decree violates Article 127, numeral 2 of the Constitution of the Republic, which states that a person cannot be a candidate if they don’t have economic solvency in managing public funds according to the Accounting Court. The majority of candidates registered and approved by the TSE for the 2003 did not complete this step in the process.

• TSE employees as candidates – There were 51 cases in which current TSE employees were simultaneously running for political office. This represented a clear conflict of interest. The TSE addressed this issue only after the media exposed it. The TSE asked these candidates to cease their work for the TSE during the election period.

• Limited resources and training of electoral organs – Finally, conversations with JED and JEM members and election-day observations revealed a critical lack of adequate training on the electoral process. Many of the JED and JEM offices were without the essential basic office equipment to perform their duties – offices, telephones, desks, computers and access to vehicles. For example, the San Salvador JED was without office space for one month after their official appointment. Most of the JEMs in the departments of Usulután and La Libertad never had office space, forcing them to meet in private homes and other locations, while the JEM in La Palma conducted their regular meetings in the post office. As a result of these resource shortages, many JEDs and JEMs reported that it was extremely difficult or impossible for them to perform their duties. For the JED, this included communicating with and visiting JEM offices, supervising the activities of political parties and visiting voting centers prior to election day.

          However, the lack of adequate TSE backing was most clearly visible on Election

          Day with the JRVs. Many JED and JEM had expressed deep concerns about

          training the JRVs in the weeks leading up to the election. This point is discussed

          in more detail in the following section of the report.

It is widely held that these problems prevail because another key legislative reform has not been enacted: the “despartidizacion” of the TSE. Because the leading political parties hold the top positions in the TSE, there is little political will to enforce the reforms. Reforming the TSE is seen as a critical step in advancing the democracy of elections.

Violence

The months leading up to the election saw a drastic increase in media coverage of violence. Gang violence, decapitations (11 cases in the first 2.5 months of 2003), domestic violence and campaign violence captured the headlines on a regular basis. While many of these violent acts were not election related, tension and concern for safety increased significantly in Salvadoran society. Undoubtedly, this contributed to low voter turn-out during the election (40%).

Many Salvadorans expressed profound concerns about the level of campaign-specific violence, recalling the elections of 1997 and 1999, which were also marked by significant violence. Estimates for the number of deaths during campaign range from 5 to more than 10. The following is a partial list of campaign-related deaths and violence:

• January 20 – An ARENA activist in Santiago Nonualco in the department of La Paz was hit by rocks thrown by sympathizers of other political parties.

• On January 21 an FMLN activist died in the town of Atiquizaya in the department of Ahuachapán after being struck in the head, chest and abdomen with stones thrown by ARENA activists during an FMLN rally.

• January 27 – A grenade explosion in the Jiquilisco area injured four FMLN activists several hours after a rally. The source of the grenade is still in question; some witnesses claim that it belonged to the four men while others say it was thrown at them.

• January 28 – An FMLN city council member in Ayutuxtepeque was arrested for attacking a member of the AP party.

• January 28 – The body of the ARENA mayoral candidate for Monte San Juan in the department of Cuscatlán was discovered. Police determined that he had been shot twice in the head.

• February 17 – An FMLN activist in Ataco in the department of Ahuachapán was shot to death in his house.

• February 23rd – The FMLN mayoral candidate in Cinquera was kidnapped by two armed men outside his Coca-Cola distribution business in Mariona. In addition to stealing his pick-up truck and $3,000, one of the men later shot at the candidate as he escaped while being led down a path known as Las Cañales.

• March 2nd – The PCN mayor in Santa Cruz Michapa in the department of Cuscatlán attacked the ARENA alternate (suplente) of the JEM.

• March 3rd – The two daughters – ages 4 & 6 – of the FMLN candidate in Mejicanos, department of San Salvador, were kidnapped -- being picked-up after school in van similar to their school van. The driver never spoke to them and dropped them off at the school after two hours.

• March 4th – FMLN and ARENA activists exchanged blows in Antiguo Cuscatlán, San Salvador after a group of ARENA activists shouted insults in front of the FMLN office.

• March 6th – A PCN city council candidate in San Martín, died from four gunshot wounds suffered two days earlier when he was attacked by unknown assailants.

• March 13th - An FMLN militant in Sonsonate died instantly from gunshot wounds and her husband was taken to Jorge Mazzini hospital in serious condition.

• Padre Rigoberto Antonio Nieto, a Roman Catholic Priest in San Pedro Masahuat, received threats from ARENA city council members, stating that there would be “reactions” against him if the FMLN won the municipal elections. He was accused of buying votes for the FMLN by giving out cement and reinforcing rod used in house construction in the cantons.

• During the campaign, the FMLN mayor and candidate, Wilber Solano, in Estanzuelas received death threats. During the process of reviewing the impugned votes following the elections, Mayor Solano was told if the FMLN won he had only two months to live.

• In La Palma, ARENA candidate claimed that FMLN made vague threats of violence and vengeance if FMLN lost elections. In addition, a woman told observers of a death threat she received on Election Day.

• March 16 - In Apopa, an FMLN activist was shot and critically wounded at the voting center. When a CIS observer took note she received the threat that “something bad would happen to her if she denounced it.”

Vote buying and influencing

In the final weeks of the campaign, up until the day before the elections, Mission Observers were informed of several cases of vote buying and influencing in rural communities in which voters had to give up their voting cards or promise to vote for a particular party. In addition, it is believed that, in at least one vote-buying scheme, the confiscated voting cards were modified by placing a new photo in card and giving it to a person loyal to the party.

As with floating votes, this is a serious threat to the development of the democratic process in El Salvador. Vote buying / influencing is deliberate manipulation of the poor economic and educational situations in which many rural Salvadorans live. Specific instances of vote buying or influence included:

• San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz – On the Thursday before the elections, the current ARENA mayor and two city council members visited 200-300 families, telling them that that the FIS-DL and the EEU development organization were going to build 300 homes for those who had lost their homes to the 2001 earthquakes. The people had to sign up by Saturday mid-day (day before the elections) and were told that the project wouldn't go through if the mayor wasn't re-elected. The FMLN legal representative called an emergency meeting of the JEM for Friday afternoon, and accused ARENA of campaigning after the election period was over. The ARENA rep to the JEM agreed that the activity was campaigning, and signed the Acta of denunciation.

• Bajo Lempa, Usulután - Reports that ARENA was giving away land and house supplies in a raffle to those people who provided their names and carnet numbers.

• La Palma, Chalatenango – Two instances of vote buying were reported to Mission observers. 1) An ARENA business owner and activist offered 100 colones to buy the voting cards of several of his employees. 2) At least three people were offered $20 by a store owner in exchange for a promise to vote for PCN.

• Jayaque, La Libertad – Separate and independent testimony was given to Mission observers by several people saying that ARENA was conducting a systematic vote-buying campaign that continued up to the day of the elections. On election day, three separate couples getting off buses to vote in Jayaque reported that ARENA workers had offered them $8.00 to vote for ARENA.

• San Pedro Masahuat, La Paz – FMLN candidate reported vote buying by ARENA. PDC reported voting buying by ARENA and FMLN.

• El Carmen, Cuscatlán - CDU sources reported that people were being offered money to hand in their voting cards until after the elections.

• In the cantons of El Faro, La Lima, San Antonio, El Potreron, Los Leones and Los Ranchos, in the municipality of Comasagua, La Libertad - On the Friday and Saturday before the election, the ARENA candidate was offering corrugated tin roofing materials to voters. In addition, the ARENA mayor offered land in exchange for votes, instructing the voters to look for certain ARENA members at the voting tables.

• San Matías, La Libertad – The PCN mayor gave out water jugs in the cantons of El Rancho, Las Flores and El Jocote one and two days prior to the elections.

• Estanzuelas, Usulután - Noted parties buying votes for 125 colones each.

• Tamanique, La Libertad - Observers noted that voters were being bribed with 125 colones, and that voters were also being intimidated by ARENA who told them that if they didn’t vote for ARENA they would loose municipal projects.

Difficulty in getting accreditation

This year, the process for getting this accreditation was extraordinarily difficult. First, while the accreditation center reportedly opened on Monday, March 10th, in order to provide ‘press’ accreditations (apparently, no one showed up), the CIS Mission was not permitted to get credentials until three days before the election, despite the large number of observers. Second, the TSE had only one computer making the ID cards. Third, there was no system used to control or organize the people waiting for accreditation (such as forming a line). As a result of these factors, huge and disorganized crowds formed at the accreditation center, quickly overwhelming the staff. People were forced to wait 3-4 hours for their ID, causing significant tension in the center. In addition, influential people were moved directly to the front of the line, ahead of people who had been waiting hours. This chaos was repeated throughout the three days the center was open.

Finally, there was no control mechanism for issuing observer accreditations. TSE did not check each person given a credential against a master list to ensure that person was a legitimate observer. While the CIS Mission provided this control mechanism for Mission observers, several Mission Observers simply presented passports and were given credentials without any validation.

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March 16 Observations

The Mission observed many challenges and areas for improvement in the Salvadoran electoral process, which have been detailed in the following pages. While many of the observations are details, it is essential to remember that several critical national electoral reforms such as residential-based voting and the “despartidización” (depoliticization) of the TSE remain unimplemented 10 years after first being introduced in the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the ARENA and FMLN coalition presidential candidate. This said, we saw a number of citizens and election workers determined to have the fairest and most democratic elections possible, marked by a spirit of common problem solving and civic festiveness.

The Mission observers were impressed with the dedication and hard work of the JED and JEM in setting up and managing the voting centers. The JRVs, despite inexperience, lack of training and having to work long hours in hot and difficult conditions, worked together as teams and never lost their enthusiasm and dedication throughout the day. In addition, the PNC must be commended for its services. With a few exceptions, Mission observers felt the police did an excellent job of assuring voting center security without being intrusive or threatening. It can be said that the majority of the people involved in the election process showed a true commitment to responsibly performing their duties.

The following observations should be used as a tool for improving the election process to ensure future elections are open, representative and fair.

Lack of training for JRVs (see Annex 4)

By far, the most common problems observed on Election Day stemmed from the poor training of the JRVs. This lack of training underscores the fragility of a fair and democratic electoral process because it opens the doors to both intentional fraud and mistakes. In addition, the lack of training contributes in a material way to general confusion and chaos of the voting process and, by extension, to the frustration of many voters. Observed examples of poor training included:

• Lack of knowledge among the JRVs during the pre-opening set-up – Most JRVs appeared completely unfamiliar with the materials contained in the electoral packet, causing chaos at nearly every table. Each JRV seemed to order the steps of the voting process differently and to affix their voter registry in a different way and location.

• Mistakes in the voting procedures of the JRVs and vigilantes – Another key result of the lack of pre-opening training for the JRVs was the high number of mistakes made in the voting of JRVs, vigilantes and supervisors. Many failed to collect carnets, ink fingers, take fingerprints and stamp the voting list. Throughout the day, Observers saw tables rectifying these steps.

• Voting centers opened late because of level of disorganization – Nearly every one of the more than 75 voting centers covered by Mission observers opened late; often by nearly 1 hour. In the smaller centers this can largely be attributed to the level of disorganization and poor training of the JRVs in completing the installation process of the tables. In the voting centers with more than 25 tables, this basic problem was exacerbated by the logistical impossibility of distributing the materials to all the JRVs and having them complete the installation process in the one hour time period usually allowed.

• Easily intimidated and influenced by Supervisors and Jefes de Centro – Supervisors and Jefes de Centro were seen giving instructions and resolving problems. While this is a part of their responsibilities they very often used intimidation and strong-arm tactics to resolve problems in favor of their parties and taking advantage of the poor training of the JRVs. Well-trained JRVs would not need as much help and would be more likely to stand up to intimidation.

• Lack of knowledge about the steps in the voting procedures – There was no standard set-up seen among the JRVs; every table ordered the steps in the voting procedure differently, opening the possibility of intentional fraud by one or members of a given JRV. As a result, Observers saw numerous cases in which steps in the process were forgotten – taking finger prints, inking the finger, stamping the electoral register (padron) after voting. In addition, numerous cases were observed where the voter signed and was finger-printed before voting, increasing the chances of getting an ink mark on their ballots which could cause their ballots to be invalidated.

• Failure to adhere to assigned duties – Observers saw many cases in which vigilantes were performing the duties of JRV members such as signing ballots, inking a voter’s finger, handing ballots to voters, etc. Such activities are prohibited by the Electoral Code, but were very common. In addition, Observers saw many cases of JRV and vigilantes leaving their tables for long periods without being replaced by their alternatives. The tables simply didn’t have all their members at these times, increasing the amount of work for the remaining members and increasing the chances for intentional and accidental mistakes.

• Confusion about closing procedures – The counting of the votes is the most important step in the election process, yet the JRV were clearly under-trained in proper closing procedures, resulting in a failure to follow all steps in the closing process. The following oversights were observed during closing procedures:

                      o Counting both Assembly and Municipal ballots at the same time

                      o Allowing the direct involvement of vigilantes in the counting process

                      o Failure to count ballot corners as a verification step

                      o Failure to check signatures and stamp of President while counting

                         ballots

                      o Not counting unused ballots nor removing them from the table

                      o Unfamiliar with the differences between impugned, null votes and

                         abstentions

                      o Not verifying that there are still a total of 400 ballots, as in the opening

                         act

                      o Difficulty in accurately completing the Actas

                      o Not properly sealing the boxes containing the counted votes

Inadequate voting locations (see Annex 5)

• Confusing center configurations – The order and placement of tables in many of the voting centers covered by the Mission were confusing. In several cases, the tables were not in alphabetic order while in others, voting tables were on many levels and crammed into remote corners. This required many voters to spend a long time searching for their voting table. Observers noted voters going from table to table asking where to vote, and being sent around in circles. After an extensive search for their names on the voting registries of several tables, many frustrated voters gave up and left the voting centers without voting.

• Lack of guaranteed right to vote in secrecy – One of the most common problems recorded by Mission observers was the general lack of voting privacy. Although in most cases voting booths were closed on three sides and generally located a sufficient distance from the JRV tables, voters rarely had full voting privacy due to the number of people – other voters – passing on all sides. Again, related to voting center layout, there was often confused crowding around voting areas, resulting in little privacy for the voter. In addition, in some cases, party vigilantes observed people voting. This is discussed in more detail in point #3 below.

• Disorder and crowding – Poor voting center layout and inefficient processing of voters caused in large part, a great deal of disorder and crowding in voting center passageways and around the voting booths. This, in turn, added further to the inefficiency of the voting process. For the most part, nobody controlled the flow of voter traffic, such as in asking waiting voters to stand in lines and or by moving finished voters out of the voting table area after reclaiming their cards.

• Limited handicap accessibility – Vigilantes and Scouts did a great job of helping handicapped voters in a few voting centers. However, overall, there seemed to be little support for handicapped voters. Observers reported many instances where these special voters received no assistance and / or were not guaranteed the right to secrecy since crowds of people bystanders usually watched them vote. In addition, the multi-level layout of many of the voting centers demonstrates a systematic failure to account of the special needs of handicapped voters.

• Insufficient lighting – Lighting after dark was a problem in nearly all of the voting centers in which Mission Observers worked. JRVs were forced to interrupt the delicate counting and paperwork phase of their work in order to move their tables closer to light sources. In many instances, there simply was no light and JRVs either worked in darkness or used lighters or flashlights to guide their work. Given the critical nature of vote counting and filling out the Actas, every possible effort should be made to provide adequate lighting, even if the lighting arrangement is temporary. Not providing sufficient lighting is unacceptable.

Influencing of voters (see Annex 6)

• Presence of party propaganda in and around voting centers – Many of the voting centers were awash in party colors on Election Day. Vigilantes, Supervisors, Jefes de Centro and the party-sponsored teams providing the endless stream of food were all wearing party vests, shirts and hats while party-sponsored buses and trucks constantly passed by the voting centers.

• Influencing of voters by vigilantes – A vigilante’s role is to oversee the electoral process, at a given table, on Election Day. There were numerous cases in which a vigilante would grab a voter’s card as soon as the voter entered the center and lead them to their table. Vigilantes were also noted taking cards from voter’s hands while the voter was searching for their name in the registry. Other inappropriate activities included handing ballots to voters, leading voters to the voting booth, and helping the voter put their ballot in the box. Finally, vigilantes were often seen standing only a short distance behind voting booths watching the voter vote.

• Food distribution in full party colors – As alluded to in the previous point, voting centers were full of party-sponsored teams dressed in party vests handing out drink and food to their JRV and vigilantes.

• Free lunches given away outside centers – While party teams were busy giving away food inside the centers, there were also reports of parties giving away free lunches and having BBQs outside the voting centers in exchange for promises to vote for sponsoring parties. The Electoral Code forbids this because it is interpreted as both vote buying and as campaigning inside the three-day no-campaigning period before the election.

• Lack of voter secrecy while voting – As discussed in earlier points, voters often were not allowed to vote in privacy due to the presence of other voters and vigilantes, thus voter secrecy was not guaranteed.

• Campaigning of candidates inside voting centers – Observers in nearly every voting center – over 75 – reported seeing candidates campaigning inside voting centers. This included centers in which the candidates were NOT registered to vote. In nearly every case, 10 or more clapping, shouting or singing supporters followed their candidates. The crowds would quickly grow as vigilantes and Supervisors inside the center would join the party entourages. These mini-rallies would last between 15-30 minutes and create serious disruptions in the voting centers. At times, opposing parties would raise a counter-cheer, adding to and prolonging the disruption. Such activities created serious pressures on the voter.

• Presence of party colors / propaganda in party-provided transportation – While political parties are allowed to provide free transportation to voters, it is forbidden to show party colors on the transport. Nearly every party transport vehicle seen by Mission Observers around the voting centers was displaying party colors. This tactic can significantly influence voters in one of two ways. First, voters may have to promise to vote for the party providing the transportation in order to be allowed to use the transportation, a violation both of their right to secrecy and to choose a party free from intimidation or influence. Secondly, the voter may simply feel obligated to vote for the party that provided them with transportation, again imposing on their freedom of choice. These tactics have an even greater possibility of pressuring the voters in rural communities where transportation options are limited.

Information centers (see Annex 7)

We believe that voter information centers should be called out and discussed as a separate point, given their potentially powerful influence on voters. These centers, which provided on-line voting information either from the CDs given out by the TSE or from the TSE webpage, were used for the first time in the 2003 elections in major population centers. Through these centers voters can get voting center location and voting table numbers, which can save them a great deal of time. While such voting centers represent a great stride forward in simplifying the voting process, several points must be raised about these voting centers based on Mission observations.

• In addition to providing voting center information, the voter’s personal information – such as address and phone number - is also available. There is no need for such information to be included in the database and represents an opportunity for abuse by the political parties or others with access to the database. \

• FMLN and ARENA were the primary providers of these information centers on Election Day. At the start of the Election Day, both parties were almost universally observed giving voters information printed with their party colors, flags or slogans, a direct violation of the Electoral Code. The smaller political parties and members of the JEDs and JEMs quickly condemned this practice. However, it shows a conscious effort on the part of both parties to exploit a new medium.

• Further, cases of disinformation were observed in which voters were given the wrong voting center information, causing them to waste time and money going to the wrong place. The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. Left in the hands of the political parties, these information centers represent an enormous potential source of fraud if used to intentionally deceive voters. As there was NO oversight of these centers, there is no way to prove malicious intent after the fact.

Low proportion of TSE, PDDH and Fiscal officials

In light of the generally poor training, the JRVs were ill prepared to handle many of the problems that arose during the elections. However, often the only neutral authority in a voting center was the JEM representative and the Mission Observers, leaving JRVs few neutral options for escalating problems. In fact, Mission Observers were repeatedly asked for advice on a wide variety of issues, but given our Observer status, we were generally unable to help. Instead, the JRVs had to rely primarily on the Supervisors and the Jefes de Centro, who almost always pushed the interests of their parties.

Closing procedures: Lack of organization, process and security (see Annex 8)

• Too many people in the voting centers – Mission Observers reported that the voting centers were full of people after the doors closed at 5pm. It was unclear who many of these people were as they did not have JRV or vigilante identification. As a result, the volume of people added to the general confusion in the centers during the voting process, making the counting process much more difficult to control. Frequently, there were 10 or more people standing around the tables watching the vote counting, but, again, it was unclear who many of these people were.

• Lack of clear neutral authority in the voting centers – The closing process is complex. With two ballot boxes, many political parties, and a great deal of paperwork to fill out after a long day of work, there was a lot of confusion and many questions about the closing procedures. It seemed that the JRVs were largely left on their own to struggle through problems. There was no clear and strong presence of a neutral electoral authority that was available to answer questions and guide JRVs through the closing process steps. Usually one TSE representative was present to collect their copies of the Acts, but this was clearly not enough to handle the questions and problems even in relatively small voting centers.

• Training & guidelines for addressing impugned and null ballots – Determining the intention of the voter in unclear ballots was a significant problem during the counting process. Not only did many JRVs not know the difference between an impugned vote and a null vote, but they also didn’t know how to process or record such votes. As a result, there can be little doubt that many votes that did not show clear intention were handled and recorded incorrectly. Further, Mission Observers reported cases of intentional fraud in which votes showing a clear intention were classified as null or impugned because of aggressive JRV members. Because only impugned votes can be recounted, any misidentification or improper recording of such of such votes whether accidental or intentional can have a significant impact on the outcome of elections, especially in light of the number of municipalities that were decided by only a small number of votes. Therefore, better training, and better oversight are needed in the counting process.

• Burdensome and difficult paperwork – The JRVs had to complete a huge volume of paperwork after counting the ballots, making 3 original duplicates for each of the two elections. In the best of conditions, this is a challenging task, but with poor training, poor lighting conditions and after working 12+ hours, completing this volume of paperwork without errors is nearly impossible. In some voting centers, the filling out of paperwork began before the official 5pm voting center closing time in order to hurry up the Acta delivery process.

• Interference of party representatives – The completion of the Actas by the JRVs was further compromised by the frequent interruptions of the party Supervisors looking for the latest vote counts. In addition, the Supervisors of the losing parties often become hostile towards the JRV members. There was no regulation of Supervisor interaction with the JRVs, leaving them free to interfere as they pleased. This added to the overall confusion and tension of the counting process.

• Lack of procedures for closing and sealing boxes after counting – The boxes containing the counted ballots were closed and sealed in a very haphazard manner. Many boxes seen in the voting centers and the JEM collection centers were not properly sealed. In some cases, ballots were literally falling out of the boxes while in others, the boxes were not sealed at all or not sealed well enough to keep someone from getting into them easily. Given the late hour, the fatigue of all the people involved, the transportation of the ballots and the darkness, the chances for fraud at this final stage of the voting day are frightfully obvious. In fact, as post-election news articles revealed, ballots and boxes were found in garbage cans in several municipalities. In the case of Estanzuelas (discussed in the next section), ballots were actually found in an opened box belonging to a different municipality located 40 kms away. It must be very strongly emphasized that more secure procedures must be put into place to secure all voting boxes to ensure no fraud happens in this critical final stage of the voting process.

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Post-Election comments / observations

In the days following the election, cries were raised about the validity of the election results in several municipalities. According to the media, 22 cases were being reviewed by the TSE for fraud or other anomalies. In addition, several cases have been reported of ballot boxes, Actas and ballots themselves being thrown away and found in garbage cans.

Although the CIS Mission does not have specific details on the majority of these 22 reported cases, the Mission was directly involved in one case in the municipality of Estanzuelas.

Before discussing the details of this case, it is essential to raise the point that while the majority of the Mission’s work ends on Election Day, there is a post-election validation process done by the TSE. This validation process is critical in establishing the credibility of the results. As such, any problems detected in the TSE’s conduct of this validation process raises serious concerns about the credibility of the election results. The case of Estanzuelas raises just such a concern:

In the municipality of Estanzuelas, the FMLN lost the election to ARENA by two votes (1178 to 1176). According to Article 260 of the Electoral Code, in cases where the difference in the vote is less than the number of impugned (or disputed) votes, the losing party can request a review of the impugned votes. There were nine impugned votes contained in the following six ballot boxes: 5452 – 1; 5455 – 2; 5456 – 2; 5457 – 1; 5461- 2; and 5464- 1. Because the number of impugned votes exceeded the difference in the final results, the FMLN requested a review.

At 10am on Monday, March 24th, the TSE held a meeting at the Proyecto Electoral in Santa Elena in order to open the 6 ballot boxes containing the 9 impugned votes. The magistrates from the TSE were in charge of the proceedings and carried out the revision in public before the media, a CIS observer, and representatives of the ARENA and FMLN Parties. Box 5452 was the first ballot box to be reviewed. When the magistrates removed the impugned ballot, it was clearly marked for the FMLN. Then, the workers brought out ballot box 4554 which had the name Ozatlan handwritten on it. Ozatlan is another municipality in Usulután located about 40 kilometers away from Estanzuelas. The magistrates of the TSE asked the workers to continue looking for box 5455 from Estanzuelas. When the box could not be produced, the meeting was adjourned until 5 p.m. that same day.

When the TSE, ARENA, FMLN, media and international observers reconvened at 5 p.m., the session was moved behind closed doors. Only the 5 TSE magistrates and the 2 legal representatives each from the FMLN and ARENA were allowed into the proceedings. Apparently, the impugned ballots in the remaining four boxes totaled: 2 votes for the FMLN; 2 votes for ARENA; 1 vote for the PDC; and 2 nullified votes. Ballot box 5455, which contained the two additional impugned votes, never reappeared.

Mysteriously, the unsealed box 4554 from Ozatlan, which had been brought out during the morning meeting, contained the two missing impugned votes from Estanzuelas. The TSE magistrates unanimously voted to accept the impugned votes from the box. The FMLN representatives walked out of the proceedings so as not to legitimate the fraud. Without reviewing the entire contents of the box, apparently the “impugned votes” from Ozatlan contained 1 vote for MR and 1 vote for ARENA.

At the end of the evening’s proceedings, the magistrates declared ARENA the winner without explaining how or why the ballot box from Ozatlan was opened or how the Estanzuelas ballots got into a box from Ozatlan. Clearly, the evidence and the ballot box were contaminated and the two so-called impugned votes could have been easily switched with valid votes in order to secure the outcome desired.

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Recommendations

• Immediate implementation of the DUI / and residential-based voting. Problems related to transportation and floating votes would be much more easily solved with the implementation of residential-based voting. Implementing the DUI would further overcome problems with the current electoral registry (pardon). Residential voting would facilitate the participation of citizens in general, but especially women and people with scarce economic resources who have more difficulty taking the day off and paying for transportation to be able to vote.

• Make the DUI free. Currently, the DUI costs $10.31. The vast majority of Salvadorans simply cannot afford this. As a required national document, the government should be obligated to provide it free of charge, just as the current Electoral Carnet is free.

• Guarantee the rights of the citizens to elect their municipal and departmental representatives:

                  1. Reform Article 119 of the Electoral Code to include as a requirement that

                      members of the JRVs and Vigilantes along with their alternates should be

                      registered to vote in the municipality where they are working.

                  2. Reform Article 248 of the Electoral Code in the precise part about the

                      form that Supervisors, Jefes de Centro, and Legal Representatives of

                      each party or coalition vote. Stipulate that these officials also vote

                      and named to work on the day of the elections is where they are registered

                      to vote.

                  3. Enforce Electoral Code 22, point 9 which states that people register in

                      their domicile, understood as where they live, work, or were born.

• Facilitate free TSE transport in all municipalities until residential voting is implemented. The TSE provides transportation in the largest population areas, but does nothing for the people living in rural areas. These people must rely on party-provided transportation or walk if they don’t have their own transport. Ironically, the public buses that usually serve these communities do not run on Election Day due, largely, to the influence of political parties.

• “Despartidizar” the TSE at the national level. As discussed in the “Campaign” section of this report and implied throughout, the current TSE structure is a deeply embedded source of the political challenges in El Salvador. Whether the issue is providing training to JRVs, transportation to voters, ensuring a clean campaign or guaranteeing an accurate voter registry, the TSE is the key force in electoral matters. Therefore, it must be made as inherently non-biased as possible.” Additionally, the administrative and jurisdictional functions of the TSE should be separated. The TSE should not be both the judge and jury on electoral matters.

• The TSE should guarantee institutional continuity immediately on the ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice of the unconstitutionality of Electoral Code 13. Mechanisms should be in place to guarantee proportional representation of deputies in the Legislative Assembly for the legislative elections of 2006.

• Consider establishing pluralistic City Councils. The current system of “winner take all” on city councils does not guarantee representation of citizens in local governments. Proportional representation would help guarantee coherency from one administration to the next. More importantly, plural city councils would facilitate reducing the tension, polarization, and violence that sometimes results by promoting a culture of consensus building and debate at the local level.

• Strengthen the Role of the Junta de Vigilancia Electoral (JVE), granting them economic autonomy so they can carry out their work of oversight and fiscalization of the TSE in an efficient manner.

• The Electoral Fiscal should assume its role in an independent and efficient manner.

• Emphasis on education of electoral bodies at all levels by the TSE. As discussed in this report, lack of training underlies many of the problems observed in the elections.

• Guarantee adequate lighting in voting center. Also, as previously proposed, the electoral packets should include a flashlight in order to compensate for lighting deficiencies in voting centers as well as for power outages (as occurred this year in San Salvador, Mejicanos and Cojutepeque among other places).

• The TSE should provide computer information centers in places accessible to the majority of the population in all 262 municipalities the day of the elections.

• Remove personal data, such as telephone numbers and address from the web pages of the TSE and the JVE in order to guarantee the privacy of each registered voter. Prohibit the selling of this data.

• Guarantee secret vote through better voting center planning and review of the current voting booth design.

• Guarantee correct procedure for sealing voting boxes with adequate materials such as using a stronger tape to prevent contamination of the materials after they leave from the JEM.

• TSE should provide copies of the Observer Regulations to all respective electoral organizations – Although most JED and JEM members cooperated fully with the Mission, the majority were not aware of the regulation allowing international observers. As a result, a few JED and JEM members were hostile and uncooperative towards observers. The hostility included efforts to keep Mission Observers from meeting with the JEDs or JEMs and out of voting centers on Election Day. Also, in some municipalities, the Observers were threatened with removal from the voting centers for taking photographs.

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Annexes

ANNEX 1 (return to top) (return to text)

List of countries/regions represented in 2003 CIS Election Observer Mission

1. Germany

2. Argentina

3. Australia

4. Austria

5. Canada

6. Spain

7. United States

8. France

9. Great Britain

10. Japan

11. México

12. Norway

13. New Zealand

14. Basque Country

15. Sweden

List of Organizations represented:

• Inter Religious Task Force on Central America, Cleveland, Ohio

• Veterans for Peace, United States

• Euskal Fondoa, Basque Country

• Casa de la Solidaridad – Network of students from Jesuit Universities

• Latín Amerikan Gruppen, Norway

• Common Borders, British Colombia, Canada

• Marin Inter-Faith Task Force , California

• University of Dayton, Dept. of Philosophy

• International Christian University, Tokyo

• SALVAID, Toronto, Canada

• Sierra Club, Canada

• CRISPAZ

• INTERSOL, Austria

• Various Catholic, Presbyterian, Unitarian and Episcopal churches

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ANNEX 2 (return to top) (return to text)

List of Municipalities covered by 2003 CIS Election Observer Mission

ANNEX 3 (return to top) (return to text)

Voters unable to vote due inconsistencies between voter registries and voting cards

• San Pedro Masahuat – several cases reported of carnet numbers not matching registry.

• Mejicanos

                o  Rosa Ramirez – name not in the voter registry

                o  Roberto Romero – carnet # (01011601460006) did not match the registry

                o  Dora del Carmen Sanchez de Clara’s (0503120447003) name was not in

                    the registry

                o  JRV 1168 – Luz Marina Vasquez Perez (01010102630004) presented a

                    card that did not correspond with the number in the registry. The table

                    allowed her to vote.

                o  JRV 1158 – man unable to vote because someone had already voted in his

                    name with a false card.

                o  JRV 1160 - reported finding the name of a deceased person on their

                     registry.

                o  JRV 1116 – sent several people listed in their registry to other tables to

                    vote.

• San Salvador

                o  Ines Diaz Zelaya (03162104430001) Centro Escolar Jorge Larde, had a

                    card but did not appear on the registry

                o  Reina Esperanza Palacios (01191101600001) Instituto Nacional Tecnico

                    Industrial, had a card but did not appear on the registry

• Suchitoto

                o  Observed a man try to vote who discovered that someone else with the

                    same name and same carnet number had already voted in his place. He

                    was unable to vote.

• San Matías

                o  Felipe Canjura (01082210470001) was unable to vote because someone

                    else had signed in the wrong place on the registry.

                o  Approximately 40 people with voting cards in San Matías mysteriously

                    appeared on the voter registries of other municipalities. Therefore, they

                    were not allowed to vote in San Matías, where their voting cards were valid.

• El Paisnal

                o  Three voters who were in the voter Master registry and the table registries

                    were not allowed to vote because they were registered or had residency in

                    another town. One of these people was Maximo Chavez Gonzalez

                   (011616082550001).

• Cojutepeque

                o  Cecilia Munguia Serrano’s carnet number did not match the registry at the

                    JRV table

                o  Carlos Antonio Vasquez (10011206780002) was unable to vote because

                     the carnet number did not match the registry.

                o  In addition, several inconsistencies in carnet numbers were reported

                    between the master registry outside the voting centers and registries at the

                    voting tables.

• San Miguel

                o  Miguel Angel Alvarado Benitez (03012109450003) was told he could not

                    vote because his name did not appear in the table registry although it did

                   appear in the displayed registry. It turns out, the JRV member did not know

                   how to find double last names.

                o  Luis Alonso Castellon (03011101690007) could not vote because his

                    name did not appear on the table registry although it did appear on the

                   display registry.

                o  Griselda Ortiz (03012502700009) and Guadalupe Ponce Amaya

                   (1306121251002) could not vote because their names did not appear in the

                    registry.

                o  Elsy Nohemy Acosta (03010101990022) could not vote because the carnet

                    number posted on the display registry did not match the table registry.

ANNEX 3.1 (return to top) (return to text)

List of Voters with voting cards in Zaragoza who appeared in the registries of OTHER municipalities without the consent of the voter

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ANNEX 4 (return to top) (return to text)

Lack of training of JRVs

Lack of knowledge among the JRVs during the pre-opening set-up

Mejicanos

• At the Escuela Japón, the voter registry lists were posted out of alphabetical order, making it difficult for voters to find their names.

• Frequently the voter registry lists at the tables were not posted in alphabetical order.

San Miguel - Little consistency in the opening procedures, voting procedures and closing procedures. Many JRVs seemed entirely unfamiliar with the various processes.

Estanzuelas - There was general confusion during set up and no consistency in the placement of ballot boxes according to the pre-established voting center map prepared and agreed to by the JEM.

Santa Ana - Frequent disorganization for setting up centers and JRVs. In addition, the voter registry lists were generally set out but not always sequentially or accessibly.

Zaragoza, La Libertad - Many of the JRV’s were confused at how to setup the voting tables were not well trained.

Mistakes in the voting procedures of the JRVs and vigilantes

San Salvador - JRV 1 - huge disagreement about who was supposed to vote at this table. Vigilantes from tables 1-20 thought they were to vote there. JEM and supervisors intervened and assured that the correct people voted there, but the confusion continued until near 9:00, when public voting finally began. (About 60 people ended up voting there before first public voter.)

San Matías

• JRV 5077 - the members of the JRV, the Jefes de Centro, members of the JEM, and Supervisors all voted in the morning without signing the first pages of the registry. There was confusion about the process, and the president of the JEM seemed unsure of the proper procedure.

• The vigilantes and suplentes interfered in the opening of the electoral packages. The JRV's could not gain control of the situation because of the lack of information regarding who had the ultimate authority of the handling of the materials.

El Paisnal

• JRV 2483 – JRV did not tint fingers and President said it was not necessary. The JRV member’s fingers were never tinted.

• Overall problem with the identification of people authorized to work at the tables. As a result, several JRV teams, Supervisors and Jefes de Centro did not vote until late in the afternoon.

Mercedes Umaña - Many of the JRV members lacked proper credentials.

San Miguel – At JRV 3650 the FMLN demanded to see the carnets in the JRVs possession. Discovered that at least three ARENA Supervisors were seen voting at this table, which was NOT the first JRV in the voting center.

Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután

• Most JRV members were not inked initially

• JRV 5549 - Secretary voted at the table at 9:03am

Estanzuelas, USULUTÁN - At least 6 sets of JRVs did not dip their fingers in ink after voting

Jayaque, La Libertad - The Supervisors and Jefes del Centro did not vote at the first JRV

Puerto de la Libertad

• JRV 4747 - vigilantes voted in the morning but did not stamp, sign, and add their names to the voter list until 2pm

• JEM president took no action when informed by CIS observer that vocales at JRV 4708 presented only photocopied credentials.

Zaragoza, La Libertad – JRV 5055 - did not remove the corners on several ballots during the voting of JRVs and vigilantes.”

San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz –

• In some cases, Supervisors and vigilantes voted and left without signing or thumb printing the registry.

• Some JRV members themselves, although having voted, also went the entire day without staining their own fingers with ink.

Easily intimidated and influenced by the Supervisors and Jefes de Centro

San Miguel - An ARENA Supervisor was observed changing the name on a TSE authorization document in order to allow an alternate ARENA representative at the JRV. The Supervisor would not allow the Observer to see the document.

San Matías - JRV 5084 - Confusion about whether or not the party vigilantes had to give up their carnets after voting. The ARENA Supervisor told the vigilantes said “no”, but the FMLN Supervisor said “yes”.

San Salvador - JRV 102 - The FMLN Supervisor told President of JRV to remove JRV member from PSD because he did not have a carnet. Supervisor told all the tables that people without carnets could not be part of the JRV. JEM later told the JRV’s that this was not true and allowed PSD person to return.

Voting centers opened late because of level of disorganization

Mejicanos - All three voting centers opened at least one hour late (INAM opened at 8:30)

San Salvador

• Feria Internacional - voting center did not open until 8:53 AM.

• Numerous tables did not finish with the voting of their members until 7:30, even 8:00.

• JRV 012 – the JRV members were still voting while line of voters was forming at the table.

• JRVs 44-47 had no tables until 6:45.

• JRV 36 - received their boxes at 8:00.

Cinquera, Cabañas - voting center opened at 8:15am

El Paisnal, San Salvador

• the voting center opened at 8:45am. Due to the late opening, there were big crowds for several hours.

• The PDC delegation arrived at 6:50am, after the set up process had begun.

San Miguel, San Miguel

• Voting center opened at 7:45am.

• JRV 3465 – Vigilantes were stilling at 7:50 while members of the public were voting.

Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután

• Voting center opened at 7:30am

• Tables not finished voting when doors opened to citizens at 7:30

Estanzuelas, Usulután - Voting center opened at 8 am

Jayaque, La Libertad - Voting center opened at 8:15 am due to the lack of a form which was not included in the packets

Tamanique, La Libertad - Voting center opened at 7:30 am

Puerto de La Libertad - Voting center opened between 7:30-7:45 am

San Jose Villanueva, La Libertad - Voting center opened at 8:05 am

Zaragoza, La Libertad - Voting center opened at 8:20 am

San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz - Voting center opened at 8 am

Suchitoto - the voting center opened at 7:00 to the public, although several JRV members as well as vigilantes had not finished voting.

Santa Ana, Santa Ana – The voting process of the JRV and vigilantes at nearly every table was very disorganized and late.

Anomalies in the voting process

San Pedro Masahuat

• JRV 6917 – president wasn’t signing the ballots at the beginning of day. Problem corrected by JEM

• JRV 6915 – Corners were not being torn off ballots. Problem corrected by JEM.

• Pre-signing and pre-stamping of was widespread

• Several tables had voters sign and finger-print before voting. Others were inking fingers before the voter cast their vote.

• At one table, the Secretary stamped entire page of registry at one time instead of after each vote.

Mejicanos

• JRV 1090 – the ballot boxes were taped on the shelf inside the voting booth, violating the requirement that the boxes be in plain sight.

• Centro Escolar Japón – several JRVs forgot to tear the corners off the ballots, at many others, the JRV did not have their fingers inked

• JRVs 1080, 1062, 1084 – the secretaries didn’t have their fingers inked

• JRV 1074 – no member of the JRV had their fingers inked.

• JRV 1072 – only two members of the JRV had their fingers marked.

San Salvador

• Numerous presidents would sign 10-20 ballots all at once, rather than do it voter by voter.

• Numerous tables would collect up to four Carnets at once, rather than one at a time.

• Numerous times voters handed their Carnets to the secretary or vocal, and the president never even looked at or touched it.

• JRV 169 voters signed the roster before voting.

• JRV 45 - After voter voted and placed ballots in boxes, secretary finally scrutinized her Carnet, found a discrepancy (she had printed instead of signed her name on the Carnet), and the supervisor was called over. Supervisor looked at Carnet and decided that she shouldn’t vote, and when found out that she had already voted, had to let her slide because her votes were already cast.

• JRV 185: JRV takes thumbprint of voter before voting.

• Some JRVs did not remove the corners from ballots.

• JRVs 395, 378 – the JRV secretaries verified carnets instead of the President.

San Matías - no table was able to follow the procedure of signing in voters and stamping fingerprints. Voters were observed signing in the wrong place, preventing other registered voters from voting. Observed that Felipe Canjura (01082210470001) was unable to vote for this exact reason.

El Paisnal - JRV 2494 – President was pre-tearing the corners off of up to 15 ballots.

San Miguel - JRV 3465 – Voters were asked to sign and finger print before receiving their ballot.

Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután - At some tables, voters were asked to sign the registry before voting.

Estanzuelas: One JRV secretary was seen stamping “voto” in the registry after the voting center had closed because they had forgotten to do it throughout the day.

· La Palma, Chalatenango – At several tables, the Presidents of the JRVs were admitting voters without thoroughly checking their voting cards or searching voters for marks of indelible ink.

Santa Ana - JRVs often inconsistent and inefficient in their layout of voting process steps. Some JRVs required thumbprint before voting completed.

Puerto La Libertad - Each table had a different process for registering and checking voters - some tables would take fingerprints, others not, etc.

Zaragoza, La Libertad - Many JRVs did not take voter thumb prints and were signing and stamping several ballots ahead of arrival of voters

Failure to adhere to assigned duties and usurpation of electoral functions

San Salvador

• JRV 147 ARENA vigilante with vest on was taking position of president while she was in restroom, and he was sitting at the table, taking Carnets, and stamping ballots.

• Numerous times, vigilantes wearing colors would sit at table and even participate. Many members of the tables were not wearing their nametags (especially toward the end of the day) and would do each others’ jobs, but nobody seemed to mind.

• At times only two people at some tables.

• JRV 98 - secretary did not have ink on any of her fingers.

• JRV 19 – At 4:50pm a vigilante who had been gone all day came back to her table to vote. Supervisor and members of table didn’t let her.

Suchitoto - a PCN vigilante, with party vest, was observed sitting behind one of the JRV desk.

San Miguel - JRV 3465 – A vocal was seen doing the duties of the President and Secretary without questioning by other people at the table.

Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután

• President handed ballots to voters while the secretary stamped the ballots, other vocals taking corners off

• JRV 5535 - Thumbprints were not taken after voting

Zaragoza, La Libertad - Many members of JRVs and vigilantes periodically left the tables without replacements throughout the afternoon and after the voting ended.

La Palma – JRV 7285 – The JRV president and secretary retired to a classroom and began to complete some of the Actas. In their absence a substitute took the secretary’s place and a vigilante took place of president. TSE discovered and resolved the problem.

Incorrect procedures and violations in the vote counting

San Pedro Masahuat

• Non-JRV and non-vigilante people were seen holding ballots.

• JRV 6912 – both ballot boxes were open at the same time and distributed to the vigilantes to hold during the counting.

• Many tables did not check the validity of the ballots (did not check for signature and stamp of JRV President).

• Many tables were seen writing down results before doing the final tally, causing them to have to correct the earlier work.

Mejicanos

• There were JRVs at all three voting centers that did not follow proper procedures.

• When it was clear that the FMLN had won in almost every JRV, the Supervisors, Jefes de Centros and vigilantes from the other parties began leaving, even though the counting process was not completed.

• In the Centro Escolar Uruguay, one FMLN secretary and two vocals were left to guard all the voting boxes and Actas. In addition, the PCN JEM member wanted to leave so the secretary at one table had him sign the Actas before they were completely filled out.

• There was wide-spread competition to see which tables could get their votes counted first, regardless of proper procedure.

San Salvador

• Some tables let vigilantes count votes, rather than the president doing it.

• JRV 1 – A vocal noticed that ballot corners had not been counted yet, and the president had already started writing the final results on the actas. After they counted the pink corners (185), they decided they didn’t need to count the yellow ones. 10-15 minutes later they finally counted the yellow corners because of some disagreement (185). There were 215 ballots left over. But the votes for both diputado and alcalde added up to 186. There was no recount; the president just wrote those results on all the Actas.

• Feria Internacional - People other than the President of the JRV counted the ballots

• JRV 361 - Did not verify the presence of the ink stamp on the ballots.

Suchitoto

• At several tables the ballots were handled and held by the vigilantes. After all the ballots had been handed out, the vigilantes counted the votes at the same time but NOT in front of JRV from other parties.

• Only ONE table checked each ballot for the signature and stamp of the JRV President.

El Paisnal

• JRV 2486 – the vote count was done carelessly and had to be redone later because of errors.

• JRV 2494 – the President did show the ballot in full view to the table and several times passed it quickly to the man next to him. He only showed the FMLN ballots while the others he counted in a less visible manner.

• Much confusion about where to put the ballots when counted: either in the boxes directly or in the designated envelopes.

Mercedes Umaña - JRVs, in general, appeared to struggle with the steps in the closing process which caused delays and mistakes.

Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután

• The vigilantes were directly involved in the process of counting votes at all the tables.

• JRV 5536 - PPR vigilantes pulled out votes and ran the whole process

• Many tables failed to count ballot corners as a verification step

• Most tables failed to check signatures and stamp of President while counting votes

• Several tables did not verify that all votes totaled to 400

• JRV 5540 - not all members of the JRV signed the final Actas

Estanzuelas, Usulután

• The majority of JRVs were not familiar with closing procedures, which lengthened the process, heightened tensions, and increased possibility of errors occurring.

• JRV were unfamiliar with the differences between impugn and null votes.

• Several JRVs had difficulty in completing the Actas, including confusion about which copies of which Acta should go in which envelope.

• Most of the JRVs had to reconfigure their Actas, envelopes, and ballots, because they were incorrectly organized when they were submitted.

La Palma, Chalatenango

• Most tables failed to check for the signature and stamp of the JRV President while counting votes.

• Tables were unfamiliar with the differences between impugn and null votes

• JRV 7275 - JRV president left center without signing 2 of the documents, while the secretary left without signing any documents.

• JRVs were seen handing over paperwork without having stamped all the copies of each document.

Santa Ana, Santa Ana

• Vigilantes were directly involved counting and holding the ballots at nearly all tables in 4 voters centers observed in the afternoon.

• Often vigilantes were holding the ballots of the smaller parties who did not have a representative on the JRV.

• Near universal failure to count ballot corners as a verification step

• Near universal failure to check signatures and stamp of President while counting votes

• Most tables did not count the blank votes and did not remove them from the table.

Tamanique, La Libertad

• The vigilantes were directly involved in the counting process

• At one JRV, when the members couldn’t find all the rolled ballots, they relied on the informal tally sheet of one of the vigilantes to record the numbers in Acta.

• Observed that JRV members did not recognize that PMR is Movimiento Renovador and considered PMR votes to be null.

• One table counted coalition votes that did not have all parties in the coalition marked as being null votes.

• Many tables had difficulty completing the Actas.

• Observed many careless reporting errors on the Actas.

Puerto de la Libertad, La Libertad

• Not counting blank votes and removing them from the table:

• JRVs 4726 and 4738 – did not count the blank votes and did not remove them from the table before counting the completed ballots.

• Tables did not verifying that all votes total to 400.

• JRVs 4728, 4749, 4723 - Data was partly corrected without recounting or re-verification

• JRV 4727 - a representative discretionally added 42 and 36 votes to the MR on the Acta without recount or consulting with other JRV members.

San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz – Non-vigilantes were signing the Actas as vigilantes.

San Matías – Voting continued until 6:30pm.

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ANNEX 5 (return to top) (return to text)

Inadequate voting locations

Confusing / poor center configurations

• San Salvador - JRVs 8-15 - had huge puddles of water on floor in front of tables and booths until about 9:00.

• Mejicanos – voters in the INAM and Centro Escolar Uruguay had difficulty finding their voting tables due to the size of the voting centers and non-alphabetical order of the tables.

• Nejapa - the voting center was poorly arranged and made worse by the absence of any signs indicating where the polling tables were located. It was difficult for voters to find their tables without the help of a party member.

• El Paisnal - The voting center was poorly arranged, making it difficult for people to find their names. This further slowed down the voting.

• San Matías - the voting center was poorly arranged and made worse by the absence of any signs indicating where the polling tables were located. It was difficult for voters to find their tables without the help of a party member.

• Cojutepeque

                 - The voting center was not closed off and access was not well controlled.

                   There were many vendors, bicyclists and non-voters simply hanging out in  

                   the voting center which caused the voting center to become very crowded in

                   the early morning and late afternoon.

                 - Many of the JRVs were in the direct sunlight all day as there was no natural

                   protection or tarps.

• San Miguel

                 - The voting center was not closed of and access was not well controlled

                   causing the center to become very crowded with non-voters, clowns,

                   vendors and party members in full party colors that were not working in the

                   election center.

                 - The layout and ordering of the tables was not well done and there were no

                   orientation aids despite the size of the voting center (323 tables).

                 - Many JRVs were forced to move during the day to stay out of the sun,

                   causing disruption and confusion.

• Estanzuelas, Usulután - the tables were not placed according to the voting center map causing people to wander around trying to find their polling place.

• La Palma, Chalatenango

                - JRVs 7277, 7278, 7280 didn’t have clearly posted voter registries making it

                  very hard for the voters to find their names.

                - Many voters did not seem to understand where to find the electoral register

                  upon entering the voting center. Observers saw and spoke with many people

                  who spent long periods of time searching for their names on the electoral

                  register and searching for the appropriate table.

• Santa Ana - serious voter problems in finding their JRV

• Jayaque, La Libertad – JRVs 4903, 4906, 4912, 4914, and 4917 were not well arranged.

• Puerto de La Libertad - Problems with the placement of voter booths and ballot boxes were quite apparent. Neither of these items was consistently placed.

Lack of guaranteed right to vote in secrecy

• Nejapa - Voting booths were not arranged to allow private voting as they had been placed below the second story balcony and were in clear view of anyone on the second story. This problem was rectified by mid-day by placing cardboard "roofs" over the voting booths. Other voting booths were also in clear view of the poll workers.

• Cojutepeque - Observers reported a lack of privacy at many of the voting booths.

• San Miguel - JRV 3703 – Voting booth was only 1 meter from the JRV table.

• Puerto de Triunfo, USULUTÁN – JRVs 5532, 5535-5539, 5543, 5546-5549 had poorly positioned voting booths which allowed people to see inside.

• Estanzuelas, USULUTÁN - The physical setup of the voting spaces made it difficult to ensure privacy, with the voting ‘booth’ close to the table and many people around the table, in addition to those waiting.

• La Palma, Chalatenango - During crowed times of the day, people searching for their names on the electoral register stood directly behind voters voting in the booths.

• Santa Ana - narrow corridors, awkward layout, some vigilantes standing too close, and family adult members entering voting booths with relatives were all common and compromised voting.

• Jayaque, La Libertad: JRVs 4904, 4906, 4909, 4912, 4914, 4915 – all did not offer adequate privacy to voters.

• San Jose Villanueva, La Libertad - Issues of privacy in voting were noticed.

• San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz - vigilantes were hovering inappropriately behind voting booths.

• Mejicanos - JRV 986 – frequent crowding around the voting booths, compromising privacy.

Disorder and crowding

• La Palma, Chalatenango - During much of the morning the voting center was very crowded. Voters had no room to form lines or keep clear of the voting tables and voting booths.

• Jayaque, La Libertad - The mixing of traffic for people lining up to vote, looking at voting registries, and voting created a crowded and confusing situation.

• Puerto de la Libertad – Observed one table where five “unidentified people sitting at the table.”

Limited handicap accessibility

• San Pedro Masahuat - Voting center contained a long flight of stairs. Handicapped voters had to be carried up the stairs.

• Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután - Occasions where voter’s right of privacy was not ensured. At JRV 5543, voters with disabilities had to vote at the JRV table.

• La Palma, Chalatenango - One observer noted that at least three physically handicapped people arrived and had no assistance in moving around the voting center.

Insufficient lighting

• San Rafael Cedros – poor lighting caused the voter carnet numbers of the JRV members to be recorded incorrectly and had to be changed.

• Cojutepeque - Poor lighting in the center made the closing procedures difficult for some of the JRVs. In addition, there was a power outage.

• Santa Ana - Darkness arrived when Actas were being completed, and poor lighting at almost all sites resulted in difficulties in preparing and observing Actas.

• San José Villanueva, La Libertad - Proper lighting was a serious issue for 3 of the 16 tables. These tables had no light. They resorted to using flashlights, one borrowed from an international observer. At 6:20pm (after nightfall), a power outage occurred. All tables continued to work steadily with the use of flashlights. Power was restored at 6:25pm.

• San Salvador – There was a power outage.

• Mejicanos - There was a power outage.

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ANNEX 6 (return to top) (return to text)

Induction to Vote

Presence of party propaganda in and around voting centers

• Mejicanos - A person entered a voting center waving an ARENA flag. He left when he was asked to.

• Suchitoto - At 6:00am, a pick-up with FMLN slogans was observed outside of the voting center with occupants handing out marked papers soliciting votes.

• Nejapa - The President of the JEM carried a copy of the Electoral Code that was covered with ARENA stickers.

• San Miguel - JRV 3465 – A vocal was seen holding up a small cardboard sign bearing the PCN stamp.

• Comasagua - The mayor had set up a small information booth outside the voting center in order to greet voters coming into the voting center and to give out t-shirts. The JEM and police asked him to stop this.

• Estanzuelas, USULUTÁN - A number of JRV members had red ribbons around their wrists, kitchen workers were given ARENA shirts.

• Santa Ana - food distribution allowed for an excessive presence of party colors. PCN, ARENA, FMLN and CDU all distributed food wearing party vests.

• Tamanique, La Libertad – JRVs 4998, 4996, 5006 - JRV members wearing party colors (red and white: FMLN).

• Puerto de La Libertad

                   - JRVs 4770, 4742, 4755, 4766 – Observers reported that JRV vocals and

                     secretaries at these tables were wearing party colors.

                   - FMLN, AP, PMR representatives dressed in full party colors were

                     providing orientation services just inside the entrance of the voting center.

Aggressiveness of vigilantes

• Mejicanos - The ARENA vigilantes sang their hymn before opening their JRVs

• San Salvador

                  - Many cases of vigilantes “helping” people vote behind booths, and even

                    taking ballots from voters, folding them for them, and putting them in the

                    appropriate boxes themselves.

                  - Party members literally grabbed people’s Carnets out of their hands as

                    soon as they walked into the voting centers, led them to the name roster,

                    and then to their table to vote.

                  - JRV 95 – The FMLN vigilante sitting next to ballot boxes took ballots from

                    people, looked at them, folded them and then placed them in the boxes.

                 - JRV 359 - CDU vigilantes were helping people put their ballots in the boxes.

• Nejapa - People wearing party colors (it was unclear if they were vigilantes) gathered at the entrance inside voting center and would immediately grab voters and escort them to the voting tables. Observers noted that the atmosphere was intimidating. At one point, the police requested that these people leave, but they did not comply.

• Comasagua - The alternate vigilantes from ARENA were greeting voters at the door, taking their voting cards and leading them to the voting tables. When confronted, they claimed to be offering services to voters on behalf of the mayor’s office

• Puerto de la Libertad

                - Voter Catalina Recinos had her carnet stolen by someone who told her he

                  was going to help her find her table assignment.

                - Bernadina Garcia was given a slip of paper that indicated her table

                  assignment was JRV#03166, which did not exist (all tables began with 047).

                - Esmeralda de Jesus Palermo reported that the man who helped her told her

                  that she could not vote.

• San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz - Some vigilantes were heard multiple times telling voters how to vote, and hovering inappropriately behind voting booths.

Food distribution in full party colors

• San Pedro Masahuat

               - FMLN brought in snacks for their people; the boxes were stamped with

                 FMLN or the red star.

               - ARENA brought in lunches in by young women wearing aprons with ARENA

                 name.

Santa Ana – Four political parties distributed food several times during the day, causing disruptions and allowing for excessive presence of party colors and distracting workers from their jobs.

Jayaque, La Libertad - Throughout the day, all political parties were moving through the voting center with food, with unauthorized personnel in full party colors. 

Free food / gifts given away outside center

• Mejicanos - JRV 1152 – ARENA vocal was giving out ARENA t-shirts

• Cinquera - ARENA distributed hundreds of Pollo Campero meals.

• San Miguel - ARENA was denounced by the TSE for handing out voter information slips stamped with the ARENA flag and for handing out t-shirts with a picture of the ARENA mayoral candidate.

• San Matías – The PCN mayor gave out pitchers or jugs in the cantons of El Rancho, Las Flores and El Jocote one and two days prior to the elections.

• Santa Ana – ARENA was reported to have been picking up people from the fincas to take them to vote and offering them lunch beforehand.

• Tamanique – ARENA had a BBQ at their headquarters at which they gave out free lunches to voters.

• Comasagua – ARENA mayor was giving out T-shirts on the day of the voting.

• La Palma, department of Chalatenango – Two instances of vote buying were reported to Mission observers. 1) An ARENA business owner offered 100 colones to buy the voting cards of several of his employees. 2) At least three people were offered $20 by a store owner in exchange for a promise to vote for PCN.

• Jayaque, department of La Libertad – Separate and independent testimony was given to Mission observers by several people saying that ARENA was conducting a systematic vote-buying campaign that continued up to the day of the elections. On election day, three separate couples getting off buses to vote in Jayaque reported that ARENA workers had offered them $8.00 to vote for ARENA.

• San Pedro Masahuat – FMLN candidate reported vote buying by ARENA. PDC reported voting buying by ARENA and FMLN.

• In El Carmen, department of Cuscatlán - CDU sources reported that people were being offered money to hand in their voting cards until after the elections.

• Estanzuelas, Usulután - Noted parties buying votes for 125 colones each.

• Tamanique, La Libertad - Observers noted that voters were being bribed with 125 colones, and that voters were also being intimidated by ARENA who told them that if they didn’t vote for ARENA they would lose municipal projects.

Lack of voter privacy and guaranteed secret vote

• San Pedro Masahuat

                       - non-vigilantes party supporters wearing party colors assisted elderly

                         voters by helping them into the voting booths, but remained in the booth

                         while the people voted. ARENA and FMLN supporters were seen doing

                         this.

                       - JRV 6909 – PDC vigilante seen in voting booth indicating where to mark

                         the ballot

                       - JRV 6928 – FMLN vigilante escorted voter to booth and talked to her

                         while she voted, attempting to look at her ballot.

                       - JRV 6929 – ARENA candidate looking over the shoulder of  young

                         woman voter while she was voting.

                       - JRV 6929 – PDC vigilante was in the booth, pointed at ballot and then

                         put the ballots in the box. The JRV contacted the JEM about this.

• San Pedro Perulapan - JRV 7660 - the FMLN vigilante watched people vote for much of the morning.

• Mejicanos

                       - JRVs 989, 1010 – the booths were turned so that the JRV members

                         could watch people vote.

                       - JRVs 979, 1000 – the PCN vigilantes were too close to the voting booth.

• San Salvador

                       - Numerous booths placed in such a way that other voters and/or

                         vigilantes (pretty much anybody) could sit or walk right behind them, even

                         talk to them, while voter was voting; in building A people from the second

                         level could also look down and observe voters in booths.

                       - JRV 370 – the vigilantes and other voters passing by could watch people

                         vote.

                       - JRV 379 – the vigilantes were standing in the voting booth between

                         voters and looked into the booth while someone was voting

• Suchitoto - The PCN supervisor and 2 vigilantes were observed standing directly behind a voting booth for a period of time watching people vote.

• Previously noted in - Puerto de Triunfo and Estanzuelas, Usulután; La Palma, Chalatenango; Santa Ana, Santa Ana; Jayaque, Puerto de la Libertad and San Jose Villanueva, La Libertad; San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz

Campaigning of candidates inside voting centers

• San Pedro Masahuat - ARENA candidate stayed at the voting center for several hours. He was observed to be campaigning. He did not leave after the JEM asked him to leave.

• San Pedro Perulapan

                      - The voting of the FMLN candidate at 11:30 caused significant disruption

                        due to the cheering and noise of his supporters. FMLN held a second

                        rally in a voting center at 3:50

                     - ARENA, MR and PCN parties also had loud and disruptive rallies when

                       their candidates voted.

• San Salvador

                     - Each party gathered about 50-100 party members with colors when

                       someone big from the party came in to vote. At times, they would stay and

                       clap and cheer for 10-30 minutes.

                     - FMLN, ARENA, and PDC all had what amounted to rallies inside voting

                       centers at some point during the day. These rallies consisted of dozens of

                       vigilantes, supervisors and voters wearing party colors parading around

                       centers singing, clapping and chanting names of their parties and or

                       candidates.

• Suchitoto - Just before noon, all four candidates were inside the voting center at the same time; the JEM confronted the candidates as a group and ask them to leave, which they did.

• Nejapa - At 11:30 am, the ARENA mayoral candidate entered the voting center with an entourage of approximately 10 party members shouting "Patria Si, Comunismo No". He was led to his voting table by the President of the JEM. In response, members of the FMLN shouted the name of the FMLN mayoral candidate.

• San Miguel - PCN and PDC both had large and loud parades of supporters in party colors, which marched the length of the voting center.

• Estanzuelas, - FMLN mayor greeted arriving voters by shaking hands.

• Santa Ana - Party candidates (various parties) went to all Voting Centers accompanied by a full entourage who shouted and applauded upon entering. This created disruptions.

• Jayaque, La Libertad - When the ARENA mayoral and deputy candidates voted, about 30 ARENA supporters in full colors held a demonstration in the middle of the voting center, and remained there for about a half hour.

• Tamanique, La Libertad

                     - The FMLN candidate came in surrounded by applauding supporters. All

                       supporters were wearing FMLN shirts and one was waving a flag. The

                       candidate walked throughout the JRV making peace signs.

                     - JRV 4747 - Had “graffiti” with ARENA propaganda.

• Puerto de la Libertad - PMR, FMLN, ARENA, PCN engaged in impromptu rallies within the voting centers as their deputy and mayoral candidates entered to vote. Large groups of party supporters dressed in party regalia and waving party propaganda marched through the voting center.

• Zaragoza, La Libertad - When FMLN mayor entered voting center, he proceeded to visit many of the voting tables, even though he was not voting at them. FMLN supported cheered and chanted slogans during his visit.

Presence of party colors / propaganda in party-provided transportation

• Cinquera -Arena provided 3 large buses and 1 coaster (from San Salvador & Santa Tecla) for taking people from San Juan Opico to vote in Cinquera.

• Tamanique, La Libertad - The ARENA headquarters were open and ARENA buses were transporting voters, directly to their headquarters.

• San Jose Villanueva, La Libertad - Observed the flying of party flags/colors on several vehicles: ARENA - one bus; FMLN - 3 trucks.

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ANNEX 7 (return to top) (return to text)

Information Centers

• San Pedro Perulapan – Outside the voting center, ARENA gave out voter information slips with the ARENA party flag stamped on them.

• Mejicanos – TSE computer was not set up until late in the morning and, due to the heat, stopped functioning by 1pm. The TSE operator was under trained and frequently gave out incorrect information.

• San Matías – Outside the voting center the FMLN were using pieces of red paper to write down the voter information.

• San Rafael Cedros - ARENA gave out voter information slips with the ARENA party flag imprinted on them.

• San Miguel- ARENA and PCN were taking voting cards (from voters) into their party headquarters and returning with slips of paper with voting information. ARENA used slips of paper imprinted with party colors.

• Comasagua - Outside the voting center, ARENA gave out voter information slips with the ARENA party flag stamped on them

• San Salvador

                       - Outside of the Gimnasio Nacional Adolfo Pineda, ARENA had an

                         information station set up with lap tops and was handing out information

                         slips with ARENA logo printed on them.

                      - Outside the voting center ARENA used pieces of paper with the ARENA

                        symbol to write down people’s numbers to ease the process at the JRVs.

• Santa Ana, Santa Ana – Outside the voting center, ARENA gave out voter information slips with the ARENA party flag stamped on them. In addition, free ARENA transport (complete with flags) was very close to the information center. People were loaded directly onto the buses after receiving their voting information.

• Jayaque, La Libertad - Many people complained to the JEM that ARENA was using their computer operation less than a block from the voting center to buy votes.

• Tamanique, La Libertad – FMLN was giving out information slips to voters with party colors.

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ANNEX 8 (return to top) (return to text)

Closing procedures

• San Salvador

                 - JRV 80 - there were 4 mayoral ballots missing. A large amount of time was

                   spent reconstructing the torn-off corners to determine the exact missing

                   ballots. Since the votes and the remainder ballots totaled 400, it was

                  assumed to be a printing error with general agreement by all parties and the

                  JEM.

                - JRV 78 – There was an error in filling out the Actas. The error was identified,

                  but the forms were already completed. Numerous vigilantes and party

                  members and other tables came to "the rescue" since this was, by then the

                  only table not finished. Eventually the erroneous data was crossed out and

                  correct data entered.

• El Paisnal

                 - The voting center closed at 4:55pm, 5 minutes early.

                 - JRV 2496 – turned away one voter, who complained to the JEM, but the

                   boxes had already been sealed.

• La Palma, Chalatenango - Some JRVs did not seem to take caution with each vote during the counting. Ballots were dropped to the floor, passed roughly from person to person and handled by individuals without the supervision of the group.

Too many people in the voting centers

• San Pedro Masahuat - People not involved in the closing process continued to be in the voting center for a long time after 5pm.

• Mejicanos - Many children and adults not involved in the closing process showed up after 5pm and stayed in the voting centers without clear purpose.

• Mercedes Umaña - many people remained in the voting center, causing confusion and crowding.

• Estanzuelas – Vigilante and JRV alternatives were still present during vote count.

• Tamanique, La Libertad – Supervisors and Legal Representatives were present during the counting and talking with the vigilantes causing disruption to the counting process.

• Zaragoza, La Libertad - After the alternatives of other parties were asked to leave the voting center, several FMLN alternatives stayed in the center.

• San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz

                     - There were many people wandering through the site other than vigilantes.

                     - Confusion with regards to people in the voting center after 5pm.

                     - Some people were signing the Actas as vigilantes when they were not in

                       fact vigilantes.

Unclear rules / guidelines for addressing impugned and null ballots

• Mercedes Umaña - There was a great deal of inconsistency in determining if votes were null or impugned.

• Estanzuelas, Usulután

                    - There was confusion about what to do with nulled or impugned votes at

                      one table.

                    - JRV 5453 – Observer noted that heated disagreements about the votes.

                      The ballots under discussion showed clear intention of voters, but “there

                      was as smudge on the white part of the ballot.

• La Palma, Chalatenango - JRVs exhibited confusion and made inconsistent decisions regarding the validity of impugned and null votes.

• Tamanique, La Libertad

                    - There was confusion on how the votes for the specific parties in the

                      coalition were recorded. For example, JRV members did not realize that

                      the PMR is the Movimiento Renovador, and therefore recorded those

                      votes as null rather in the allotted space for PMR.

                    - JRV considered as null the votes for coalition members that did not have a

                      candidate for that party.

Burdensome and difficult paperwork

• San Miguel - JRV 3690 – JRV began filling out Actas before voting center closed.

• Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután - Tables began filling out Actas before 5pm while the voters were still voting.

• Estanzuelas, Usulután - At many tables, there was confusion about which copies of which Acta should go in which envelope.

• La Palma, Chalatenango - JRVs were seen collecting and completing paperwork before the close of the voting day.

• Santa Ana, Santa Ana - Generally, excessively burdensome paperwork at end of day when workers fatigued (Actas)

• Tamanique, La Libertad - Very slow and cumbersome process.

Interference of party representatives

• Puerto el Triunfo, Usulután - Observed party officials interfering at several tables.

• Santa Ana, Santa Ana - Party supervisors were pressuring JRVs/Vigilantes to get advance informal results from each table.

Lack of procedures for closing, sealing and storing boxes after counting

• San Salvador

                      - Many boxes were not taped shut, and even had contents spilling out on

                         floor.

                      - Numerous pairs of people would stop and open, go through, and re-tape

                        final boxes between leaving their tables and arriving at the JEM.

                      - At the office of the JEM, final boxes of votes lined up against wall next to

                       JEM, but were not supervised at all. People were going through them

                       (even boxes that weren’t their own), and JEM didn’t even realize that this

                       was happening. Further, only ten yards away, there was an unguarded

                       door where people were entering and exiting.

                     - Numerous people threw their boxes on the pile without the JEM ever

                       seeing or touching them.

• El Paisnal

                     - General lack of knowledge about how to close and seal the boxes.

                     - JRV 2492 – the ballot boxes were not fully sealed until well after the votes

                       had been counted and the Actas signed. 

                     - General confusion about who should be in charge of taking the boxes to

                       the JEM office.

• San Miguel - Vote counting was done in the full view of the public and in poor lighting conditions.

                    - JRV members had to walk for up to 15 minutes to the JEM center

                      unescorted and, in some cases, unaware of its location.

                    - JRVs had to wait in line at the JEM center for up to 5 hours in order to

                      hand in their ballot materials.

                    - At the JEM center, there was confusion and indecision about how to deal

                     with the mass of JRV materials which needed to be logged in.

• Estanzuelas, Usulután - There was no uniformity of how ballots boxes and envelopes were handed in to the JEM.

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ANNEX 9

Other problems

• Suchitoto

                  - JRV 07622 – a person had tried to vote three times, resulting in a large

                    scuffle with many people crowded around the table.

• San Matías / Nejapa

                   - Lack of standard security measures between the voting centers. In San

                     Matías the police searched people entering the Voting Centers, and in

                     Nejapa they were not.

• San Rafael Cedros

                   - A woman claiming to be a PDC alternate with false PDC documents was

                     caught and her vote was annulled.

                   - 25 false ID cards (no thumb prints) were reportedly seized by the various

                     JRVs and given to the JEM.

• El Paisnal – JRVs and vigilantes did not enter the voting center until 6:45am

• Mejicanos – The CDU party was using a computer from the TSE.

• San Matías

                   - The legal representative, who is the cousin of the mayor, tried to vote twice,

                     using two different voting cards with different names. She was stopped by

                     a Supervisor in the voting center.

                   - Voting in San Matías did not end until 6:30pm.

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