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Final Report 2004 Presidential Election, El Salvador
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|
Date |
Acts of Violence |
|
1/02 |
Damage to ARENA office in Mejicanos** |
|
1/02 |
ARENA member injured by a bullet, supposedly fired by an FMLN member, in Mejicanos |
|
10/02 |
ARENA militant killed in Cojutepeque* |
|
12/02 |
Bus employees injured by ARENA militants |
|
13/02 |
Damage to ARENA office in San Marcos** |
|
16/02 |
FMLN and ARENA destroy each other's propaganda and confrontations ensue |
|
18/02 |
Attack on a human rights promoter* |
|
21/02 |
Confrontations between PCN and ARENA militants over painting and posters |
|
21/02 |
ARENA members attack FMLN militants |
|
22/02 |
ARENA office in San Martín vandalized** |
|
25/02 |
Confrontations between ARENA and FMLN members in San Antonio Los Ranchos |
|
3/03 |
30 ARENA activists detained for confrontations with police |
|
12/03 |
One person injured by a bullet in Tony Saca’s caravan in Usulután* |
|
16/03 |
Home of an FMLN councilmember vandalized** |
|
19/03 |
One dead during close of ARENA campaign* |
|
19/03 |
Destruction of ARENA propaganda** |
|
20/03 |
ARENA militant killed in own home* |
|
20/03 |
Municipal cleaning employees assaulted by ARENA members |
* In these cases, it is difficult to know if the crime is of a political nature or just common crime.
** In these cases, it was not proven who committed the damages.
Leaders of both parties always denied a strategy of violence implemented from the party leadership. However, each party is responsible for the acts of its militants and should control them. The acts of violence between ARENA and the FMLN were a recurring theme, without provoking a call for intolerance of violence by the political parties. Furthermore, it does not make much sense to blame a few fanatic militants when the discourse of the leaders encourages violence.
There were initiatives to prevent and contain the violence between party militants, like the restriction of painting and putting up posters, or requiring the notification of municipal authorities before a rally, even though they did not produce many results.
· In San Antonio los Ranchos, for example, the FMLN Government and ARENA representatives concluded a “gentlemen’s agreement” to avoid confrontations during an ARENA rally in the town, as proposed by Article 234 of the Electoral Code. However, the agreement was broken by both parties. On February 25, there were violent confrontations between FMLN and ARENA militants during an ARENA march.
· In San Salvador, the city ordinance that restricted propaganda painting and posters in certain areas of the city was not respected. City employees took down ARENA propaganda as well as FMLN propaganda.
Beyond the electoral violence, it is worth noting that the presence of anti-gang laws and the daily violence generated a climate of fear and threats that the candidates exploited. Notable was the utilization of violence for an overwhelming presence in the media that contributed to the climate of fear.
TSE Magistrates Julio Hernandez and Pablo Cerna denounced “the campaign of terror or fear,” and said that, “to go vote with fear or stricken with terror, it cannot be said that the vote is free and conscientious.”[31]
The ARENA party emphasized, in much of its discourse, the “terror” of the FMLN: “[ARENA presidential candidate Tony] Saca says not to fear the FMLN.”[32] El Diario de Hoy quoted Tony Saca as saying, “the homeland is in danger.”[33]
The media have an obligation to inform the population, give clarification and attempt to bring out the truth, so the sensationalistic treatment of certain issues is contrary to the journalistic ethic. The fact that 288 guns were supposedly destined for the FMLN Municipal Government of Mejicanos is a significant example of the utilization of fear to disqualify a political party. The coverage of this story went on for a long time (from February 3 to 28), despite the clarifications given by the Forjas Taurus Brasil and Hunter’s Gun companies, the municipal governments of Mejicanos and Antiguo Cuscatlan and the Human Rights Ombudsperson. This issue gave rise to a series of implicit threats, such as that the Municipal Government of Mejicanos was going to arm gang members or commit violence on Election Day.
It was not just the sensationalist press that took advantage of the case but also the politicians. Rene Figueroa, of ARENA, was quoted in La Prensa Gráfica as asking, “Could it be that the FMLN wants to arm its activists to increase violence?”[34] Rene Aguiluz, of the CDU-PDC, said that, “it should be investigated if the FMLN prepared a boicot of the presidential elections.”[35]
This type of reaction is very indicative of the level of distrust and fear reached in the electoral campaign. The utilization of fear culminated with the threats of fraud or boicot from both major parties.
ARENA and the FMLN used threats of fraud or disturbances on Election Day to discredit their adversaries. These threats and accusations of fraude or violence generated fear and distrust among the electorate. An article by Ernesto Alfonso Buitrago in the CoLatino said:
Note to Salvadorans and foreign observers: fraude has already been committed… what is certain is that the cowardice and with which they have offended and robbed the Salvadoran national consciousness… fraud has already been committed… Without pointing out other vile tricks that, without a doubt, they are going to employ, fraude has already been committed.[36]
An opinion article in La Prensa Gráfica read:
Technical fraud in sight… TSE infected by the FMLN… their technical capacity is not doubted, but their impartiality is, given that the FMLN cannot be trusted… [they are people of] little morality.[37]
ARENA warned of the threat of a boycott by the FMLN. El Diario de Hoy ran the front page headline, “They Warn of a Boycott.”[38] The following day they ran an article headlined, “Plan to Boycott Elections,” that implicitly accuses the FMLN.[39]
These examples illustrate the levels of slander and defamation reached during the electoral campaign.
La Prensa Gráfica published opinion polls about the electoral campaign. Of the people polled, 79% thought that the campaign was violent and 69% thought it was superficial. To the question “Which party has been the most violent?” 51% answered that the FMLN has, and 23% answered that ARENA has.[40]
Furthermore, the very words used by pollsters can influence the results of public opinion polls and people’s perceptions. El Diario de Hoy published a poll to show how people characterized the candidates. People chose words like “ill-mannered,” “corrupt” and “repugnant” to describe FMLN candidate Schafik Hándal while the adjectives proposed in the poll for ARENA candidate Tony Saca were much more positive, the worst of which were “angers easily,” “arrogant” and “liar.”[41] This type of manipulation encourages perceptions of the FMLN candidate as being a violent and terrifying person.
Despite the difference in perception of the violence generated by the FMLN and the violence generated by ARENA, the March 5, 2004 edition of El Mundo reported that the FMLN had presented twenty-three denunciations against ARENA and ARENA had presented twenty-two denunciations against the FMLN. In reality the violence generated by the FMLN was equal or less than that generated by ARENA.
Violence, and especially the confrontations between ARENA and the FMLN, was constant during the campaign. Political violence generated a climate of fear and distrust among the people and it weakened the electoral process. The press, with its treatment of the news, influenced the population’s perception of the violence. For these reasons, sometimes the line between information and propaganda is blurry.
Propaganda
Propaganda constituted a key problem during the electoral campaign. It gave rise to numerous violations of the Electoral Code. Propaganda during the campaign violated Articles 227 and 237 of the Electoral Code, dealing with the appropriate times and places for propaganda and the people authorized to carry it out. The electoral campaign was also marked by “dirty” propaganda that violates Articles 177 and 179 of the Penal Code, dealing with crimes against honor.
In an opinion piece, titled “Propaganda and Information,” columnist Carlos Mayora Re proposes a very interesting reflection about propaganda and its impact:
Propaganda is lawful, what is unlawful is to use it to mislead. In fact, the very definition of propaganda, an “action or effect of making something known with the goal of attracting followers or customers,” does not present in and of itself any ethical problem. However, when it is used as a vehicle for half-truths… when information… is conspicuous because of its absence, only with difficulty can we vote sensibly, thoughtfully and with discretion… It is tough to separate information from propaganda… [the candidates] often only run through cliches, the commonplace and - in the worst cases - disqualification of their opponents as an electoral strategy. And that is not information… It is also certain that the media play their part in the confusion. In fact, discerning between information and propaganda is of the utmost importance in electoral periods. And some experienced journalists have allowed themselves to be seduced by the ease of cliches and the comfort of stereotypes, we simple radio listeners and television viewers, what can we hope for?[42]
Electoral propaganda is indispensable, but it undermines the rules of the game when it does not respect the regulations defined by the Electoral Code, and when it attacks the honor of people involved in the electoral process. Contrary to what happened during the 2004 campaign, it is necessary to guarantee scrupulous respect for the rules that regulate electoral propaganda.
There was a significant difference in the development of electoral propaganda among the four contending parties. The smaller parties suffered from the inequality of resources to carry out their campaigns. On the other hand, the wealthier parties had more propaganda because they could invest more. The ARENA party developed a strategy of overwhelming propaganda that invaded all the communication media and covered the whole country.
Disguised Propaganda
Propaganda is a sensitive and complex issue that not only includes publicity for a political party but can also be considered to include the treatment of information about the political parties. The unequal coverage of different parties in the media can be called a form of disguised propaganda.
We can highlight the general distribution of information on the newspaper pages, such as:
· ARENA candidate Tony Saca was covered on more pages than any other party's or coalition's candidate.
· Rarely are all the parties and coalitions in contention mentioned on the pages that cover election news.
· When several parties are mentioned on one page, there is an unequal districution of page space: in general, 3/4 of the page covers ARENA, 1/4 covers the FMLN, or less than 1/4 if the other parties share the rest of the page.
· The articles about Tony Saca tend to occupy the top part of the page in La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy.
The words used to present information, when they are not neutral, also constitute a biased position and a disguised propaganda. La Prensa Gráfica carried a headline that read, "Red Tide Invades Mejicanos," to cover an FMLN rally in that city.[43]
The media should give space to all opinions, especially during the electoral campaign. Colombian journalist Javier Restrepo, professor at Pontificia Javeriana University and the University of the Andes, one of the most notable proponents of journalistic integrity in Latin America, says, "In taking sides for good or bad, the press is losing that guarantee called credibility." It is worth mentioning that La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy offered much space to anti-communists like Fidel Castro's daughter and the Cuban writer Carlos Alberto Montaner. Both compared El Salvador to Cuba and predicted a "horrible tragedy," involving "conflicts with the military, with society, with the collapse of all productive potential" if the FMLN won.[44]
It is difficult to question the legitimacy or illegitimacy of journalists' actions. However, the role of the journalist is to contribute to public knowledge, not to generate fear with doubtful associations. In this sense, the associations between the FMLN and the Venezuelan crisis are questionable, as are the links between the FMLN and the March 11 attacks in Madrid.
In El Diario de Hoy, after a front-page article titled, "Chavez Sinks Venezuela into Chaos," and three pages about the Venezuelan crisis, there was a photo of Schafik Handal with Hugo Chavez.[45] The relationship between Handal and Chavez is true, but to publish this photo after a special report on the Venezuelan crisis is not innocent. It generates fear and the idea that what is happening in Venezuela will happen in El Salvador if Handal wins.
In an article about the March 11 attacks in Madrid, El Diario de Hoy also pointed out past links between the ETA and the FMLN.[46] Any direct association between the FMLN and the attacks in Madrid is doubtful. In the first place, despite its repeated suggestions of possible links, the Spanish Government never had any proof that the ETA was involved in the attacks. Secondly, the article takes advantage of the tragedy to bring up the links between the FMLN and ETA during the 1980s, when the FMLN was a guerrilla organization and not a legitimate political party as it is today. Review of history in order to analyze the present is relevant, but the historical evolution of the parties mentioned must also be taken into account. The links between ETA and the FMLN in the 1980's could be true, and there would be no reason not to report exact information on these links. What is questionable is to imply a direct link, in the headline, between the FMLN and the attacks in Madrid.
The majority of violations involving electoral propaganda, however, are much more obvious and serious.
Illegal Propaganda
Throughout the country there were violations of Article 232 of the Electoral Code. Article 232 reads:
Propaganda cannot be hung or painted on buildings, public monuments,
trees, works of art or traffic signals on the streets and highways, nor on
the walls of private homes without permission from the owner.[47]
Electoral propaganda, especially television spots, violated Article 232 of the Electoral Code, which reads:
Political parties and Coalitions cannot, in any instance, use the symbols, colors, slogans, songs or the images or photographs of the candidates of other parties in their electoral propaganda.[48]
· ARENA distributed a small book during the campaign that contained cartoon images of FMLN candidate Schafik Handal.
· Television advertisements - Handal denounced a dirty campaign from the right wing and filed a complaint against Rafael Antonio Menjívar, representative of the Liberty Foundation (Fundación Libertad): beginning on February 26, it ran advertisements that made attacks on Handal’s honor and image. One advertisement states, “Schafik Handal is a cynical kidnapper who intends to govern the country.” (CIS, Trans.) The FMLN candidate also requested an investigation into the sources of funding for the these advertisements.
The political parties, particularly ARENA, did not respect the legal campaign periods. Painting and putting up posters began before the legal date set by the TSE. Propaganda in the media ran until March 21, Election Day. These are violations of Article 230 of the Electoral Code, which reads:
Political parties, Coalitions, communication media and all individuals are prohibited from doing propaganda in the press, on the radio, on television, at rallies, at demonstrations, with flyers, loudspeakers, painting or posters in public places before the initiation of the propaganda period set by Article 81 of the Constitution, during the three days prior to the election and on Election Day.[49]
In the press, propaganda continued through March 18, 19, 20, and 21 in spite of the prohibition, and the propaganda even intensified. For example, on Election Day, the Woman for Freedom (Mujeres por la Libertad) association, published the same three pages of advertisements against the FMLN in each of the two major newspapers.
Propaganda done by institutions that were not political parties or coalitions was a serious problem, as it violates Article 227 of the Electoral Code, which reads:
…the right to propaganda corresponds only to the contending political parties and coalitions, which can be done through all legal media without any further limitations than those established by the law, morality and good custom.[50]
In other words, all the paid advertisements placed by Women for Freedom or by the Revolutionary Tendency (Tendencia Revolucionaria) are illegal. This is serious because it is a party strategy, since the associations that published these advertisements are closely linked to the political parties. Furthermore, they generally constitute insulting propaganda. Many of these advertisements could be considered violations of Article 228 of the Electoral Code, which reads:
It is prohibited to damage the morality, honor or private life of candidates or leaders, living or dead, through electoral propaganda. These could also be considered crimes against honor that constitute violations of several articles in the Penal Code (Arts. 177, 178, 179, 181). Illegal propaganda weighs heavily in the communication strategies of the political parties since it represents an investment.[51]
Costs of Paid Advertising Space, in $US
|
|
El Diario de Hoy |
La Prensa Gráfica |
CoLatino |
|
¼ page |
$410 |
$330.53 |
$176 |
|
½ page |
$600 - $820 |
$661.06 |
$352 |
|
Full page |
$1235 - $1635 |
$1322.12 |
$705 |
Political parties are instigators and accomplices to illegal and dirty propaganda. In the last few days before the election, despite the legal prohibition, there was an increase in paid advertisements and illegal and dirty propaganda.
This type of illegal and defamatory propaganda reached a climax with an advertisement in El Diario de Hoy on March 18 and 19, in the name of the National Association of FMLN War Veterans of El Salvador (Asociación Nacional de Veteranos de Guerra del FMLN El Salvador). This press release mentioned clandestine armed groups closely linked with the FMLN, the Cuban Government and gangs. “We blame the Salvadoran Communist Party FMLN for any attack that journalists might suffer in our country.”[52] This advertisement was illegal, because of the date it was published and because it was not by a political party, and defamatory. On March 20, Mauricio González Ayala, coordinator of the FMLN War Veterans, published a response in the CoLatino, La Prensa Gráfica, and El Diario de Hoy, in which he demonstrated his disgust for the publications:
…in which the name of the sector is unduly used, making clear that they are not an association… The name of the sector is being used to lie and defame… The people that sign the publication are false and the ID numbers do not correspond to their names.[53]
The FMLN presented a denunciation before the TSE, for violation of the Electoral Code Articles 230 and 284.
Illegal and dirty propaganda primarily concerned ARENA and the FMLN. But ARENA launched a propaganda strategy much broader and more insulting that that of the FMLN. Among other examples, we can point out:
· A flyer showing Tony Saca dressed as a woman, with the slogan, “The best is behind”
· A pamphlet published by ARENA comparing the supposed values of the FMLN with those of ARENA
· Television advertisements using Schafik Handal’s image
· The paid advertisements by Women for Freedom
Beyond the paid advertisements, dirty propaganda also arose in opinion articles and editorials that constitute obvious crimes against honor. El Diario de Hoy carried an article titled, “Reasons Not to Vote for the Communists.” Among the fifty-two propositions, all defamatory, were the following:
Because their current leader is a bitter fanatic, disrespectful and of poor character… Because the influence of one bearded man over another would accelerate the communist damage…. Because he is, in conclusion, treacherous, hidden, back-stabbing, traitorous, and, finally, cowardly.[54]
These examples of illegal and dirty propaganda demonstrate neglect for the basic rules of democracy, lack of regard for the laws that regulate the electoral process and lack of respect for political adversaries. They also represent a lack of respect for the electorate, since the dirty campaign served as a smoke screen to avoid debate over each party’s platform. The overwhelming and disproportionate presence of pro-ARENA propaganda in all the communication media, the streets and highways surely had a strong influence over the election results. Strict compliance with the regulations on propaganda should be monitored. Attention should be given to the equality of material resources that each political party or coalition has, and the financing of political parties and the associations linked to them should be controlled. A strong condemnation of illegal and dirty propaganda would be an important step toward guaranteeing respect for the democratic process in the next election.
The electoral campaign was characterized by violence and violations of the laws that regulate the electoral process. The political parties, especially ARENA and the FMLN, were responsible for the climate of fear and disrespect. During this electoral campaign, just as Joaquín Samaoya pointed out in his article, “Fear Does Not Allow Us to Think,” published in La Prensa Gráfica, that the political parties did not contribute to the strengthening of democratic values:
We are observing a campaign oriented more and more toward winning votes with fear…. The idea is to generate fear to take votes away from the FMLN and get the backing of the undecided, the indifferent and those who tend to vote for the PCN or the Coalition… On one hand, in the interviews of the morning and evening, the party representatives seduce us with smiles, nice suits, soft voices respectful behavior and even a good idea or two. On the other hand, in the street, in the plaza and in assemblies of employees at some businesses, threats, demagogy, intolerance, stupidity and aggression abound… The political parties have contributed little to educating the public… preventing the people from using their intelligence.[55]
The TSE also has an important responsibility since they did not demand respect for the electoral laws.
This campaign did not strengthen a democratic culture. The insults, the threats and the use of the past prevailed in the speeches by candidates of ARENA and the FMLN and substituted for a true debate over their respective political programs. It is a deplorable consequence, that denies the citizen the right to be informed and choose conscientiously.
V. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE
Throughout the political campaign season, US Government officials made statements clearly aimed at influencing the opinion of Salvadoran voters. These comments began as early as June 2003, and became stronger as Election Day approached. Bush Administration officials, embassy officials and Congresspeople all weighed in their opinion as part of a powerful campaign in an effort to make Salvadorans believe that, if the FMLN won:
a) US-El Salvador relations would deteriorate thus endangering US financial assistance and foreign investment.
b) They would no longer be able to receive remittances, which total more than $2 billion a year and are the top revenue source for this country, from their family members living in the US.
c) Salvadorans in the US would be deported.
The US Embassy in San Salvador and the current US Ambassador, Douglas Barclay, made statements to the press declaring that the US Government would respect the outcome of the elections. However, statements from other US officials did not reflect the same objectivity. In fact, the sheer number of statements from other US officials, and the intimidating ideas that they expressed, assured that the Ambassador’s declarations of objectivity were brushed aside in the mainstream media and in the mind of the average Salvadoran.
Anti-FMLN declarations by the US Government were reported in large headlines in the mainstream newspapers El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa Gráfica. These declarations were used in editorials to press the point that an FMLN win would bring disaster upon the Salvadoran people. This idea was reinforced further by ARENA campaign ads in the newspapers, radio, and television; some using direct quotes from US officials. On the other hand, declarations of objectivity from US Congresspersons received scant coverage; most were reported only in the smaller afternoon paper, the CoLatino.
The end result of the bias of the US government and the Salvadoran media was that many voters, come Election Day, sincerely believed that if they did not vote for ARENA they would no longer receive remittances from the US which, for many, are their main source of income. For example, while meeting with the community in San Martin on Friday, March 19, CIS observers were asked several times if it was true that remittances would stop if the FMLN won. On that same day in Metapán, the CIS observer team had scheduled a meeting with the FMLN Legal Representative to the Municipal Electoral Council (JEM) and the local Party Coordinator. The party representatives skipped over standard formalities, opening the meeting with the topic of the rumors about remittances and deportations. As the observers explained that the rumors were false, dozens of people gathered in the office to hear their answers.
The bias of the US government and the Salvadoran media surely had an impact on the final outcome of the elections.
Rose Likins, the former US Ambassador to El Salvador, was the first to make anti-FMLN statements before leaving her post in June 2003. Although she said that the United States would “respect the will of Salvadorans,” she continued by making the observation that US relations with the Fransisco Flores Administration, and with the ARENA party in general, are “excellent because we share principles and objectives,” and that they would ”re-analyze” relations if the FMLN won the presidency. She continued by saying that, “it is better to speak now, before the candidates are chosen, to make clear the basis of our relationship. We want the voters to decide, keeping in mind the current factors.”[56]
Former Ambassador Likins declared that the Bush Administration was aware of her sentiments. She said that, “if the question is if Washington knows what I’m going to say … I’m going to say it frankly: in this case, yes, they know.”[57] In fact, Likins’ statements served as a template for the comments to come over the next ten months. The parade of officials visiting El Salvador included: Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Daniel Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, Special Envoy to the Western Hemisphere for the State Department, and Jeb Bush, Florida Governor. Various officials offered further comments during press conferences held in the US. The statements became more frequent, and their threats more specific, as the elections approached.
Several of these US officials noted that they would respect the outcome of the Salvadoran elections, but only after they had made many anti-FMLN comments. They generally emphasized the good relations that they have with the ARENA Government, because of the “values” and “visions” that they share. This served to underscore the differences between the positions of the current US administration and the FMLN on several issues, and to threaten that bilateral relations between the two countries, and therefore US financial support to El Salvador, would suffer in the event of an FMLN win.
Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs:
We want to deepen our relations with the Salvadoran government and hopefully the Salvadoran people elect someone who shares our vision, our values and the interest of deepening and improving the relations and associations between our countries, but it is the Salvadorans’ decision and we are going to respect the results.[58]
Otto Reich, Special Envoy to the Western Hemisphere for the White House:
…[Salvadorans should] choose a government that they know can have good relations with the U.S. and that shares values and principles such as democracy, the right to private property, the fight against terrorism, that I don’t think that we share with the FMLN.[59]
All Salvadorans must reflect and think about under what plan and ideology the country could prosper or the country could take a step backwards. [60]
You have to be very careful in a democratic election, to not give the reins of power to a person with an autocratic history or vision. [61]
Daniel Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs:
I believe that we can ask ourselves what is their [the FMLN] commitment to democracy, and I hope that the Salvadorans ask themselves this question.[62]
Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs:
Salvadorans must judge how relations with us would be… Hopefully Salvadorans also want this and decide who could strengthen this association and look to the future, not to the past. [63]
We know the history of this political movement [the FMLN], and therefore it is fair that Salvadorans judge what kind of relations that movement can maintain with us. [64]
Otto Reich, Special Envoy to the Western Hemisphere for the White House:
We are concerned about the impact that an FMLN victory could have on the commercial, economic and migration-related relations of the US with El Salvador. [65]
We could not have the same confidence in an El Salvador led by a person who is obviously an admirer of Fidel Castro and of Hugo Chavez… The United States would be fully justified in revising aspects related to a bilateral diplomatic relationship. [66]
Dana Rohrabacker, US Congresswoman from California:
It is important that the Salvadoran people understand that their decision at the polls will have consequences for future relations with the United States. [67]
Thomas Tancredo, US Congressman from Colorado:
Under an FMLN presidency, the U.S. government would not have a trustworthy counterpart. [68]
Good relations between our two countries could be in danger. [69]
El Diario de Hoy alluded to a comment by Douglas Barclay, US Ambassador to El Salvador:
…the United Status is going to determine the type of support and relations according to what the elected candidate decides.[70]
US Government statements against the FMLN grew more specific as Election Day grew closer. Threats included stopping the flow of remittances and non-renewal of the TPS (Temporary Protected Status) program, the US measure that extends temporary work visas to some 290,000 Salvadoran immigrants, with the result that Salvadorans could be deported. This would reduce crucial financial support sent to families back in El Salvador.
Dan Burton, US Congressman from Indiana:
If the communist candidate of the FMLN assumes the presidency of El Salvador, it could very well be necessary for the United Status to reconsider our relationship with El Salvador, the prolongation of TPS and our current support for the sending of their remittances to their country.[71]
Thomas Tancredo, US Congressman from Colorado:
It could be necessary for the American authorities to examine very carefully and possibly apply controls to the flow of $2 billion of remittances... unfortunately, to the detriment of many people who live in El Salvador… If the FMLN controls the Salvadoran government after the March 2004 Presidential Elections, it could mean a radical change in US policy regarding the essentially free flow of remittances from Salvadorans living in the US to El Salvador. [72]
In addition to the above comments, various functionaries from the US displayed their preference for the ARENA party with their actions and words. Otto Reich made his comments in a press conference held at the ARENA party campaign center. Jeb Bush, during a visit to El Salvador to discuss CAFTA (the Central America Free Trade Agreement), met only with ARENA presidential candidate Tony Saca, giving the justification that Saca was the former president of the National Private Business Association (ANEP). Rogelio Pardo-Maurer, Deputy Defense Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, after a visit with Tony Saca in Washington, commented that the ARENA plan “is a plan that inspires a lot of confidence in us.”[73]
Another act that created a lot of anti-FMLN press occurred during Roger Noriega’s visit to El Salvador. Noriega met with the candidates from the ARENA, CDU-PDC, and PCN parties but did not meet with the FMLN candidate Schafik Handal. The reason given was that earlier, the FMLN had used a photo of Ambassador Douglas Barclay in a campaign advertisement in the newspapers. The photo was of Barclay and Handal shaking hands during a courtesy visit by the new Ambassador. The Ambassador had condemned this use of his image, saying that it was “inappropriate” and that “a courtesy visit by an ambassador is not a political event.”[74]
Representatives of the US Government insisted that its functionaries have a right to express their opinions on Salvadoran politics, although this is a violation of the Salvadoran Constitution and the Electoral Code.
Paul Trivelli, Director of Central American Affairs for the Department of State:
We said that we would not hesitate to express our opinion on issues that affect our bilateral relations and that we will continue reacting to the actions and statements of the FMLN during the campaign.[75]
Douglas Barclay, US Ambassador to El Salvador, expressed:
Congresspeople can say what they want when they are here.[76]
All of these comments from US government officials served as a base for the mainstream media, Salvadoran officials, and ARENA political propaganda.
The anti-FMLN statements made by US officials were reported in La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy, the two newspapers with the largest circulation in the country. The CoLatino, which has only a fraction of the circulation of the Diario and the Prensa, printed only those statements that favored the FMLN.
|
Newspaper |
Number of articles with statements from US officials, against the FMLN |
Number of articles with statements from US officials, talking about objectivity |
El Diario de Hoy |
14 |
1 |
|
La Prensa Gráfica |
13 |
5 |
|
CoLatino |
0 |
6 |
La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy reported all of the anti-FMLN statements made by US officials using large headlines, often on the front page. These articles were given large amounts of space, while the few articles where US officials claimed objectivity were relegated to smaller areas. Following are some of the headlines that appeared in these two newspapers:
PENTAGON SUPPORTS ARENA PLATFORM [La Prensa Gráfica]
USA PROTESTS FMLN [La Prensa Gráfica]
OFFICIAL CLOSE TO BUSH VETOES FMLN [La Prensa Gráfica]
SUBSECRETARY OF STATE CALLS ON SALVADORANS TO VOTE FOR ONE WHO SHARES THE VISION AND VALUES OF WASHINGTON [El Diario de Hoy]
THREAT TO EXPEL SALVADORANS CAUSES WORRY [El Diario de Hoy]
La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy emphasized the message coming from the US government in their editorials. For example, and editorial in El Diario de Hoy spoke of the FMLN’s supposed “poor relations with the US,” that the FMLN “would create problems for our relatives in the US,” and that “they would manage, in different ways, a reduction of family remittances.”[77]
Another editorial in El Diario de Hoy was titled “Remittances from the US Running Serious Risk” and repeated the comments made by Thomas Tancredo.
Salvadoran Government officials (from the ruling ARENA party) and the ARENA candidate Tony Saca also used the US comments to their advantage. Francisco Flores, the President of El Salvador, made comments to the press on June 6, just two days after those of Rose Likins:
We will have no more migration protection from abroad, we will not be able to protect [immigrants], they will be deported. How many families are not going to receive their remittances? An important source of the economy will be lost. We are talking about immense risks for the country… Investors are nervous. I know many projects that are being delayed, people saying, ‘I’m not going to invest while this is not defined.’ The first effect is in the investor and that affects jobs.[79]
Flores was reported as being “worried for the future of remittances because of the comments of Tancredo, Burton, Rohrabacker.” [80]
René León, the Salvadoran Ambassador in Washington DC, reacted to Tancredo’s comments about TPS, saying that "[US] Legislators threaten the continuation of TPS."[81] He also commented on the other statements from US officials:
This is not an invention and we have not provoked these warnings, this is a signal being emitted from Washington, emitted from Congress and we look at this signal with concern.[82]
Tony Saca, the ARENA presidential candidate, met with Congresspersons Tom Davis, Kevin Brady, Mario Díaz-Balart, Jerry Weller and later with Pardo-Maurer, Deputy Defense Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, after which he told the press, "Today I would receive another blessing, but from Dan Fisk."[83] He also said that:
…of course they want the next government to be a government that believes in democracy, liberties, openness and free trade.[84]
The ARENA party also emphasized the threats of the US Government in its campaign advertisements. Some of this propaganda was published in US papers, in areas where many Salvadorans live. The Houston Chronicle, of Houston, Texas, carried an ad asking Salvadorans to tell their family members back home to vote for ARENA so that they would continue to be able to send home remittances.
Women for Freedom (Mujeres por la Libertad), a group that placed a large number of anti-FMLN propaganda in the Salvadoran newspapers, quoted Roger Noriega, Daniel Fisk, and Rose Likins in one of their ads and also noted that, “some Salvadoran brothers do not realize the catastrophe and the chaos that… would result from a Presidency… with Schafik Handal.”[85] It is very interesting that the US Embassy did not condemn the use of direct quotes by Women for Freedom as it condemned the FMLN’s use of a photo of the Ambassador shaking hands with Shafik.
Amidst this mass of anti-FMLN sentiment, some statements did appear from US government officials claiming the objectivity of the US Government, a few even condemning statements made by Roger Noriega. Unfortunately, the majority of these statements were printed only in the CoLatino, a newspaper whose circulation is just a fraction of that of La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy. Those statements that did appear in the mainstream newspapers received less space and smaller headlines than the anti-FMLN statements.
Douglas Barclay, the new US Ambassador to El Salvador, noted in El Diario de Hoy on January 29th that his country would support the candidate that won. One day before that he had told La Prensa Gráfica, "It’s not my job to have fears. Salvadorans should make a decision to know who suits them."[86]
The US Embassy made statements, published in a small article in La Prensa Gráfica. The article reads:
The US Embassy asserted that the government of that country is willing to work with the government that Salvadorans choose… The Embassy explained that the government has no control over remittances… They also signaled that the immigration policy is defined only with conditions of a domestic character, not international relations with certain countries.[87]
After ARENA had won the elections, La Prensa Gráfica interviewed Douglas Barclay, who addressed the false rumors about remittances and immigration policy in more detail:
Remittances are an arrangement that exists between the Salvadoran in the United States and their family and friends in El Salvador. It is something purely economic. The US Government has nothing to do with remittances… Regarding the migration situation, US Law is determined by the US Congress… and it would be speculation that a law would be changed because of the results of an election.[88]
US Representatives Raúl Grijalva and Xavier Becerra authored a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell condemning Otto Reich’s statements, signed by twenty-eight of their fellow Congresspersons. The letter requested Powell to make a public statement denouncing the comments made by Otto Reich. They also held several press conferences. Unfortunately, their statements appeared only in the CoLatino:
…it bothers us that the Salvadoran citizens feel that members of the US try to influence the election results… It is because of our economic and cultural ties, and because of the history of US Government’s negative influence in the internal conflicts of El Salvador, that government representatives should remain neutral in the issues that concern only Salvadorans.[89]
They later reacted to the comments of Otto Reich during his visit to El Salvador:
...It is irresponsible and false to suggest to Salvadorans in the United States that they would be at greater risk of being deported or that they could no longer send remittances to El Salvador… We make a call to Secretary Powell, to affirm the official position of the United States… and denounce the incendiary comments of Mr. Reich.[90]
Grijalva and Becerra reacted to Thomas Tancredo’s statements in another press conference:
The fear that Salvadorans have about remittances is false and it is very irresponsible for anyone to campaign with this.[91]
Ana Sol Gutiérrez, from the State Congress of Maryland, also made statements clarifying that the visa and remittance rumors were false.[92] This was followed nine days later by statements from the Los Angeles City Council[93] and Liz Figueroa, California State Senator,[94] also calling the rumors false.
With this behavior the US Government violated the Salvadoran law that prohibits any foreigner, while in El Salvador, from participating in politics. US officials have clearly participated in politics by stating their opinions in favor of the ARENA candidate and against the FMLN.
According to the Salvadoran Constitution: “Foreigners who directly or indirectly participate in internal politics of the country lose their right to reside here.”[95] The Electoral Code says that, “foreigners who directly or indirectly participate in political activities will be immediately deported.”[96]
It goes against international standards of conduct that a government should interfere in the politics of another sovereign country. In addition, because of the extensive involvement of the US in the Salvadoran civil war during the 1980’s, the US government should take extra care to respect the right of El Salvador to govern itself and determine its own leaders via fair, democratic elections. Just as the US promised in the 1992 Peace Accords to keep its military out of El Salvador, it should keep its government out of local politics.
These sentiments are best expressed by Dennis Kucinich:
The people of El Salvador have a right to free and fair elections without interference from the United States. The U.S. cannot claim to be a leader in promoting democracy worldwide and at the same time hinder democracy by attempting to influence the outcome of elections abroad.[97]
Lack of JRV Members and Alternates
Many JRVs lacked proper members and alternates on Election Day. In some cases, JRVs operated with only one or two members present. Not only is this a violation of article 117 of the Electoral Code, but it also highlights the fact that political parties did not have alternates available to replace JRV members in the event that they would leave their post. Additionally, the CIS observed vigilantes taking the place of JRV members when no alternates were present, which also violates articles 243 of the Electoral Code.
Party Colors at JRVs
Article 230 of the Electoral Code prohibits JRV members from wearing anything that alludes to political parties or coalitions inside the voting centers on Election Day.[98] Each Salvadoran political party has its own distinct color scheme and they often use only their colors as a form of propaganda (i.e. in painting highways and light poles). In twenty-three of the thirty-six municipalities covered by CIS, observers reported that JRV members were wearing party colors. [99] While no party was exempt from this violation of the Electoral Code, the FMLN was in violation most frequently.
Procedural Errors
There were an overwhelming amount of errors that occurred regarding JRV duties and responsibilities on Election Day and by both the actual and potential consequences of these errors. While most of these errors are a result of JRVs receiving inadequate training, some errors may also be the result of bad intentions on the part of JRV members or members’ own attempts to be more efficient. The following three sections detail the most common and concerning errors that occurred on Election Day.
A) Procedural Errors During Installation[100]
JRV members and vigilantes are the citizens with the greatest opportunity to vote twice. The TSE has set forth procedural steps to limit this possibility. Many CIS observers reported, however, that JRVs failed to carryout these preventative steps. Observers from ten municipalities reported cases in which JRV members and/or vigilantes did not ink their fingers after voting. Even more concerning is that in six municipalities, there were reports of JRV Presidents neglecting to retain JRV members’ and vigilantes’ DUIs. Failure to comply with these procedural steps leaves the possibility open for JRV members and vigilantes to vote at the JRV at which they are listed in the electoral registry in addition to the JRV at which they are assigned to work.
CIS observers reported that JRVs omitted or mismanaged other procedural steps during the installation process. For example, in two municipalities, JRVs failed to verify that the ballot box was empty before they began to receive votes. Both the Electoral Code[101] and the TSE JRV Instruction Manual make clear that this is an essential part of installing the JRV for operation. Additionally, there were many reports of JRVs poorly counting and inspecting ballots. Errors such as these that occur during installation could lead to problems and disputes concerning vote validity and questions of stuffed ballot boxes during the vote count.
B) Procedural Errors while Processing Voters
In an overwhelming number of municipalities covered by the CIS, observers reported that JRV Presidents failed to carry out his/her initial duties for processing a voter. As detailed in the TSE JRV Instructional Guide, his/her initial duties are to verify the following:
1) The citizen's identity, with the DUI photograph.
2) The authenticity of the DUI, that it does not present alterations.
3) That the citizen does not show signs of ink used in the voting process.[102]
Observers from 15 municipalities reported incidences of JRV Presidents failing to verify DUI photos and authenticity. Often times, voters were directed to give their DUIs to the JRV Secretary directly, thus bypassing the President. In nine municipalities, observers reported that many JRV Presidents did not check voters’ hands for indelible ink. These two steps appeared to be completely omitted from the voting process at many JRVs in various municipalities.[103] Failure to verify DUIs and photographs open the door to two possible scenarios:
1) People who are not authorized to vote can do so by using someone else’s DUI.
2) People who have already exercised their vote can vote a second time, using someone else’s DUI.
In fact, the CIS received a number of reports from both citizens and electoral officials that many citizens were not allowed to vote because someone had already voted in their place. Additionally, there was a case in San Miguel in which the Electoral Registry showed that one man had voted even though his family informed the JRV members that he was living in the United States.
According to article 253 of the Electoral Code, JRV members should nullify votes that appear without the JRV President’s signature and/or stamp during the vote count. The CIS observed many cases of JRV Presidents neglecting to sign and stamp ballots in nine municipalities. For example, in Estanzuelas, Usulután, twenty-six votes were nullified during the vote count because they did not have the President’s signature and stamp.[104] This error is very serious in that it nullifies a citizen’s vote due to a failure on the part of the JRV President. Article 249 of the Electoral Code says that Vocals should verify that the ballot has the President’s signature and stamp before giving the ballot to a voter. This procedural step limits the JRV President’s individual ability to nullify votes by failing to sign and stamp ballots. It is concerning, however, that observers from eight municipalities reported that JRV Vocals omitted this step of the voting process.
One of the most concerning discrepancies that arose on Election Day concerns errors regarding signatures and fingerprints in the JRV partial Electoral Registry. Observers in sixteen municipalities reported cases in which voters arrived to JRVs to emit their vote and discovered that the Electoral Registry already had a signature and fingerprint next to their name.[105] In some cases, JRVs allowed these people to vote and either asked them to sign and fingerprint to another person’s name[106] or did not require them to sign or fingerprint the registry at all. In other cases, JRVs did not allow these people to vote.[107] According to the law, JRVs had no other choice than to deny these people the right to vote. However, there were cases of individuals who were not permitted to exercise their right to vote due to the mistakes or crimes of other voters, the failure of JRVs to monitor voters as they sign the registry, and/or the ineffectiveness of JRVs in verifying voters’ identification.
Other errors that occurred while JRV members processed voters include processing multiple voters at one time and preparing ballots in advance. Observers in twelve municipalities reported that JRVs were processing multiple voters, and observers in seventeen municipalities reported that JRV Presidents were preparing ballots in advance. These errors are probably the result of JRV members trying to be efficient, especially when lines were long. However, errors such as these open the door for problems, anomalies, and fraud.
C) Procedural Errors During the Closing of the Polls and Vote Count
Article 243 in the Electoral Code prohibits JRVs from closing the polls before the 5:00 p.m. closing time set forth by the same Code. The CIS observed violations of this electoral law in five municipalities. For example, in San Pedro Masahuat, the JEM ordered all JRVs to begin the vote count at 4:30 p.m. [108] Even more concerning is that in four municipalities, citizens were denied the right to vote due to early poll closings.[109]
Many JRVs were observed filling out and even signing the closing acts before carrying out the actual vote count. This was observed in eight municipalities.[110] Perhaps JRVs took such actions in an attempt to speed up the closing process. This error is nonetheless very concerning. The purpose of having JRV members and vigilantes sign the closing acts is to ensure that all are in agreement with the vote count results at that JRV. Errors such as this during the closing and vote count indicate that the JRVs were not using the control mechanisms established in the Electoral Code, and they also make the system more vulnerable to fraud.
An overwhelming amount of observers reported that JRVs were not utilizing all of the mechanisms set in place to confirm the number of votes received.[111] This was evident both during the voting process and during the vote count. For example, many JRVs failed to use the voter control sheet as citizens voted, and many of the JRVs that did use the sheet failed to balance the number on the sheet with the number of votes received during the vote count. Additionally, many JRVs did not tear off ballot corners before giving ballots to voters but rather did so during the vote count. Further weakening the system for reconciling votes, many JRVs did not count leftover ballots or ballot corners during the vote count. Failing to use all of these mechanisms to confirm the number of votes can result in counting unauthorized ballots as valid or failing to take into account potentially missing ballots.
As previously mentioned, the Electoral Code explicitly states that any ballot that appears without the JRV President's stamp and signature should be nullified during the vote count.[112] In six municipalities, observers reported that JRVs were not checking to see if ballots had the stamp and signature during the vote count. In effect, this error could lead JRVs to count stuffed ballots or ballots otherwise unauthorized as valid during the vote count. Observers also reported several cases in which JRVs discovered ballots without the President's signature and stamp. In many of these cases, JRV members proceeded to stamp and sign them during the vote count and counted them as valid votes.
Lack of Proper Training for JRVs
On the day of the elections, JRV members are in charge of the process. They are responsible for facilitating the voting process and classifying and counting the votes. Taking the importance of their role into consideration, the apparent lack of training that JRV members is concerning. The CIS observed that many JRV members were generally unfamiliar with the following aspects of their responsibilities:
their specific duties as President, Secretary, and Vocals
how to fill out the opening and closing acts
how to classify votes as valid, null, disputed, etc.
the procedural steps and the order of the steps to process voters.
This lack of training is due to three primary factors:
Some JRV members are trained by the TSE, others by political parties, and some are not trained at all. This results in JRV members having varied levels of knowledge and training with regard to electoral law and JRV duties.
Errors and omissions in the JRV Instructional Manual that was provided in the Electoral Packet as a guide and reference for JRV members
Errors and omissions in the JRV Instructional Video distributed by the TSE.
Furthermore, the CIS observed the following weaknesses in the JRV Instruction Manual and Video distributed by the TSE:
The JRV Instructional Manual and Video only describe the general voting process and the voting process for blind voters. It does not describe any protocol that JRVs should follow for processing voters with physical or developmental disabilities or for processing illiterate voters. The CIS observed in many voting centers in which JRV tables and voting booths were not accessible to people with physical disabilities. In these cases, the ways in which JRV members and vigilantes allowed these people to vote varied. JRV members must be instructed as to whom should assist these voters in emitting their vote and how they should do so in order to ensure these voters’ right to vote secrecy and respect. Additionally, JRVs should be explicitly informed that deciding the ability to vote of someone who appears to be developmentally delayed is not within their power as JRV members.[113]
As previously mentioned, the CIS observed many cases in which JRV Presidents failed to sign and stamp ballots and in which these ballots were nullified during the vote count. Additionally, the CIS observed that many Vocals did not review ballots before giving them to voters. Article 249 of the Electoral Code states that the Vocal should hand the ballot, properly signed and stamped, to the President, which the other members and vigilantes should verify. But nowhere in the JRV Instructional Manual or Video does it say that the Vocal or any other member of the table should verify that the ballot has the President’s signature and stamp. This should be included in the manual as a mandatory step in JRV Instructional materials in order to comply with the Electoral Code and to explicitly inform JRV members of their right and duty to check the JRV President’s power to nullify votes by neglecting to sign and stamp ballots.
Article 247 of the Electoral Code states that ballot boxes should be located in places that guarantee a secret vote, maintaining a prudential distance from the JRV, but within view of the JRV. The JRV Instructional Manual and Video, however, simply instruct JRV members to place the ballot box on the JRV work table.[114]
The JRV Instructional Video fails to mention the step in which the JRV President should remove the ballot corner and save it in the assigned bag. The actor that represents the JRV President does remove the corner, but the narrator does not mention this as one of the steps in processing the voter. This particular omission in JRV instructional materials calls our attention because the CIS observed many cases in which JRV members handled ballot corners improperly while processing voters and did not utilize them to confirm the number of votes received as part of the closing process.[115]
Article 4 of the Electoral Code states that "competent authorities are obligated to guarantee the liberty and purity of the vote, and facilitate the exercise of the vote."[116] Therefore, electoral officials are under the obligation to provide services to accommodate all voters with special needs.
Voters with Physical Disabilities
The Ministry of Health of El Salvador estimates that ten percent of the population of the country is afflicted with some disability[117]. Consequently, creating the conditions in which disabled persons can comfortably exercise their right to vote should be of paramount concern to electoral organisms at all levels. However, the CIS observed problems with regard to both the physical set-up of voting centers and the actions of JRV members and vigilantes in enabling disabled voters to emit their vote on the day of the elections.
In 16 of the 36 municipalities[118] in which CIS observers were present, the voting centers and/or the location of the JRVs within the voting centers were deemed to be inaccessible to voters with physical disabilities. For example, some voting centers were only accessed by rocky dirt paths or steep staircases. Inside voting centers, JRVs were observed to be poorly placed, at times on sidewalks as much as a meter and a half above the level of the street.[119]
According to Article 116 of the Electoral Code, it is the responsibility of the Municipal Electoral Council (JEM), in cooperation with the Departmental Electoral Council (JED), to determine the location of the voting centers in their respective municipalities, keeping in mind four criteria: accessibility of the center, familiarity of citizens with its location, easily trafficked by people and vehicles, and adequate infrastructure and public services.[120]
The JEMs of 16 municipalities were negligent in the application of these criteria. This negligence impeded voters from exercising their right to vote, a primary right of all Salvadoran citizens guaranteed by both the Electoral Code and the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador. The needs of voters with limited mobility and voters in wheelchairs was not adequately considered in the selection of voting centers.
In addition to structural problems in voting centers, the behavior of vigilantes, members of JRVs, and family members of disabled persons was observed to be problematic. In some municipalities, the right of physically disabled voters to emit their vote in secret was violated unnecessarily by family members, vigilantes and JRV members when they adapted the voting process to accommodate the needs of disabled voters. For example, at JRV 1538, in Cuscatancingo, San Salvador, a woman in a wheelchair was pushed by three family members and one vigilante from the JRV to the voting booth. They remained by her side as she marked the ballot. One family member then took the marked ballot from her hand, folded it and placed it in the ballot box. And, in Estanzuelas, Usulután, physically disabled voters were forced to use vigilantes to assist them in the voting process, even though they stated that they preferred to be accompanied to the voting booth by their family member. Actions such as this are unnecessary and should be avoided. Disabled voters should be allowed to emit their vote in secret to the fullest extent possible.
Voters with Developmental Disabilities
On three separate occasions CIS observers stationed in San Pedro Masahuat, La Paz, observed individuals with alleged developmental disabilities arrive at the voting center to emit their vote. On all three occasions, the individual was permitted to vote. However, at JRV 6789, at approximately 1:50 p.m., conflict arose between the JRV members, Legal Representatives, Supervisors, Vigilantes, a Center Coordinator (jefe de centro) and members of the JEM regarding the right of a developmentally disabled individual to vote. In addition to these electoral officials, a group of spectators formed to watch the dispute. A dramatic discussion arose in the middle of the voting center regarding the right to vote of this individual who both appeared in the Electoral Registry and who had in his possession an authentic DUI, because he appeared to be developmentally disabled to the involved parties.
Article 7 of the Electoral Code and the Constitution list developmentally disabled individuals among those people that have lost the right to vote.[121] However, the inability to vote must be declared by a judge or tribune. The members of the JRV and other electoral officials present in the voting center on the day of the elections are not authorized nor competent to determine the inability of an individual to vote. Public spectacles such as that created in San Pedro Masahuat are not only unnecessarily humiliating for the developmentally disabled individuals, but a violation of the Constitution of the Republic.
Illiterate Individuals
Illiterate voters, a population which makes up 28.5 percent of the Salvadoran voting population,[122] also warrant special accommodations in order to emit their vote. The CIS observed in ten voting centers in which orienters were not available to assist voters in locating the JRV where they were assigned to vote.[123] In three municipalities, voters were observed leaving the voting center without voting, reportedly due to their inability to locate their JRV.[124] This frustration and confusion felt by many voters on the day of the elections is amplified for individuals who are unable to read. Staffing the voting centers with more orienters to assist illiterate individuals would minimize these problems.
3) INFLUENCE ON VOTERS AND INDUCTION OF VOTE
In a democracy, free and independent voting constitutes a fundamental human right. Voters should be able to make their decision based on nothing more than their personal preference for a candidate or political party. The Electoral Code of El Salvador states that:
Nobody may impede, disrupt, or disturb the exercise of suffrage. The competent authorities have the obligation to guarantee the freedom and purity of suffrage and facilitate its exercise.[125]
On Election Day, voters should have the right to go to a voting center to make their decision and cast their vote without undue influence or intimidation.
In El Salvador, political parties have several months before Election Day to communicate their proposals to the population in order to win votes. Attempts to sway voters on Election Day, especially in or around the voting centers, interfere with the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Attempts to sway voters with fear or intimidation constitute even more blatant violations of voters’ human rights.
On Election Day we observed, and received reports of, numerous efforts to influence and intimidate voters.[126] In almost every municipality where the CIS observed we saw some form of illegal campaigning; illegal propaganda; direct pressure on voters from election officials and party representatives; or the giving of food, water or other gifts to voters by political party activists. CIS observers also received several reports of vote buying. Previous to Election Day observers received reports of people being intimidated with losing jobs if they did not work and/or vote for the official party. All of these activities undermine the culture of democracy, the right to a free vote, voters’ confidence in the purity of the electoral process, and even the legitimacy of the election results. Many of these activities also violate electoral law as stated in the Electoral Code.
Much of the influence and intimidation of voters observed by the CIS seemed to target the poor and uneducated. Given the extreme poverty, some people cannot afford to turn down food or money in exchange for their vote, or risk losing their jobs. Propaganda in the voting centers can overwhelm or confuse voters from more tranquil, rural settings. And voters that need free transportation often have no choice but to use buses that promote a political party. Taking advantage of people’s needs and vulnerabilities constitutes a particularly reprehensible means of influencing votes.
The various attempts to influence votes on Election Day and beforehand not only violate the letter and the spirit of electoral law, but they also contribute to a general atmosphere of tension and rivalry.
Propaganda and campaigning on Election Day tend to heighten emotions and violations of the law require party representatives and election officials to investigate and attend to the problems. Heightened emotions and time spent dealing with violations of the law distract all participants in the electoral process from concentrating on facilitating that process.
Campaign
The most common attempts to influence voters observed by the CIS were in political party campaigning. Electoral law sets clear limits on when and where the political parties can carry out campaigning and propaganda.
It is prohibited for Political Parties or Coalitions, communication media, naturalized or legal citizens, to do propaganda… during the three days prior to the election and on the day of the election. Partisan propaganda is also not permitted in the voting centers.[127]
The CIS observed violations of laws regarding propaganda and campaigning in twenty-one of the thirty-six municipalities in which we observed.[128]
CIS observers saw many campaign activities on the day before and the day of the election, including campaigning and propaganda within the voting centers. Party activists marching through voting centers with party flags, party banners and posters within the voting centers, and food containers with party logos within the voting centers were seen in many municipalities. The CIS saw party activists orienting voters to their voting tables using slips of paper marked with party logos in thirteen municipalities. Electoral law prohibits all of these activities.
In addition to being illegal, propaganda and campaigning on Election Day, and especially in the voting centers, can serve to overwhelm and intimidate voters in their attempt to freely cast their vote. Partisan enthusiasm in what should be the neutral, non-partisan process of Election Day also increases tension between party members and undermines the peaceful and cooperative atmosphere of the public event.
Gift Giving and Vote Buying
Another form of propaganda seen by CIS observers on Election Day was the distribution of food, water and other gifts by party activists to voters.[129] In two municipalities, this even occurred within the voting centers.
Though we received eye-witness testimony in only one case, CIS observers received reports of vote buying from multiple sources in each of four municipalities.[130] Vote buying constitutes one of the most blatant violations of the right to a free and independent vote.
Transportation
On Election Day, in at least four municipalities, the CIS observed buses and trucks that carried party flags.[131] CIS observers reported seeing at least one case of each party, including the coalition, transporting voters on buses or trucks with party flags. In at least one of those municipalities, party-provided transportation carried voters to a location where party activists then handed out food as voters got off the buses.
Given the great distances that many voters live from their respective voting centers, the lack of regular public transportation on Election Day, and the difficult economic situation of many voters, the transportation provided by the political parties plays an important role in facilitating voters’ exercising their right to vote. The transportation provided by political parties is a valuable contribution to the election process, but the use of that service to promote those political parties undermines the spirit of free and independent voting.
Direct Pressure from Officials and Party Representatives
Members of the JRVs, as the election officials on the front lines of the voting process, have a great responsibility to remain neutral and facilitate free and independent voting for all voters. The Electoral Code describes, as a primary responsibility of the JRV: "To watch over the fulfilment of the Law and all the related dispositions to the electoral process."[132]
CIS observers reported three cases of JRV members interfering or influencing voters’ exercise of their right to vote.[133] Since the JRV members handle votes and run the voting process, their attempts to influence votes severely undermine the integrity of the process.
Party vigilantes were seen to commit numerous attempts to influence voting in twelve municipalities.[134] The Electoral Code specifically warns vigilantes from interfering in the electoral process.
The Political Party or Coalition representatives or vigilantes that seriously interrupt, in word or deed, the functions of the Electoral Bodies or interfere in the development of the electoral process, will be relieved of their duties without further process.[135]
Vigilantes have a significant presence in the voting centers. They are numerous and they wear party regalia. Due to their numbers and their visibility, party vigilantes can play an important role in facilitating and monitoring the voting process, but they can also serve as a very intimidating presence when they intervene with voting. Aggressive party vigilantes constitute a threat to voters’ right to vote free of intimidation and influence.
The right to vote in secret is an essential aspect of true democratic elections. Salvadoran law makes clear the importance of voting secrecy. The Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador[136] and the Electoral Code[137] state that voting should be “free, direct, equal and secret.”
One of the most significant concerns raised by CIS observers on Election Day was the lack of voter secrecy. CIS observers noted various factors that compromised voter secrecy. Lack of space in the voting center, poorly placed voting booths and the proximity of vigilantes and other people around the voting booths all resulted in compromised secrecy for voters. The primary threat to voting secrecy was the ability of other people to see the insides of voting booths while voters marked their ballots.
The CIS observed compromised voting secrecy due to voting center layout and crowding in eight municipalities. Where the voting center did not have enough space for all the voters, the packed crowds of people forced voters and vigilantes alike to pass behind and around the voting booths, within sight of voters marking their ballots. In some voting centers there were bridges and higher levels from which people could see into the voting booths.
Another prevalent cause of compromised voter secrecy was the placement of the voting booths by JRVs. CIS observers saw voting booths placed such that other people could see inside the booth in twenty-five municipalities. Sometimes the available space limits the choices of how to place the voting booth, but JRVs often poorly arranged the voting booths even when better arrangements were possible.
Party vigilantes also posed a threat to voter secrecy on many occasions. In four municipalities, CIS observers saw vigilantes taking voters’ marked ballots to put them into the ballot box.[138] Additionally, in eight municipalities, CIS observers saw vigilantes standing very close to the voting booths or even directly behind the voting booths where they could have seen voters marking their ballots.[139]
The 2004 Presidential Elections resulted in an unprecedented rate of voter turnout, with 63 percent of the voting population coming out to emit their vote and exercise their civic responsibility.[140] The increased participation of the Salvadoran people in the electoral process is commendable.
However, increased participation in the elections requires a higher degree of logistical support at all levels, in order to process voters in a timely manner, control crowds and prevent chaos in the voting centers. High voter turnout was no surprise- predictions of an unprecedented rate were made frequently in the months leading up to the elections. Nonetheless, little was done to prevent such problems and the CIS observed many instances in which the logistical support provided and the planning done by the Municipal Electoral Councils (JEMs), Departmental Electoral Councils (JEDs) and the TSE was inadequate.
Overcrowding and long lines were observed by the CIS in 15 municipalities. Overcrowding caused confusion and frustration among voters. Voters had difficulty finding their respective JRV and in some cases, left the voting center without voting. Overcrowding also overwhelmed the JRVs, causing many procedural errors to take place and creating opportunities for fraud. On several occasions, groups formed that blocked the JRV’s view of the ballot box. This is in direct violation of article 247 of the Electoral Code. In three municipalities, there were observations of voters placing their ballots in ballot boxes that did not correspond to their JRV.
One of the four primary criteria for the selection of voting centers is that there be adequate infrastructure and public services.[141] However, inadequate infrastructure was observed, in terms of public bathrooms, electricity and adequate protection from sun exposure in many municipalities.
Nine municipalities had inadequate lighting during the vote count and one municipality, San Francisco Chinameca experienced two power outages during the vote count. Inadequate lighting made the vote count difficult for JRVs and created an opportunity for fraud during one of the most critical moments of the voting process.
In many outdoor voting centers, there were no tarps or canopies available to provide shade for members of the JRV, as recommended by the TSE in their Voting Center Criteria.[142] Consequently, JRV members moved their tables, voting booths and ballot boxes throughout the day in order to avoid excessive sun exposure. This resulted in increased confusion. When tables were moved, they were no longer in numerical order and the signs hung on walls and posts that indicated JRV numbers no longer corresponded to the correct table. Often times, the tables were moved to positions which greatly compromised voter secrecy. Providing adequate working conditions for JRV members, in terms of canopies and roofs, would prevent this problem.
The CIS observed problems in the voting process caused by missing materials and inadequate materials in 18 out of 36 municipalities[143]. Problems with the indelible ink, partial Electoral Registry display stands, crayons, voting booths and ballot boxes had some of the most concerning consequences.
Marking the finger of the voter with indelible ink is an important measure to guarantee that voters are unable to vote twice. It was reported to observers that the indelible ink was easily washed off. In Metapán, voters even washed off the indelible ink in the presence of CIS observers. This is an unacceptable weakness that would be easy to solve through the quality of the materials.
Due to the unprecedented voter turnout, ballot boxes were observed to be too small to accommodate the number of ballots. JRV members dealt with this problem in two ways, both of which compromise the transparency of the electoral process. In some cases, ballot boxes were opened midday to push ballots to the bottom of the box. Other times, JRV members used rulers to push down ballots through the opening in the top of the box. Ballots were torn during this process, resulting in arguments over their validity during the vote count. Ballot boxes must be large enough to accommodate all of the ballots.
The cardboard stands provided to display the partial Electoral Registry were also observed to be problematic. The lightweight material of the display stand did not hold up in outdoor voting centers. At times, the stands fell over and sheets of paper were blown off by the wind. Additionally, the stand required that pages of the Electoral Registry be attached at ground level, which caused difficulty for elderly and mobility impaired persons in locating their names on the registry. In some municipalities, voting booths were also made of lightweight cardboard. The booths were flimsy and were often seen covered in handwritten party slogans.
The crayons used by voters to mark their ballots had defects that are particularly concerning. The heat on the day of the election caused many crayons to melt. When voters marked a flag and then folded the ballot in half, the flag on the opposite side of the ballot became stained with ink from the crayon. This raised many questions as to the validity of the vote, and even made the intention of the voter unclear during the vote count.
6) ROLE OF THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE
The CIS applauds the National Civilian Police (PNC) for the role they played in the 2004 Presidential Election. It was an election characterized by tension and fear. The police played a critical role in preventing electoral violence before and during the day of the election. Nonetheless, there are a several noteworthy areas of concern.
Unprecedented Presence of the Police
In 26 out of 36 municipalities, the CIS observed armed, uniformed police officers present inside the voting center. In two municipalities, armed, uniformed police officers were observed close to JRVs and voting booths. And, in Santa Ana, those police officers violated voter’s right to vote in secret by observing voters while they marked the ballot in the voting booths.[144] Additionally, in two municipalities, the CIS observed PNC helicopters circling over the voting centers.[145]
In most cases, police were present as a security measure, at the request of the Municipal Electoral Council (JEM), in accordance with article 357 of the Electoral Code. While CIS observed that police officers were generally respectful and helpful to the process, it is noteworthy that this was the first time since the signing of the Peace Accords that armed, uniformed police were present inside the voting centers. Given the history of the Civil War in this country and tactics frequently used by the national police to impart fear in the population, the presence of the PNC can be interpreted as intimidating. Additionally, it sets a dangerous precedent for future elections.
Presence of Weapons Inside the Voting Center
Article 357 of the Electoral Code establishes that the police are obligated to guarantee that no one, apart from the police themselves, enters the voting center with weapons of any kind. However, in four municipalities, the CIS observed weapons inside the voting center, [146] carried in by voters, vigilantes and private security guards hired to work in businesses located inside a voting center. This negligence on the part of police officers failing to disarm armed citizens is particularly concerning as it could compromise public safety.
The Right of Police to Emit their Vote
In the weeks leading up to the elections, legislation was presented in the Legislative Assembly that would allow police officers to vote during the installation of the JRVs in the first JRV of the voting center in which they were assigned to work. This legislation was vetoed by the President of the Republic prior to the elections.[147] Although the legislation was not enacted for this election, it did raise questions regarding the right of the police to emit their vote, and whether they could do so armed and/or in their PNC uniform. The lack of clarity regarding the rights of police was played out in the media in the weeks before the elections. Miguel Angel Guerrero Vallecillo, Chief of the Public Security Division of the National Civilian Police (PCN) stated in a presentation to CIS International Elections Observers on March 8, 2004 that chiefs of police of each municipality were given the authority to determine the procedures police would use to emit their vote in their respective municipality. However, testimony made by the police to observers revealed that many officers believed they were prohibited from voting on election day. Additionally, police officers were observed attempting to vote and being denied the right because they were either armed or armed and uniformed. There was a lack of clarity and miscommunication on the national level that led to police officers and JRV members being misinformed regarding police officer’s right to vote.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the observations of all six CIS Election Observation Missions, the CIS recommends the following reforms to the laws and the electoral process, taking into account not only the 2004 Presidential Elections but also the preparation process for the 2006 Municipal and Legislative Elections.
1. Promoting a Culture of Democracy
TSE promotion of civic culture to encourage debate, participation and respect in the democratic framework
The TSE should assure that the political parties publicly debate their platforms
2. Revise the Electoral Code
Revise the objective of the new Electoral Code to include the spirit and the letter of constitutional reforms and adjust to the new electoral experiences, so guaranteeing electoral justice
3. Implement TSE Reforms
Reform the relevant Articles of the Constitution of the Republic and the Electoral Code, respectively, to eliminate the partisan division of the TSE and the temporary electoral organizations
Establish a process to sanction the TSE Magistrates when their party affiliation supercedes the Electoral Code and the interests of the citizenry in applying electoral law, endangering electoral justice
Reform Article 80 of the Electoral Code to permit decisions by 3-2 majority when the Magistrates cannot reach agreements with a 4-1 majority
4. Resolution by the TSE Against Violations of Electoral Law
That the TSE fulfill its obligations as required by the Electoral Code and the Constitution
5. Reforms to the Political Party Internal Regimen
(Title VII, Chapter III of the Electoral Code)
Institutionalize the right to propaganda equality for political parties
Require political parties present an audit to the TSE and to make public their spending records on the campaign
Prohibit political parties from accepting donations that come from illicit activities for campaign financing
Institutionalize the internal control mechanisms of political parties in the following aspects: election of leadership, affiliation requirements, control mechanisms for the leadership with respect to the membership base
6. Reform Article 182, Paragraph 3 of the Electoral Code
Permit all political parties to remain after presidential elections, not requiring that they receive a given percentage of the votes to remain. As there is only one winner in a presidential election and no proportional representation, it is difficult for smaller parties to gain the required number of votes. Article 83 of the Constitution states that "the political system is pluralistic and is expressed through the political parties, which are the only instrument for the exercising representation of the people within the government."
7. Guarantee Voting Secrecy
Redesign the voting booths to guarantee voting secrecy
Find appropriate voting centers and placements for the voting booths to guarantee secrecy
8. Implement Residential Voting
The TSE and the Legislative Assembly should implement the residential voting system
9. Guarantee Adequate Lighting in the Voting Centers
Also, provide flashlights in the electoral packets to use in case of bad lighting or power outages
10. Provide Free TSE Transportation to Voting Centers
Free transportation, provided by the TSE, in every municipality of the country, especially in the interior where there are scarce economic resources and scarce access to transportation, to facilitate greater citizen participation
Avoid the pressure that parties exert on citizens on party-provided transportation
11. Facilitate Participation of Disabled Voters
Assure wheelchair accessibility in voting centers
Guarantee special voting booths for people in wheelchairs
Promote consciousness and write clear instructions on JRV procedures for voters with various disabilities such as the hearing impaired and the physically disabled, as have been established for the visually impaired in the JRV Instruction Manual
Provide TSE orienters to help illiterate voters or those who have other special needs
12. Include new sanctions in the Electoral Procedures Law against private businesses or work centers where employees are required or pressured to vote for a certain political party.
13. Enforce the law to implement sanctions against persons from the public administration where employees are required or pressured to work for or vote for a certain political party.
14. Improve Training for All Electoral Organizations
Assure a uniform and comprehensible training to facilitate the process and avoid conflicts that arise from misunderstanding of the Electoral Process
Make the contents of the instructional materials consistent with the process established in the Electoral Code
15. Give institutional continuity to the failure of the Supreme Court of Justice on the unconstitutionality of Article 13 of the Electoral Code
Guarantee proportional representation for Deputies in the Legislative Assembly for the 2006 Municipal and Legislative Elections
16. Promote a Law to Establish Pluralistic Municipal Councils
To guarantee proportional representation, impose political pluralism and strengthen coherence in the transitions between administrations
17. Strict Application of Universal Suffrage for all Salvadorans above the age of 18 with DUI
Revise the Constitution, the Electoral Code and the laws to:
Assure the mechanisms to guarantee the right to vote for the National Civilian Police (PNC) officers and members of the Armed Forces on Election Day, taking into account their work obligations
Permit Salvadorans living abroad to vote
Guarantee access to voting for all Salvadoran citizens who have a mental disability (reforming Article 74 of the Constitution)
Other Suggestions
18. The Electoral Attorney General should play a more proactive role in investigating and punishing acts of violence and electoral anomalies, especially those who vote twice.
19. Suggestions for the Electoral Project (TSE Logistics Unit)
Increase the size of the ballot boxes
Make ballot-markers with a new material (the current material melts in the heat)
Improve the quality of the indelible ink
New design for the voting booths, to guarantee voting secrecy
Provide all the support necessary for the smooth functioning of the JEMs (location, paper materials, equipment, etc. Back to top
COUNTRIES REPRESENTED
IN THE 2004 CIS ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION
Australia
Canada
Chile
France
Germany
Great Britain
Guatemala
Israel
Italy
Japan
Lebanon
The Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
United States
ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTED IN THE
2004 CIS INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
Center for Global Education, U.S.A. & El Salvador
Chicago Religious Leadership Network (CRLN), U.S.A.
CoCoDA, Canada
CommonBorders – Canada
Episcopal Church, El Salvador
Inter-Religious Task Force (IRTF) – Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.
Latin American Solidarity Group (LAG) – Norway
Oakland Catholic Workers, U.S.A.
Saint Theresa Catholic Church – Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.A.
San Francisco State University, U.S.A.
Sarah Lawrence College, U.S.A.
University of Denver, U.S.A.
University of New Mexico, U.S.A.
University of Texas – Austin, U.S.A.
Veterans for Peace, U.S.A.
MUNICIPALITIES COVERED IN THE
2004 CIS INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION
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1. CABAÑAS Cinquera Ilobasco Sensuntepeque
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7. SAN MIGUEL San Miguel
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2. CHALATENANGO Chalatenango El Paraíso Nueva Concepción Nueva Trinidad
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8. SAN SALVADOR Apopa Cuscatancingo Mejicanos San Martín San Salvador Tonacatepeque
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3. CUSCATLÁN Cojutepeque San Pedro Perulapán San Rafael Cedros
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9. SANTA ANA Metapan Santa Ana
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4. LA LIBERTAD Antiguo Cuscatlán Colon Comasagua Jayaque Puerto de La Libertad San Matías Tamanique Zaragoza
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10. SAN VICENTE San Vicente
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5. LA PAZ Olocuilta San Francisco Chinameca San Pedro Masahuat
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11. USULUTÁN Berlín Estanzuelas Mercedes Umaña |
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6. LA UNIÓN Conchagua La Unión
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NOTE ACCREDITING CIS OBSERVERS
TSE RESOLUTION AGAINST THE ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN
AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE
CIS observers witnessed acts of verbal aggression inside the voting centers of the following municipalities: San Vicente.
San Vicente
A confrontation arose between ARENA and FMLN party militants inside the voting center at the hour of the vote count. The police intervened. The party militants were directed to leave the center through different exits.
The CIS observed incidences of physical violence between party members in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Cuscatancingo, Estanzuelas and San Miguel.
Antiguo Cuscatlán
Shouting and shoving was witnesses between the ARENA Center Coordinator and the FMLN President of the JEM. Bystanders became involved, and the police intervened
Cuscatancingo
CIS observers reported that there was pushing and slapping between a supervisor and a vigilante in front of JRV 1621.
Estanzuelas
FMLN vigilantes encountered a group of ARENA party members as they exited the voting center. Insults were exchanged. An FMLN supporter struck an ARENA supporter with a covered machete. Then ARENA supporters struck a different FMLN supporter several times. Ultimately, Señor Amadeo Martin, the President of the JEM (ARENA), shoved this FMLN supporter into a truck.
San Miguel
A confrontation erupted between an ARENA vigilante and another, unidentified person during the vote count. One of them was evacuated in a police truck, reportedly with paralyzed legs. The other individual was evacuated in an ambulance with a bloodied face.
PROPAGANDA
A) Before Election Day
ARENA militants were campaigning at the CODECO office in Berlin on the day before the election, March 20th.
La Union
ARENA militants were seen painting and putting up posters inside the voting center at approximately 8 p.m. on Saturday, March 20th.
Metapán
Local residents received phone calls from Tony Saca, in the presence of observers, on the day before the election, March 20th.
B) Day of the Elections
1. The CIS observed party members campaigning inside the voting centers in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlan, Colon, Cuscatancingo, Jayaque, La Union, Mejicanos, San Rafael Cedros, San Salvador and San Vicente.
Antiguo Cuscatlan
The FMLN vice-presidential candidate entered the voting center accompanied by a group of supporters waving FMLN flags.
ARENA mayor of Antiguo Cuscatlan entered the voting center accompanied by a group of supporters waving ARENA flags.
Colón
There was a Coalition flag carried through the Gustavo and Indel voting centers at approximately 1:00 p.m.
Cuscatancingo
ARENA and FMLN food deliverers entered the voting center with flags. They were asked to leave or remove the flags.
La Union
The mayor of La Union, Mario Antonio Vides, was observed to be campaigning in the voting center. He was dressed in ARENA clothing, followed by a cameraperson, and walking through the voting center shaking hands and chatting with voters.
Mejicanos
ARENA supporters gathered around the entrance to the voting center carrying flags and singing the ARENA hymn.
At 3:10pm a group of FMLN supporters marched through the voting center wearing party colors, waving two flags.
San Salvador
ARENA members were seen handing out party pamphlets in the Feria Internacional.
San Vicente
At 4:00 p.m., a group of approximately 30 ARENA supporters, all dressed in party colors, marched through the voting center carrying a large ARENA flag.
The mayor of San Vicente, from PCN, was observed walking through the voting center followed by a large group of party members, all dressed in PCN clothing.
2. The CIS observed various forms of illegal propaganda within the voting centers in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlan, Chalatenango, Colon, Comasagua, Conchagua, La Union, Mejicanos, Metapán, Olocuilta, Puerto de la Libertad, San Miguel, San Rafael Cedros, San Vicente and Sensuntepeque.
La Union
The voting center was decorated with posters and murals from both the FMLN and ARENA.
FMLN propaganda was displayed at the entrances to the voting centers.
Metapán
An FMLN banner was seen inside the ISSS voting center.
San Miguel
There was propaganda throughout the voting center.
There were FMLN t-shirt vendor stands inside the voting center.
San Vicente
PCN flags were hanging from the electricity poles around the park. There were also poles around the voting center that were painted with PCN colors.
Sensuntepeque
Sections of the curb within the voting center were painted with ARENA colors.
3. The CIS observed the FMLN delivering food to JRV members and vigilantes in containers adorned with party colors, the party logo or images of Schafik Handal in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Comasagua, Cuscatancingo, Metapán, San Salvador, San Vicente and Sensuntepeque.
4. The CIS observed ARENA delivering food to JRV members and vigilantes in containers adorned with party colors, the party logo or images of Tony Saca in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, San Salvador and Sensuntepeque.
5. The CIS observed the Coalition delivering food to JRV members and vigilantes in containers adorned with party colors, the party logo or images of Hector Silva in the following municipalities: La Unión and Metapán.
C) Orientation of Voters
1. The CIS observed slips of paper marked with the FMLN logo being used to orient voters in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlan, Colon, Comasagua, Cuscatancingo, La Unión, Metapán, Puerto de la Libertad, San Martin, San Miguel and San Vicente.
Comasagua
FMLN was using pieces of paper printed with the FMLN logo and the words “La Esperanza...Vencerá al Miedo” to write down citizen’s JRV numbers. They were asked to stop twice by the JEM. Ultimately, the JEM went accompanied by the police to stop the FMLN from using those papers.
2. The CIS observed slips of paper marked with the ARENA logo being used to orient voters in the following municipalities: Cuscatancingo, La Union, San Pedro Masahuat, San Salvador, San Vicente and Santa Ana.
JRV ANOMALIES
A) JRV Members in Party Colors
1. The CIS observed incidents of JRV members wearing party colors in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Chalatenango, Cojutepeque, Colón, El Paraíso, Jayaque, La Unión, Mercedes Umaña, Metapán, Nueva Concepción, Nueva Trinidad, Olocuilta, San Francisco Chinameca, San Matías, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, San Pedro Perulapán, San Rafael Cedros, Santa Ana, Sensuntepeque, Tamanique, and Zaragoza.
Cojutepeque
FMLN JRV members were in party colors at JRVs 7368, 7369, 7372, 7375, 7376, 7378, 7379, 7383, 7385, 7387, 7388, 7389, 7391, 7393, 7396, and 7397. Typically, they wore red t-shirts with white ribbons.
At JRV 7388, the ARENA member was wearing a red, white and blue baseball cap.
At JRV 7370, the ARENA member was wearing a red, white and blue blouse.
The FMLN JRV member at table 7388 was made to put a white shirt over his red shirt in the late morning.
Colón
JRV members were dressed in party colors at JRVs 4627, 4611, 4677, 4679, and 4666.
La Unión
At JRV 6275, the Secretary (FMLN) had a red and white pedicure.
Before the opening of the polls, an FMLN supervisor was seen distributing red handkerchiefs to the FMLN JRV members. When a JRV member of another party protested, the FMLN supervisor claimed the handkerchiefs were 'for cleaning the table'.
Nueva Concepción
At JRVs 7112, 7111, 7113, 7110, 7104, 7114, 7105, 7104, and 7107, FMLN JRV members were seen wearing red shirts.
Nueva Trinidad
The Presidents of JRVs 7224 and 7225 wore red shirts.
At JRV 6864, the FMLN alternate for the Secretary wore a red shirt.
At JRV 6861, the FMLN Secretary wore a red shirt.
At JRV 6866, the Coalition Vocal wore a Coalition shirt all day.
At JRV 5084, the Coalition alternate of the JRV wore a bright yellow shirt.
At JRV 5092, an FMLN alternate sat at the table wearing an FMLN shirt.
At JRV 7524, the FMLN alternate wore a red shirt.
Santa Ana
At JRVs 2692, 2671, and 3044 the FMLN members were wearing party colors (handkerchiefs, scarves and shirts).
Tamanique
At JRV 4994, the FMLN alternate was wearing a white shirt with a red collar.
At JRV 5000, the FMLN alternate had a white dress shirt on with a visible FMLN T-shirt underneath.
At JRV 5004, the FMLN Secretary carried a red bandana hanging out of his back pocket.
Zaragoza
At JRV 5072, the ARENA member was wearing party colors. He was asked to remove them by JEM members.
B) Installation of JRVs and Opening of Polls
1. The CIS observed cases in which JRV members did not mark their fingers with indelible ink after voting in the following municipalities: Berlin, Comasagua, El Paraíso, Estanzuelas, Ilobasco, Mercedes Umaña, San Miguel, and San Pedro Perulapán.
Comasagua
· At JRV 4872, none of the JRV members marked their fingers after voting.
Estanzuelas
· At JRVs 5435 and 5436, the members of the JRV did not mark their fingers with indelible ink after emitting their vote.
San Pedro Perulapán
· At JRV 7472, some JRV members failed to ink their fingers after voting.
2. CIS observers reported incidences in which JRV Presidents did not inspect and count ballots properly in the following municipalities: Colón, Conchagua, San Francisco Chinameca, and San Miguel.
Colón
At JRVs 4617, 4668, 4673, 4672, 4679, 4683, 4686, and 4671, the ballots were not well inspected or counted carefully.
San Francisco Chinameca
At JRVs 6862, 6863, and 6867, the ballots were initially counted by the Secretary or Vocal.
At JRVs 6866 and 6868, the ballots were not all counted one by one.
3. The CIS observed cases in which JRV Presidents failed to retain the DUIs of JRV members and vigilantes in the following municipalities: Conchagua, El Paraíso, Nueva Concepción, Puerto de La Libertad, San Francisco Chinameca, and San Miguel.
Nueva Concepción
At JRV 7078, a vigilante was seen holding his DUI at 4:30 p.m.
Puerto de La Libertad
The President of JRV 4738 returned the DUI to the Attorney General Representative after she voted. CIS observers reported that she left the voting center for several hours after voting.
San Francisco Chinameca
At JRV 6866, the Secretary kept the DUIs of JRV members in his pocket.
4. The CIS observed cases in which JRVs operated with less then 3 members in the following municipalities: Colón, Cuscatancingo, Jayaque, Mejicanos, San Miguel, and San Pedro Masahuat.
Colón
In the afternoon, the Presidents and Secretaries were observed to be missing from JRVs 4621 and 4688.
Mejicanos
JRV 0956 opened with only two JRV members.
San Pedro Masahuat
JRV 6806 was comprised of only the ARENA and FMLN members at 8:00am.
5. CIS observers reported cases where JRVs failed to check the inside of ballot boxes before receiving votes in the following municipalities: Comasagua and San Miguel.
Comasagua
JRVs 4857, 4863, 4865, and 4862 did not check ballot boxes to make sure they were empty.
6. Additional Observations:
San Martín
In two instances at the CEJL voting center, ARENA vigilantes were retired from their duties after already having voted because JRV members noticed that their DUIs were emitted after the December 21st cutoff date. In these cases, the JEM instructed the JRVs to make a note in the act and to then nullify their votes during the vote count.
San Rafael Cedros
At JRV 7514, the JRV members voted openly while seated at the table.
At JRV 7524, JRV members did not sign or fingerprint beside their DUI numbers after voting.
San Vicente
The members of JRV 8374 opened the electoral packets before deciding each member’s role at the JRV.
C) Processing Voters
1. The CIS observed incidents in which JRV Presidents failed to verify the authenticity of voters’ DUIs in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Colón, Comasagua, El Paraiso, Estanzuelas, Metapán, Nueva Trinidad, Olocuilta, San Francisco Chinameca, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, Sensuntepeque, Tamanique, and Zaragoza.
At JRV 7375, the Secretary began directly receiving DUIs by mid-morning.
At JRV 7370, the Secretary received DUIs while the President ate breakfast.
Estanzuelas
At JRV 5439, the Vocal and Secretary were taking DUIs.
At JRV 7223, the President never verified the authenticity of voters’ DUIs.
At JRVs 6864 and 6865, the Secretary was taking voter DUIs instead of the President.
At JRVs 6864, 6865, 6866 and 6868, the Presidents did not verify the authenticity of DUIs, or did so after people had voted.
Tamanique
At JRV 4994, the Secretary was receiving and verifying the authenticity of the DUI.
At JRV 5068, two voters switched DUIs and successfully voted under the other person’s name because the President did not check the photographs on the DUIs.
2. The CIS observed incidents in which JRV Vocals did not inspect ballots before handing them to voters in the following municipalities: Berlin, Comasagua, Mercedes Umaña, Nueva Concepción, San Francisco Chinameca, San Rafael Cedros, San Salvador, and Zaragoza.
At JRV 4872, President gave ballots directly to voter passing them to the vocal for inspection.
At JRV 7111, President gave ballots directly to the voter without passing them to the vocal for inspection.
At JRV 6864, at times the President handed ballots directly to voters, bypassing the Vocal.
At JRVs 6864 and 6864, Vocals did not inspect the ballots before giving them to voters.
At JRV 0105, the President handed ballots directly to voter without passing them to the vocal for inspection.
3. The CIS observed cases of improper handling of ballot corners in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Comasagua, La Unión, Metapán, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, and San Vicente.
JRV 7370, a Vocal tore off the corners from the ballots while the President ate breakfast.
At JRV 6275, the JRV President not ripping off the corners of the ballots. At 7:30 a.m., the members of the JRV realized the mistake and all members of the table decided to open the ballot box and rip off the corners.
San Pedro Masahuat
At JRV 6801, a Vocal took over the task of tearing ballots and taking the corners off before voters were present.
At JRV 8416, JRV members were discarding the corners of the ballots under the table.
4. The CIS observed incidences in which JRV Secretaries forgot to stamp voter registry and/or stamped multiple names at one time in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Chalatenango, Cojutepeque, Colón, Comasagua, Jayaque, La Unión, Mercedes Umaña, Metapán, Nueva Trinidad, San Francisco Chinameca, San Miguel, and San Rafael Cedros.
At JRVs 7371, 7373, and 7374, Secretaries were going through the registry and stamping up to twenty names at a time.
At JRV 4872, the Secretary was stamping two names in the voter registry at once.
JRV 6264 was not stamping the registry after people had voted.
At JRVs 6863, 6864 and 6867, the Secretary did not stamp all the voters names on the registry as they voted. Instead, he stamped many at once.
At JRVs 7526 and 7514, the Secretaries neglected to stamp the registry.
5. CIS observers reported Presidents preparing ballots in advance in the following municipalities: Berlin, Chalatenango, Cojutepeque, Colón, Cuscatancingo, Estanzuelas, La Unión, Mejicanos, Mercedes Umaña, Metapán, San Martín, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, San Rafael Cedros, San Vicente, Sensuntepeque, and Tonacatapeque.
At JRV 7038, the President signed three to four ballots at a time.
At JRVs 7376 and 7382, the Presidents were signing and stamping ballots in advance.
At JRVs 4610, 4614, 4615, 4616, 4617, 4673, 4635, 4672, 4575, 4710, and 4624, ballots were stamped and signed in advance.
At JRVs 5427, 5432, 5437 and 5438, the Presidents signed and stamped up to ten ballots in advance.
At JRV 0956, the President left signed and stamped ballots with the alternate while he left the table.
At JRVs 8377, 8375, 8409, 8410, 8416, 8399, and 8471, the Presidents were signing and stamping ballots in advance.
6. CIS observers reported an overwhelming number of cases in which JRVs neglected to inspect voters’ hands for indelible ink in the following municipalities: Chalatenango, Cojutepeque, Colón, Jayaque, La Unión, Metapán, San Rafael Cedros, Sensuntepeque, and Zaragoza.
7. CIS observers witnessed JRVs failing to require voters to mark fingers with indelible ink in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Cojutepeque, La Unión, San Miguel, San Salvador (Feria Internacional), and Santa Ana.
At JRV 6264, a voter refused to put her fingerprint in the registry or ink her pinky finger, saying that she did not want to stain her hand. None of the JRV members insisted that she do it.
At JRV 2737, several voters did not stain their fingers with indelible ink.
8. The CIS observed incidences in which voters were told to sign and fingerprint the voter registry and/or mark their fingers with indelible ink before emitting their vote in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Colón, La Unión, Mejicanos, Nueva Concepción, Olocuilta, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, San Vicente, and Tamanique.
At JRV 6264, the Vocal told voters to put their fingerprints in the registry and mark their pinkies with indelible ink before receiving their ballots.
At JRVs 8346, 8390, 8374, and 8406, voters were asked to sign and put their fingerprint on the registry prior to voting.
9. The CIS observed inconsistency in the marking of the voter control sheet among JRVs in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Comasagua, Estanzuelas, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, San Pedro Perulapán, San Rafael Cedros, and Zaragoza.
Cojutepeque
At JRV 7376, the Vocal inconsistently checked off boxes on the voter control sheet as people voted.
JRV 4859 was not using the voter control sheet until the JEM intervened at approximately 9:10 a.m. and instructed them to use the control sheet.
At JRV 7516, the Vocal did not fill the voter control sheet consistently.
At JRVs 7527 and 7534, they did not fill the control sheet until an ARENA Center Coordinator instructed them to.
10. The CIS observed JRVs processing multiple voters at one time in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Apopa, Cojutepeque, Estanzuelas, La Unión, Mejicanos, Mercedes Umaña, Metapán, San Miguel, San Salvador, San Vicente, and Santa Ana.
JRV 7384 began processing two or three voters at one time around noon.
Estanzuelas
JRV 5439 was processing up to six voters at a time.
At JRV 6264, multiple persons went to the voting booth at the same time to emit their vote.
At JRV 0971, the President handed up to three ballots at a time to the Secretary.
11. The CIS observed cases of JRVs not requiring voters to sign and/or fingerprint the registry in the following municipalities: Conchagua, Jayaque, La Unión, Mercedes Umaña, Metapán, Nueva Concepción, San Pedro Perulapán, San Rafael Cedros, Santa Ana, Sensuntepeque, and Tamanique.
La Unión
At JRV 6264, the registry showed inconsistent fingerprints and signatures.
Nueva Concepción
At 9:30am, JRV 7103 was told to only have voters fingerprint the registry and not to sign in order to speed things up. The FMLN Jefe de Centro continued to walk through the voting center to inform the other JRVs.
Santa Ana
At JRVs 2737, 2740, and 2707, voters were not consistently signing their names on the registry.
JRVs 4994 and 4995 did not have all voters sign the voter registry.
12. CIS observers reported instances of JRV Presidents failing to stamp and/or sign ballots in the following municipalities: Estanzuelas, Mercedes Umaña, Metapán, and San Rafael Cedros.
At JRV 5432, twenty-six votes (twenty-five of which were for ARENA) appeared with no signature or stamp from the JRV President (FMLN) during the vote count. These votes were nullified.
At JRV 5440, five votes appeared without the signature or stamp of the President during the vote count. They were nullified.
JRV 1008 found 15 ballots without the signature of the President during the vote count. The JRV nullified these votes.
13. The CIS observed instances of citizens being the denied their right to vote due to early poll closings in the following municipalities: El Paraíso, La Unión, Olocuilta, and San Salvador.
JRV 7289 closed at 4:55 p.m. and denied a voter who arrived before 5:00 p.m. the right to vote.
At the Feria Internacional voting center, the guards responsible for closing the voting center did not allow an elderly woman to enter at 4:55 p.m. Ten minutes later, however, they allowed a family to enter the center and vote.
14. The CIS observed cases in which voters arrived to JRVs and discovered that someone had signed and fingerprinted beside their name in the JRV registry in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Colón, Comasagua, Cuscatancingo, Ilobasco, La Unión, Mejicanos, Mercedes Umaña, Nueva Concepción, Olocuilta, Puerto de la Libertad, San Martín, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, San Pedro Perulapán, and Santa Ana.
(See APPENDIX 13 for specifics regarding these cases)
15. The CIS observed instances in which people whose names appeared in the JRV registry were denied the right to vote because their DUI numbers were higher than 03447681-9 in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán and Mejicanos.
Two cases reported, including the following:
- David Alexander Gonzalez (DUI 03448662-8)
- Juan de Mata Gomez Ventura (DUI 03452184-2)
16. Additional Observations:
A JRV Secretary discovered that he had allowed a citizen to vote that did not appear in his JRV voter registry. The voter was allowed to vote again at their corresponding JRV, which was number 4868.
At JRV 6275, JRV members did not record the information of voters that were not allowed to vote.
When the family of Luis Alonzo Mejia arrived to vote, they noticed that the JRV registry showed that Luis Alonzo Mejia had voted. The family, however, pointed out that he has been in the United States for the past 6 months.
D) Closing of the Polls and Vote Count
1. CIS observers reported seeing JRVs begin to fill out and/or signing the closing acts before the closing of the polls and vote count in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Comasagua, Conchagua, El Paraíso, Mercedes Umaña, Nueva Concepción, San Francisco Chinameca, and Zaragoza.
Cojutepeque
JRVs 7391, 7366, 7393, 7395, 7382, and 7375 began filling out and signing the closing acts before the closing of the polls.
Comasagua
JRV 4865 began filling out the closing acts at 12:45pm and they signed them before entering vote count information.
JRV 4860 began filling out and signing the closing acts at 2:40pm.
Nueva Concepción
JRV 7103 signed the closing acts before filling in vote count information.
At JRVs 7085 and 7078, JRV members began filling out and signing closing acts at 1:30pm.
San Francisco Chinameca
At JRV 6865, the FMLN Secretary began to fill out the closing act before the closing of the voting center.
2. During the vote count, CIS observers reported cases in which JRVs failed to check for the President’s stamp and signature on the ballots in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Estanzuelas, La Unión, Mercedes Umaña, Olocuilta, and San Rafael Cedros.
3. The CIS observed instances of JRVs stamping, signing ballots, and/or tearing off ballot corners during the vote count in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Conchagua, Olocuilta, Mejicanos, and San Miguel.
During the vote count, the members of JRV 7390 noticed that a ballot (in favor of ARENA) was missing the president’s signature and stamp. The President (Coalition) signed the ballot and counted it valid.
At JRV 0958, they discovered a ballot still had the corner attached. A JRV member tore off the corner and counted the ballot as valid.
4. The CIS observed cases in which JRVs did not count leftover ballots and/or ballot corners to reconcile the vote count in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Conchagua, Estanzuelas, La Unión, and San Rafael Cedros.
Estanzuelas
JRV 5432 did not count leftover ballots.
La Unión
JRVs 6257, 6286, and 6289 did not count leftover ballots.
5. CIS observers reported the presence of unaccredited people during the vote count in the following municipalities: La Unión, San Miguel, San Vicente, and Sensuntepeque.
At JRV 6275, a large crowd of police, media, and other children and adults gathered around the table during the vote count. A JEM member arrived, announcing their presence was not permitted, but did not try to disperse the crowd.
6. The CIS observed instances in which JRV Presidents did not show the ballots to other JRV members and vigilantes or announce the votes as he/she removed and sorted ballots from the ballot box in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque, Metapán, and Sensuntepeque.
At JRV 7369, a Vocal was removing the ballots from the box and handing them to party members without announcements and without holding the ballot up so that everyone could see the voter’s intent.
At JRV 7371, the President announced votes very quickly and did not show the ballots to the entire JRV before handing them to the respective party members.
7. Additional Observations:
San Pedro Masahuat
The JEM ordered JRVs to begin the vote count at 4:30pm.
The CIS observed voters placing their marked ballots in ballot boxes corresponding to other JRVs. None of these instances was discovered during the vote count.
INDUCTION AND INFLUENCE ON VOTERS
A) Vote Buying
1. CIS observers received reports of vote buying in the following municipalities: Berlin, Estanzuelas, Metapán, and San Miguel.
Berlin
Observers received several complaints of vote buying and acts of intimidation from people that live in the cantons around Berlín.
FMLN party members told observers that ARENA was buying votes at the ARENA orientation center.
Nelson Gilberto Leon Guido (DUI 01381023-6) and Pedro Reyes Lainez (DUI 03367766-6) testified that ARENA militants came to their community offering $87 worth of credit for fertilizer and seeds to plant corn. They reported that the militants said that if ARENA won, the people would receive the credit, but that if ARENA lost, they would have to pay back the $87.
Sr. Guido also told observers that an ARENA militant said that ARENA would give water to houses with ARENA flags, but not to other houses in their community where there is no water service.
Observers received numerous reports from various party representatives and local citizens that ARENA was buying votes on buses and in the cantons.
San Miguel
There were reports that ARENA was inducing votes from the China House, the Mayor’s office and Pollo Campero and at both ends of the voting center.
There were reports of ARENA militants grabbing citizens at the ends of the voting center and offering money in exchange for their votes.
There were reports of vote buying on ARENA buses.
There were many reports of ARENA buying votes from within the Tropico Inn.
There were reports of ARENA paying $20 for votes in Canton Santa Inez.
2. The CIS observed party militants giving voters food and other gifts in the following municipalities: Colón, Comasagua, Jayaque, Olocuilta, San Rafael Cedros and San Salvador.
Colón
ARENA was offering free water and food from booths by its information centers, some marked with ARENA colors.
Comasagua
ARENA members distributed party t-shirts to voters as they passed by the party office on the way to the voting center. They were asked to stop by the JEM and the police.
Jayaque
Where people exited the buses, ARENA activists were distributing food throughout the day.
Olocuilta
One voter received a meal from a PCN vigilante immediately after she voted.
ARENA and the FMLN gave out free lunches at their party offices.
ARENA gave out T-shirts.
San Salvador
At the Feria Internacional voting center, ARENA members were seen bringing lunches to voters.
At the Feria Internacional voting center, ARENA members passed out water bags with ARENA logos and pictures.
B) Influencing Votes
1. The CIS observed JRV members influencing voters in the following muncipalities: Comasagua and San Vicente.
Comasagua
At JRV 4863, there were several complaints that the Coalition JRV member was handing ballots to voters and pointing to the Coalition flag on the ballot.
San Vicente
At JRV 8346, the JRV allowed a woman to mark her ballot at the table at 1:45pm. The voter asked the JRV President if she should, "vote like this?" pointing to the ARENA flag. The JRV President indicated yes and the woman marked the ballot accordingly.
At JRV 8380, the JRV President asked a woman whom she would like to vote for, and voted for her despite the protests of the other JRV members.
2. For cases of vigilantes influencing votes, see APPENDIX 10: Vigilantes and Party Representatives.
VIGILANTES AND PARTY REPRESENTATIVES
A) Vigilantes and Party Representatives Taking On JRV Duties
1. The CIS observed cases of vigilantes actively taking part in the installation of the JRVs in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Berlin, Comasagua, Metapán and Nueva Trinidad.
Comasagua
At JRV 4857, vigilantes set up the ballot box and the ballot box was not checked by the JRV.
ARENA vigilantes were seen opening electoral packets.
Nueva Trinidad
At JRV 7223 the PCN vigilante opened the ballot box and put in the JRV and vigilante DUIs.
2. The CIS observed cases of vigilantes taking on duties of JRV members in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Berlin, Comasagua, Conchagua, Cuscatancingo, Estanzuelas, Mejicanos, Mercedes Umaña, Nueva Concepción Nueva Trinidad, Olocuilta, Sensuntepeque, San Francisco Chinameca, San Martín, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, Santa Ana, and Zaragoza.
Antiguo Cuscatlán
Vigilantes were observed turning in signed acts and packets.
Estanzuelas
At JRV 5437, a PCN vigilante took the seat of the JRV President and stamped ballots.
At JRV 5428, an ARENA vigilante replaced the Vocal for the Coalition and inked voters’ fingers for 15 minutes.
Nueva Concepción
At JRV 7114, an FMLN vigilante took the place of the JRV President and handed ballots to voters.
Nueva Trinidad
At JRV 7224, a Coalition vigilante sat at the table and read DUI numbers to JRV members.
At JRV 7223, a Coalition vigilante replaced the JRV Secretary for a time.
At JRV 6866, a Coalition vigilante took the place of the missing Coalition JRV member for the entire day.
At JRV 6865, a PCN vigilante repeatedly replaced the PCN Vocal.
At JRVs 6864 and 6865, PCN vigilantes took off their smocks and took on the duties of the JRV Vocals.
San Pedro Masahuat
At JRV 6783, an FMLN vigilante was handing ballots to voters at 1:16 p.m.
At JRV 6788, an ARENA vigilante was handing ballots to voters at 3 p.m.
At JRV 6776, an FMLN vigilante was handing ballots to voters.
At JRV 6800, ARENA and FMLN vigilantes took on the roles of their respective JRV members.
Santa Ana
At JRV 2708, the alternate to the ARENA vigilante was directing voters to sign the registry and handing voters their ballots.
3. The CIS observed cases of vigilantes sitting at JRVs in the following municipalities: Chalatenango, Cojutepeque, Comasagua, El Paraíso, Nueva Concepción Puerto de la Libertad, San Francisco Chinameca, and San Miguel.
Cojutepeque
At JRV 7369, a PCN vigilante was seated at the table (8:40am).
At JRV 7369, a Coalition vigilante was seated at the table (9:25am).
At JRV 7392, an ARENA vigilante was seated at the table.
At JRV 7389, an FMLN vigilante was seated at the table.
At JRV 7398, an ARENA vigilante was seated at the table (3:45pm).
At JRV 7374, an FMLN vigilante was seated at the table.
At JRV 7372, an FMLN vigilante was seated at the table.
Comasagua
At JRVs 4867, 4862, 4860, and 4857, vigilantes were seated at the tables at various times throughout the day.
Nueva Concepción
At JRV 7105, vigilantes were sitting at the JRV table at 11:00 a.m.
At JRV 7113, two ARENA vigilantes were sitting at either side of the table between 1:30 and 2:30 p.m.
San Francisco Chinameca
At JRV 6869, an FMLN vigilante sat at the table.
At JRV 6869, there was an ARENA Vigilante sitting at the table.
At JRV 6860, ARENA and FMLN vigilantes sat at the table.
4. Additional Observations:
Colón
Between 12:20 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. in the Gustavo voting center, ARENA and FMLN Jefes de Centro and Supervisors were opening ballot boxes in an effort to compact ballots. This was observed at JRVs 4665, 4666, 4667, 4668, 4669, 4972, 4673, 4674, 4675, 4676, 4677, 4678, 4679, 4680, 4681, 4682, 4683, 4684, 4687, 4688, 4689, 4690, 4691, and 4692.
B) Vigilante Interference
1. The CIS observed cases of vigilantes placing voters' ballots into the ballot box in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Conchagua, Mejicanos, and San Francisco Chinameca.
At JRVs 1007 and 1009, ARENA vigilantes put a few people's votes into the ballot box.
San Francisco Chinameca
At JRV 6863, an ARENA vigilante put a voter's ballot in the ballot box.
2. The CIS observed cases of vigilantes standing or sitting very close to the voting booths in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Apopa, Berlin, Cojutepeque, Comasagua, Estanzuelas, San Francisco Chinameca, and Tamanique.
Cojutepeque
At JRV 7396, a PCN vigilante stood right next to voting booth.
At JRV 7371, an ARENA vigilante looked over the shoulders of three voters.
At JRV 7376, an ARENA vigilante stood behind voting booth while all JRV members and other vigilantes voted.
At JRV 7393, a PCN vigilante stood directly behind voting booth.
Comasagua
Vigilantes at JRVs 4867 and 4869 were standing close to voting booths and watching citizens as they voted.
San Francisco Chinameca
Vigilantes at JRVs 6864 and 6865 sat close to and in between voting booths.
Tamanique
A PCN Vigilante from JRV 4992 was standing close to voting booth.
Berlin
A Coalition vigilante handed a ballot to a voter and told her to vote for the Coalition.
At JRVs 5431, 5435 and 5440, vigilantes protested when handicapped voters tried to vote with the help of family members. These voters were forced to vote with the help of party vigilantes.
La Unión
Vigilantes from the FMLN, PCN and ARENA were seen accompanying voters to the voting booths.
An FMLN vigilante was observed accompanying a voter to the voting booth and then yelling loudly 'Vote for the FMLN, Vote for the FMLN'.
Santa Ana
At JRV 2708, the alternate to the ARENA vigilante was handing voters ballots and pointing to the ARENA flag.
At JRV 2733, an ARENA vigilante was observed standing next to and speaking to a woman as she was casting her vote.
C) Excess Party Representatives in the Voting Center
1. Excess party representatives were observed in the following municipalities: Cojutepeque and San Pedro Perulapán.
Cojutepeque
There were 4 ARENA Center Coordinators present in the voting center.
San Pedro Perulapán
There were 3 ARENA Center Coordinators present in the Centro Escolar voting center.
Conchagua
The President of a JRV left the table, leaving the completed acts and electoral packet with the Secretary, Vocal and two ARENA vigilantes. Upon President's return, the packet was missing. The Secretary returned and did not know what happened. After some confusion, the packet was found at ARENA headquarters with the vigilantes. The material was reviewed, the ballots counted and verified with the acts.
A vigilante was seen with a machete under his shirt.
Nueva Trinidad
At JRV 7223, a PCN vigilante took the crayon from an elderly woman as she was going to vote. An ARENA vigilante and an FMLN supervisor intervened.
At JRV 7223, an ARENA vigilante opened the ballot box to press down the ballots.
INADEQUATE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
A) Inside the Voting Centers
1. Voting centers were not adequately accessible to handicapped voters in the following municipalities: Antiguo Cuscatlán, Apopa, Berlin, Cojutepeque, Colón, Comasagua, Cuscatancingo, Estanzuelas, Jayaque, Nueva Trinidad, San Francisco Chinameca, San Miguel, San Pedro Masahuat, San Vicente, Santa Ana and Sensuntepeque.
Antiguo Cuscatlan