San Rafael Cedros – The ARENA JEM member in San Rafael Cedros, Ricardo Tejada, told Mission Observers that ARENA had registered 800 people to vote in San Rafael Cedros that lived in other municipalities.

San Matías – At 3pm on March 16, the PCN mayor brought in 307 people from the cooperatives of Las Marias, La Hacienda and Sitio de Los Nejapas in the municipality of Quezaltepeque and Las Annonas in San Pablo Tacachico on buses from his bus company. The PCN won the election with a margin of 228 votes.

San Miguel - ARENA had Supervisors assigned for every five JRVs, instead of every 20 tables as specified in the Electoral Code. As a result, there were far too many ARENA representatives in the voting center; more people then were allowed to vote according to the ratio of one supervisor per 20 tables.

Cinquera – It is estimated that political parties brought in the following number of people to vote in Cinquera:

Estanzuelas – ARENA was detected bringing in voters on buses from Berlin, San Vicente, and La Peña with people who do not live in Estanzuelas. ARENA won the election by 2 votes.

Problems with the voter registry – The accuracy of the list of registered voters was repeatedly questioned throughout the election. In a meeting on January 24, 2003, the Junta de Vigilancia reported to Mission Observers that there were 45,919 deceased people and 4,888 duplicates included in the registry, while an additional 22,810 voters were either added or taken out of the registry after the final deadline for making changes had passed (14,183 with birth certificates and 8,627 were excluded). In addition, on March 12th, four days before the election, the newspaper Diario de Hoy reported that 50,000 people who had applied for voting cards had not received them.

The unfinished process of issuing the DUI – In order to remedy the voter registry problem, the decision was taken in 2002 to rebuild the voter registry based on the national identity card (DUI) database. The registration of all Salvadorans and the issuance of DUI cards were supposed to be completed before the 2003 elections so that the DUI could be used as the voting card. However, the project is significantly behind schedule because of the burdensome and bureaucratic registration process and the card fee of $10.31 which many Salvadorans cannot afford. These continuing problems raise serious doubts that the DUI-based voting system will be ready for the 2004 Presidential elections.

Lack of electoral code enforcement – During the campaign, there were several denunciations of the TSE for not enforcing the electoral code. Violations included the failure of parties to file necessary paperwork, the early commencement of campaign activities (before the official election period had begun), and the allowing of changes to the voter registry past the registration deadline. Further, the TSE should have declared Legislative Decree 669 inapplicable, that transitionally grants an elected official 60 days after taking power to present economic solvency in the use of public funds to the Accounting Court; this Legislative Decree violates Article 127, numeral 2 of the Constitution of the Republic, which states that a person cannot be a candidate if they don’t have economic solvency in managing public funds according to the Accounting Court. The majority of candidates registered and approved by the TSE for the 2003 did not complete this step in the process.

TSE employees as candidates – There were 51 cases in which current TSE employees were simultaneously running for political office. This represented a clear conflict of interest. The TSE addressed this issue only after the media exposed it. The TSE asked these candidates to cease their work for the TSE during the election period.

Limited resources and training of electoral organs – Finally, conversations with JED and JEM members and election-day observations revealed a critical lack of adequate training on the electoral process. Many of the JED and JEM offices were without the essential basic office equipment to perform their duties – offices, telephones, desks, computers and access to vehicles. For example, the San Salvador JED was without office space for one month after their official appointment. Most of the JEMs in the departments of Usulután and La Libertad never had office space, forcing them to meet in private homes and other locations, while the JEM in La Palma conducted their regular meetings in the post office. As a result of these resource shortages, many JEDs and JEMs reported that it was extremely difficult or impossible for them to perform their duties. For the JED, this included communicating with and visiting JEM offices, supervising the activities of political parties and visiting voting centers prior to election day.

January 20 – An ARENA activist in Santiago Nonualco in the department of La Paz was hit by rocks thrown by sympathizers of other political parties.

On January 21 an FMLN activist died in the town of Atiquizaya in the department of Ahuachapán after being struck in the head, chest and abdomen with stones thrown by ARENA activists during an FMLN rally.

January 27 – A grenade explosion in the Jiquilisco area injured four FMLN activists several hours after a rally. The source of the grenade is still in question; some witnesses claim that it belonged to the four men while others say it was thrown at them.

January 28 – An FMLN city council member in Ayutuxtepeque was arrested for attacking a member of the AP party.

January 28 – The body of the ARENA mayoral candidate for Monte San Juan in the department of Cuscatlán was discovered. Police determined that he had been shot twice in the head.

February 17 – An FMLN activist in Ataco in the department of Ahuachapán was shot to death in his house.

February 23rd – The FMLN mayoral candidate in Cinquera was kidnapped by two armed men outside his Coca-Cola distribution business in Mariona. In addition to stealing his pick-up truck and $3,000, one of the men later shot at the candidate as he escaped while being led down a path known as Las Cañales.

March 2nd – The PCN mayor in Santa Cruz Michapa in the department of Cuscatlán attacked the ARENA alternate (suplente) of the JEM.

March 3rd – The two daughters – ages 4 & 6 – of the FMLN candidate in Mejicanos, department of San Salvador, were kidnapped -- being picked-up after school in van similar to their school van. The driver never spoke to them and dropped them off at the school after two hours.

March 4th – FMLN and ARENA activists exchanged blows in Antiguo Cuscatlán, San Salvador after a group of ARENA activists shouted insults in front of the FMLN office.

March 6th – A PCN city council candidate in San Martín, died from four gunshot wounds suffered two days earlier when he was attacked by unknown assailants.

March 13th - An FMLN militant in Sonsonate died instantly from gunshot wounds and her husband was taken to Jorge Mazzini hospital in serious condition.

Padre Rigoberto Antonio Nieto, a Roman Catholic Priest in San Pedro Masahuat, received threats from ARENA city council members, stating that there would be “reactions” against him if the FMLN won the municipal elections. He was accused of buying votes for the FMLN by giving out cement and reinforcing rod used in house construction in the cantons.

During the campaign, the FMLN mayor and candidate, Wilber Solano, in Estanzuelas received death threats. During the process of reviewing the impugned votes following the elections, Mayor Solano was told if the FMLN won he had only two months to live.

In La Palma, ARENA candidate claimed that FMLN made vague threats of violence and vengeance if FMLN lost elections. In addition, a woman told observers of a death threat she received on Election Day.

March 16 - In Apopa, an FMLN activist was shot and critically wounded at the voting center. When a CIS observer took note she received the threat that “something bad would happen to her if she denounced it.”

San Francisco Chinameca, La Paz – On the Thursday before the elections, the current ARENA mayor and two city council members visited 200-300 families, telling them that that the FIS-DL and the EEU development organization were going to build 300 homes for those who had lost their homes to the 2001 earthquakes. The people had to sign up by Saturday mid-day (day before the elections) and were told that the project wouldn't go through if the mayor wasn't re-elected. The FMLN legal representative called an emergency meeting of the JEM for Friday afternoon, and accused ARENA of campaigning after the election period was over. The ARENA rep to the JEM agreed that the activity was campaigning, and signed the Acta of denunciation.

Bajo Lempa, Usulután - Reports that ARENA was giving away land and house supplies in a raffle to those people who provided their names and carnet numbers.

La Palma, Chalatenango – Two instances of vote buying were reported to Mission observers. 1) An ARENA business owner and activist offered 100 colones to buy the voting cards of several of his employees. 2) At least three people were offered $20 by a store owner in exchange for a promise to vote for PCN.

Jayaque, La Libertad – Separate and independent testimony was given to Mission observers by several people saying that ARENA was conducting a systematic vote-buying campaign that continued up to the day of the elections. On election day, three separate couples getting off buses to vote in Jayaque reported that ARENA workers had offered them $8.00 to vote for ARENA.

San Pedro Masahuat, La Paz – FMLN candidate reported vote buying by ARENA. PDC reported voting buying by ARENA and FMLN.

El Carmen, Cuscatlán - CDU sources reported that people were being offered money to hand in their voting cards until after the elections.

In the cantons of El Faro, La Lima, San Antonio, El Potreron, Los Leones and Los Ranchos, in the municipality of Comasagua, La Libertad - On the Friday and Saturday before the election, the ARENA candidate was offering corrugated tin roofing materials to voters. In addition, the ARENA mayor offered land in exchange for votes, instructing the voters to look for certain ARENA members at the voting tables.

San Matías, La Libertad – The PCN mayor gave out water jugs in the cantons of El Rancho, Las Flores and El Jocote one and two days prior to the elections.

Estanzuelas, Usulután - Noted parties buying votes for 125 colones each.

Tamanique, La Libertad - Observers noted that voters were being bribed with 125 colones, and that voters were also being intimidated by ARENA who told them that if they didn’t vote for ARENA they would loose municipal projects.

Lack of knowledge among the JRVs during the pre-opening set-up – Most JRVs appeared completely unfamiliar with the materials contained in the electoral packet, causing chaos at nearly every table. Each JRV seemed to order the steps of the voting process differently and to affix their voter registry in a different way and location.

Mistakes in the voting procedures of the JRVs and vigilantes – Another key result of the lack of pre-opening training for the JRVs was the high number of mistakes made in the voting of JRVs, vigilantes and supervisors. Many failed to collect carnets, ink fingers, take fingerprints and stamp the voting list. Throughout the day, Observers saw tables rectifying these steps.

Voting centers opened late because of level of disorganization – Nearly every one of the more than 75 voting centers covered by Mission observers opened late; often by nearly 1 hour. In the smaller centers this can largely be attributed to the level of disorganization and poor training of the JRVs in completing the installation process of the tables. In the voting centers with more than 25 tables, this basic problem was exacerbated by the logistical impossibility of distributing the materials to all the JRVs and having them complete the installation process in the one hour time period usually allowed.

Easily intimidated and influenced by Supervisors and Jefes de Centro – Supervisors and Jefes de Centro were seen giving instructions and resolving problems. While this is a part of their responsibilities they very often used intimidation and strong-arm tactics to resolve problems in favor of their parties and taking advantage of the poor training of the JRVs. Well-trained JRVs would not need as much help and would be more likely to stand up to intimidation.

Lack of knowledge about the steps in the voting procedures – There was no standard set-up seen among the JRVs; every table ordered the steps in the voting procedure differently, opening the possibility of intentional fraud by one or members of a given JRV. As a result, Observers saw numerous cases in which steps in the process were forgotten – taking finger prints, inking the finger, stamping the electoral register (padron) after voting. In addition, numerous cases were observed where the voter signed and was finger-printed before voting, increasing the chances of getting an ink mark on their ballots which could cause their ballots to be invalidated.

Failure to adhere to assigned duties – Observers saw many cases in which vigilantes were performing the duties of JRV members such as signing ballots, inking a voter’s finger, handing ballots to voters, etc. Such activities are prohibited by the Electoral Code, but were very common. In addition, Observers saw many cases of JRV and vigilantes leaving their tables for long periods without being replaced by their alternatives. The tables simply didn’t have all their members at these times, increasing the amount of work for the remaining members and increasing the chances for intentional and accidental mistakes.

Confusion about closing procedures – The counting of the votes is the most important step in the election process, yet the JRV were clearly under-trained in proper closing procedures, resulting in a failure to follow all steps in the closing process. The following oversights were observed during closing procedures:

Confusing center configurations – The order and placement of tables in many of the voting centers covered by the Mission were confusing. In several cases, the tables were not in alphabetic order while in others, voting tables were on many levels and crammed into remote corners. This required many voters to spend a long time searching for their voting table. Observers noted voters going from table to table asking where to vote, and being sent around in circles. After an extensive search for their names on the voting registries of several tables, many frustrated voters gave up and left the voting centers without voting.

Lack of guaranteed right to vote in secrecy – One of the most common problems recorded by Mission observers was the general lack of voting privacy. Although in most cases voting booths were closed on three sides and generally located a sufficient distance from the JRV tables, voters rarely had full voting privacy due to the number of people – other voters – passing on all sides. Again, related to voting center layout, there was often confused crowding around voting areas, resulting in little privacy for the voter. In addition, in some cases, party vigilantes observed people voting. This is discussed in more detail in point #3 below.

Disorder and crowding – Poor voting center layout and inefficient processing of voters caused in large part, a great deal of disorder and crowding in voting center passageways and around the voting booths. This, in turn, added further to the inefficiency of the voting process. For the most part, nobody controlled the flow of voter traffic, such as in asking waiting voters to stand in lines and or by moving finished voters out of the voting table area after reclaiming their cards.

Limited handicap accessibility – Vigilantes and Scouts did a great job of helping handicapped voters in a few voting centers. However, overall, there seemed to be little support for handicapped voters. Observers reported many instances where these special voters received no assistance and / or were not guaranteed the right to secrecy since crowds of people bystanders usually watched them vote. In addition, the multi-level layout of many of the voting centers demonstrates a systematic failure to account of the special needs of handicapped voters.

Insufficient lighting – Lighting after dark was a problem in nearly all of the voting centers in which Mission Observers worked. JRVs were forced to interrupt the delicate counting and paperwork phase of their work in order to move their tables closer to light sources. In many instances, there simply was no light and JRVs either worked in darkness or used lighters or flashlights to guide their work. Given the critical nature of vote counting and filling out the Actas, every possible effort should be made to provide adequate lighting, even if the lighting arrangement is temporary. Not providing sufficient lighting is unacceptable.

Presence of party propaganda in and around voting centers – Many of the voting centers were awash in party colors on Election Day. Vigilantes, Supervisors, Jefes de Centro and the party-sponsored teams providing the endless stream of food were all wearing party vests, shirts and hats while party-sponsored buses and trucks constantly passed by the voting centers.

Influencing of voters by vigilantes – A vigilante’s role is to oversee the electoral process, at a given table, on Election Day. There were numerous cases in which a vigilante would grab a voter’s card as soon as the voter entered the center and lead them to their table. Vigilantes were also noted taking cards from voter’s hands while the voter was searching for their name in the registry. Other inappropriate activities included handing ballots to voters, leading voters to the voting booth, and helping the voter put their ballot in the box. Finally, vigilantes were often seen standing only a short distance behind voting booths watching the voter vote.

Food distribution in full party colors – As alluded to in the previous point, voting centers were full of party-sponsored teams dressed in party vests handing out drink and food to their JRV and vigilantes.

Free lunches given away outside centers – While party teams were busy giving away food inside the centers, there were also reports of parties giving away free lunches and having BBQs outside the voting centers in exchange for promises to vote for sponsoring parties. The Electoral Code forbids this because it is interpreted as both vote buying and as campaigning inside the three-day no-campaigning period before the election.

Lack of voter secrecy while voting – As discussed in earlier points, voters often were not allowed to vote in privacy due to the presence of other voters and vigilantes, thus voter secrecy was not guaranteed.

Campaigning of candidates inside voting centers – Observers in nearly every voting center – over 75 – reported seeing candidates campaigning inside voting centers. This included centers in which the candidates were NOT registered to vote. In nearly every case, 10 or more clapping, shouting or singing supporters followed their candidates. The crowds would quickly grow as vigilantes and Supervisors inside the center would join the party entourages. These mini-rallies would last between 15-30 minutes and create serious disruptions in the voting centers. At times, opposing parties would raise a counter-cheer, adding to and prolonging the disruption. Such activities created serious pressures on the voter.

Presence of party colors / propaganda in party-provided transportation – While political parties are allowed to provide free transportation to voters, it is forbidden to show party colors on the transport. Nearly every party transport vehicle seen by Mission Observers around the voting centers was displaying party colors. This tactic can significantly influence voters in one of two ways. First, voters may have to promise to vote for the party providing the transportation in order to be allowed to use the transportation, a violation both of their right to secrecy and to choose a party free from intimidation or influence. Secondly, the voter may simply feel obligated to vote for the party that provided them with transportation, again imposing on their freedom of choice. These tactics have an even greater possibility of pressuring the voters in rural communities where transportation options are limited.

In addition to providing voting center information, the voter’s personal information – such as address and phone number - is also available. There is no need for such information to be included in the database and represents an opportunity for abuse by the political parties or others with access to the database. \

FMLN and ARENA were the primary providers of these information centers on Election Day. At the start of the Election Day, both parties were almost universally observed giving voters information printed with their party colors, flags or slogans, a direct violation of the Electoral Code. The smaller political parties and members of the JEDs and JEMs quickly condemned this practice. However, it shows a conscious effort on the part of both parties to exploit a new medium.

Further, cases of disinformation were observed in which voters were given the wrong voting center information, causing them to waste time and money going to the wrong place. The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. Left in the hands of the political parties, these information centers represent an enormous potential source of fraud if used to intentionally deceive voters. As there was NO oversight of these centers, there is no way to prove malicious intent after the fact.

Too many people in the voting centers – Mission Observers reported that the voting centers were full of people after the doors closed at 5pm. It was unclear who many of these people were as they did not have JRV or vigilante identification. As a result, the volume of people added to the general confusion in the centers during the voting process, making the counting process much more difficult to control. Frequently, there were 10 or more people standing around the tables watching the vote counting, but, again, it was unclear who many of these people were.

Lack of clear neutral authority in the voting centers – The closing process is complex. With two ballot boxes, many political parties, and a great deal of paperwork to fill out after a long day of work, there was a lot of confusion and many questions about the closing procedures. It seemed that the JRVs were largely left on their own to struggle through problems. There was no clear and strong presence of a neutral electoral authority that was available to answer questions and guide JRVs through the closing process steps. Usually one TSE representative was present to collect their copies of the Acts, but this was clearly not enough to handle the questions and problems even in relatively small voting centers.

Training & guidelines for addressing impugned and null ballots – Determining the intention of the voter in unclear ballots was a significant problem during the counting process. Not only did many JRVs not know the difference between an impugned vote and a null vote, but they also didn’t know how to process or record such votes. As a result, there can be little doubt that many votes that did not show clear intention were handled and recorded incorrectly. Further, Mission Observers reported cases of intentional fraud in which votes showing a clear intention were classified as null or impugned because of aggressive JRV members. Because only impugned votes can be recounted, any misidentification or improper recording of such of such votes whether accidental or intentional can have a significant impact on the outcome of elections, especially in light of the number of municipalities that were decided by only a small number of votes. Therefore, better training, and better oversight are needed in the counting process.

Burdensome and difficult paperwork – The JRVs had to complete a huge volume of paperwork after counting the ballots, making 3 original duplicates for each of the two elections. In the best of conditions, this is a challenging task, but with poor training, poor lighting conditions and after working 12+ hours, completing this volume of paperwork without errors is nearly impossible. In some voting centers, the filling out of paperwork began before the official 5pm voting center closing time in order to hurry up the Acta delivery process.

Interference of party representatives – The completion of the Actas by the JRVs was further compromised by the frequent interruptions of the party Supervisors looking for the latest vote counts. In addition, the Supervisors of the losing parties often become hostile towards the JRV members. There was no regulation of Supervisor interaction with the JRVs, leaving them free to interfere as they pleased. This added to the overall confusion and tension of the counting process.

Lack of procedures for closing and sealing boxes after counting – The boxes containing the counted ballots were closed and sealed in a very haphazard manner. Many boxes seen in the voting centers and the JEM collection centers were not properly sealed. In some cases, ballots were literally falling out of the boxes while in others, the boxes were not sealed at all or not sealed well enough to keep someone from getting into them easily. Given the late hour, the fatigue of all the people involved, the transportation of the ballots and the darkness, the chances for fraud at this final stage of the voting day are frightfully obvious. In fact, as post-election news articles revealed, ballots and boxes were found in garbage cans in several municipalities. In the case of Estanzuelas (discussed in the next section), ballots were actually found in an opened box belonging to a different municipality located 40 kms away. It must be very strongly emphasized that more secure procedures must be put into place to secure all voting boxes to ensure no fraud happens in this critical final stage of the voting process.

Immediate implementation of the DUI / and residential-based voting. Problems related to transportation and floating votes would be much more easily solved with the implementation of residential-based voting. Implementing the DUI would further overcome problems with the current electoral registry (pardon). Residential voting would facilitate the participation of citizens in general, but especially women and people with scarce economic resources who have more difficulty taking the day off and paying for transportation to be able to vote.

Make the DUI free. Currently, the DUI costs $10.31. The vast majority of Salvadorans simply cannot afford this. As a required national document,