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Election Observers - Final Report 2004 |
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Final Report - June 1, 2004: Printer-Friendly Presidential Election, El Salvador International Observer Mission Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS)
*If you choose to use material from this report, please cite Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS) *All translations from original Spanish done by CIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction
II. Detentions of International Observers
III. Role of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
IV. Propaganda and Violence During Electoral Campaign
V. United States Government Influence
Influence on Voters and Induction of Votes Role of the National Civilian Police
VII. Recommendations
VIII. Appendices · Appendix 1: Countries Represented in 2004 Mission · Appendix 2: Organizations Represented in 2004 Mission · Appendix 3: Municipalities covered in 2004 Mission · Appendix 4: Note Accrediting CIS Observers · Appendix 5: Resolution of the TSE Against the Illegal Campaign · Appendix 6: ELECTION DAY: Aggression and Violence · Appendix 7: ELECTION DAY: Propaganda · Appendix 8: ELECTION DAY: JRV Anomalies · Appendix 9: ELECTION DAY: Induction and Influence of Votes · Appendix 10: ELECTION DAY: Vigilantes and Party Representatives · Appendix 11: ELECTION DAY: Inadequate Logistical Support · Appendix 12: ELECTION DAY: Other Actors · Appendix 13: Registry Problems · Appendix 14: CIS Meetings with Electoral and National Officials
I. INTRODUCTION
The Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS) carried out its Sixth International Election Observer Mission in El Salvador, March 15 – 23, 2004. The Mission was made up of 270 observers from 15 countries and a team of 20 volunteers who worked from January 12 – May 12 to prepare the conditions for the mission, observe the election process leading up to the day of the elections, and compile this report.
We would like to give special thanks to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the Human Rights Ombudswoman (PDDH), and the U.S. Embassy for making the election mission possible in the face of a decision by the Salvadoran Government to detain and deport international observers upon their arrival in El Salvador.
The CIS would also like to thank the Electoral Oversight Board (JVE), the training staff at the TSE, the TSE Electoral Project (logistical unit), the political parties, members of 11 Departmental Electoral Councils (JED), 36 Municipal Electoral Councils (JEM), the National Civilian Police (PNC), The Electoral Attorney General, and the Canadian, French, and German Embassies for taking the time to meet with us and explain the process and their perspectives on it. We would also like to thank the 36 municipalities that invited and facilitated the presence of CIS observers.
The 2004 Presidential Election represented advances and setbacks in the democratic process initiated with the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992. The most notable advances include:
At the same time the fragility of the incipient 12 year-old democratic process was also exposed:
With our report, we hope to document the strengths and weaknesses in the electoral system in an objective manner and set out a series of recommendations for reforms to strengthen the democratic process, citizen participation and future elections.
The CIS is dedicated to building people-to-people exchange and accompaniment of the Salvadoran people in grassroots efforts to develop lasting and profound democracy, including the promotion of cultural activities, language exchange, human rights, emergency aid, human development, and micro-economic efforts. The CIS International Election Observer Mission is part of our contribution to strengthening democratic participation.
Ultimately, it is the Salvadoran people who have the last word in building free and fair elections and, more importantly, a culture of democracy - a culture where differences are debated and respected; where the majority make a decision with respect for the minority; where coercion and manipulation to influence people’s votes are not accepted and violators are sanctioned; where elected representatives seek out the interests of their constituents in building policies on an ongoing basis; and where Legislative Assembly, City Councils, neighborhood associations, school boards, the police, and the justice system serve as tools to strengthen civil society participation. The CIS is committed to accompanying that process.
II. DETENTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS (March 12 and 13, 2004)
International Observation has played an important role in the electoral process since the Peace Accords were signed in 1992. The Peace Accords laid the ground work for the creation of important democratic institutions including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the National Civilian Police, the Human Rights Ombuswoman, while the FMLN was recognized as a political party. These institutions have contributed to important gains in the democratic process. However, they remain very fragile and in some cases have not consolidated their role as stipulated in the 1992 Peace Accords.
The presence of international observation has played an important role in supporting the consolidation of the democratic process in the post-war period. The presence of international observers has contributed to building confidence in the voters in the election process. In rural areas where violence and intimidation both historically and currently surround electoral processes, fear continues to be present at election time. Additionally, the presence of international observers has contributed to an objective base of information and recommendations to evaluate the process and strengthen it. The report of the 2003 CIS Observer Mission was used as a base of evaluation in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). The CIS recommendations were also unanimously incorporated into the agenda of the Commission on Electoral Reforms of the Legislative Assembly. All political parties congratulated the CIS Observer Mission and recognized the importance of the CIS contribution. Since 1994 the CIS has hosted and trained observer missions duly accredited by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
It is worrisome that high-level authorities of the Salvadoran Government arbitrarily made the decision to prohibit the presence of international observation in the 2004 elections. CIS observers who entered at Comalapa Airport on Friday evening, March 12, were told that there was an order to detain and deport international election observers, unless they presented a credential upon entering the country.
The CIS request for accreditation was approved by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on January 30, 2004.[1] According to Article 20 of the Regulations for International Observers of Electoral Processes in El Salvador, observers enjoy the right to receive a visa to enter the country.[2] We believe there is no reason to require credentials at the airport, since the Supreme Electoral Tribunal issues the credentials after visiting observers have arrived in El Salvador, not before. The CIS, with the help of the TSE, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudswoman, and the U.S. Embassy, who all worked until 2 a.m., were eventually able to get the detained observers into the country early Saturday morning, March 13. Arbitrary detentions at the airport were repeated on Saturday, March 13, with more than 80 international visitors, observers and non observers, including the Human Rights Ombudsman from Costa Rica and a Spanish priest. The U.S. Ambassador himself went to the airport on Saturday, March 13, due to the gravity of the situation.
Article 5 of the Salvadoran Constitution states that all persons have the liberty to enter, stay in territory of the Republic and leave, with the exception of limitations the law establishes.[3] Article 5 of the Immigration Law expresses that foreign persons can enter the Republic as tourists, temporary residents and definitive residents, without signaling any other migratory category.[4] According to Article 20 of the Regulations for International Observation, observers enjoy the right to receive a visa to enter the country.[5] The rights of international visitors and observers were violated with arbitrary detentions at the airport. The March detentions of international observers and other foreign visitors, raised questions about the transparency of the electoral process. The CIS would like to recognize and thank the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), TSE Magistrate Julio Hernandez and his team, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudswoman and the United States Embassy for their efforts to guarantee international observation in spite of these violations.
III. ROLE OF THE SUPREME ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (TSE)
A. Strengths of the Electoral Process in the 2004 Presidential Elections
The Observation Mission found two principal strengths:
1. The substitution of the Electoral Card by the Unique Identity Document (DUI)
The electoral reforms carried out by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) in 2003 brought two important new advances associated with the Electoral Registry system: the DUI and the new Electoral Registry, which signified a change in Article 9 of the Electoral Code.[6]
Without a doubt, the DUI has given greater security, transparency and confidence to the citizenry on Election Day, serving to prevent votes using the identity of deceased individuals and identity theft. Because of its reliability, it is the document used to identify Salvadoran citizens, above 18 years of age, in all public affairs, including at voting time. The use of the DUI constitutes a great step forward for fair, transparent and democratic elections.
The use of the DUI, which has also allowed citizens to vote in their city of residence, has contributed to the modernization and updating of the Electoral Registry, which is based on the National Registry of Native Persons (RNPN) data given by citizens when they obtain their DUI.
2. Implementation of the New Electoral Registry with Digital Photos
The new Electoral Registry - where a majority of the deceased and those with duplicate voting cards have been deleted - includes a photograph of each citizen, which makes it more difficult to usurp identity or vote twice. We can point out only a small fault in this registry, which is the low printing quality of the photographs, but this has not prevented its effectiveness in checking the identity of voters in a fast and concise way on Election Day. This new Electoral Registry is the most agreed-upon point in the electoral reforms. It is the reform with the most impact.
Once the checks on personal information of the citizens in the Electoral Registry has finished - on January 24, 2004 - the electoral roll was made up of 3,442,393 eligible voters. This is 400,000 more people than in the last election. Another advantage to this new measure has been the variety of ways to find out, in advance, about the voting center and voting table where one is registered to vote, cutting the time required to find this information on Election Day. This also contributes to reducing the saturation of the voting centers.
However, the fact that the Salvadoran population went to the polls in unprecedented numbers does not mean that they necessarily expressed themselves freely and confidently. To say that we must take into account the development of the electoral process and the campaign. Our intention is to take into account the factors that determine whether people expressed themselves with freedom and conviction in this report's analysis of the process.
B. Weakness of the Process in the 2004 Presidential Elections
The following are the weak aspects that we observed in the electoral process:
1. Non-Compliance with the Electoral Calendar and Administrative Delays
· The electoral campaign was, by law, scheduled to begin on November 21, 2003, when the TSE commenced the election period. The ARENA party, however, began a disguised campaign much earlier, in August, ignoring Article 230 of the Electoral Code.[7] Seeing the passivity of the TSE, the other parties also began their campaigns early, similarly violating the Electoral Code.
· There was a one-week delay in the acquisition of the electoral materials that make up the electoral packet - especially the indelible ink - adding more uncertainty to the electoral process, just twenty days before the election.[8]
· A similar delay occurred with the acquisition of computers, which had not been received just two days before the first simulation. Even though the simulation went on as planned, the delay contributed to increased doubt about the transparency of the process.
· There was non-compliance with the electoral calendar by an increased number of Municipal Electoral Councils (JEMs) in carrying out the swearing in of the Vote-Receiving Council (JRV) members after the assigned period. This is also the responsibility of the TSE, which should have supervised the job. Due to the hierarchical structure of the electoral bodies, it is the TSE's obligation to respond to the actions of the various councils.
· There was a delay in the distribution of electoral packets to the Departmental Electoral Councils (JEDs), which began on March 16, while the last day on the Electoral Calendar to have finished was the next day, March 17.
2. Anomalies in Bidding for Contracts
· Administrative delays also occur in the normal process of awarding contracts after the deadline, as is the case with the printing of ballots or the purchase of the electoral packets. With these delays, the contracts are left deserted and have to be awarded directly and after the deadline, when irregularities can occur with the decisions over which businesses will receive the contracts.
· There was confusion with double bids, one for renting and another for purchase of equipment for the vote count. Doubts about the contradictory decisions from the TSE, which should contract out the supplies and services for better functioning, according to the Electoral Code.[9] First there was a bidding process for the purchase of a preliminary counting system, when the Organization of American States (OAS) had already set one up the year before. Later, instead of continuing with the bidding for renting 160 computers, they decided to buy 112 and use the OAS program.
· There was confusion with the bidding for purchase of computers in February, before leaving open the December bidding for rental, violating the Public Acquisitions and Contracts Law (LACAP) by not ending the first bidding before starting another bidding for the same contract.[10] Furthermore, there was confusion with the application of Article 63 of LACAP, in not accepting the proposal from Data & Graphics among the three that were presented at the rental bidding, when this article only applies to purchase bids when there is only one bid. Finally, there was confusion when both bids were left open and a third process, called "urgent necessity," was opened, which is not legally recognized as a bit. Nevertheless, this unusual process allowed the purchase of 112 computers from Digital Corporation.[11]
3. Anomalies in the Functioning of TSE Dependents
PLANNING UNIT · Non-fulfillment of the announcement by the TSE to distribute letters to citizens so that they could verify their information on the new Electoral Registry, when 1,500 of these letters were found in a trash dump that the Gigante Express delivery company had not delivered.[12]
· Saturation, in the days just before the election, of the TSE office of accreditation, due to the increased number of people who had still not received their credentials. The reason was the delay with which the TSE began operating the office, as well as the scarcity of resources and personnel with which it worked.
GENERAL AUDITING · The TSE left open a five week period for citizens to verify their data through various means. However, the various means were not always effective. There were typographical errors in the letters sent by the TSE, and many of the letters were lost or did not arrive in time for the recipients to verify their information. The TSE website was slow and required Internet Explorer 6.0. The information centers were not much visited because they were not publicized well. The mobile units were sent to outlying cities during hours when the streets were empty. There were denunciations of duplicated or stolen DUIs. Finally, many people complained of not being attended on the phone lines set up by the TSE for verifying information.
ELECTORAL PROJECT (LOGISTICS) UNIT· Several JED expressed dissatisfaction with the logistical support they received from the TSE. JED members discussed this with observers in several departments. Some JED demanded, among other things, material support in order to fulfill their duties, including chairs for the JRVs and communication and transportation facilities. Some JEM had their meetings in cafes, and in San Fransisco Chinameca, the JEM operated in a tin shack.
DATA PROCESSING UNIT · The weaknesses in the vote-counting system that allowed outsiders to break into the system in the March 7 simulation, according to the Attorney General, were not so much a result of a leak as of administrative negligence by the head of information technology, failing to comply with Article 91, number 1, of the Electoral Code.[13] Negligence allowed access, from any terminal in the counting center, to the security copy of the database that contained all the codes to enter the system, which allowed for alteration of the acts. This situation resulted in the organization of a third simulation, after which there would be only three days before the election in which to fix any errors. These circumstances made for greater uncertainty among the citizenry about the transparency of the process and the reliability of the results.
4. Silence and Indecision in the Arbitration of the Electoral Process
· Silence by the TSE about a Ministry of the Treasury decision, that violates Article 187 of the Electoral Code[14], to distribute only 50% of the electoral debt (campaign financing) to the political parties and not 75% as the Code indicates.
· Despite statements by the TSE President inviting the political parties to end electoral violence, and despite the plan coordinated by the Attorney General (FGR) and the National Police (PNC) to curb violence, an end to the violence was never reached. This was partly due to the lack of authority exerted by the TSE to oblige the political parties to follow the Regulation of Electoral Propaganda.
· According to Article 227 of the Electoral Code, only political parties have the right to use propaganda to gain votes. The Liberty Foundation (Fundación Libertad), Women for Freedom (Mujeres por la Libertad) and The Revolutionary Tendency (La Tendencia Revolucionaria) should have been punished for carrying out a negative, defamatory campaign against the image of the FMLN, its candidate, and the ARENA party, and influencing people not to vote for one party or the other. For the same reason, several columnists in the major newspapers should also have been reprimanded for carrying out a type of dirty and partisan propaganda. The TSE should have instilled respect for democracy by reminding the media and the political parties to comply with the Electoral Code Articles 227, 228 y 79, numeral 10,[15] demonstrating that the TSE is ready to demand compliance with the law. [16]
· The cases that have not been resolved by the TSE - over fifty denunciations - deal, in general, with the destruction of propaganda, violations of the parties' rights to propaganda, the use of state resources for campaigning, and electoral violence. Some examples:
◦ FMLN vs. ARENA and ARENA vs. FMLN, for violent acts ◦ ARENA vs. the Mayor of Apopa, for an arbitrary judgement preventing an ARENA rally ◦ FMLN vs. ARENA for opinion polls that ask people for their DUI numbers ◦ FMLN vs. Rafael Menjivar and FMLN vs. the Salvadoran Social Security Insititute, for television advertisements that damage FMLN candidate Schafik Handal's image ◦ ARENA vs. FMLN, for running advertisements linking ARENA candidate Tony Saca with events of past governments ◦ ARENA vs. the Mayor of San Salvador, for taking down electoral propaganda ◦ The National Conciliation Party (PCN) vs. a group of ARENA supporters, for destroying PCN propaganda on bus route 42-A ◦ Others
The reason that the resolutions are not followed through with is the lack of consensus among the TSE Magistrates.
· Article 237 of the Electoral Code prohibits public officials from promoting a political party during the campaign.[17] Salvadoran diplomats (René León, Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States, and Margarita Escobar, Salvadoran Ambassador to the OAS) made pro-ARENA statements during the campaign.[18] The TSE did not denounce these infractions.
· The TSE never ordered that the propaganda that violates Article 232 be taken down, like the painting and posters on public buildings and monuments, trees, and traffic signals.[19] It was the local authorities, such as the Mayor of San Salvador, that took measures to enforce compliance of the law. [20]
· The TSE also remained silent when faced with statements from foreign officials that constituted a clear intrusion into the internal affairs of the country.[21]
5. Partisan Division of the TSE
· Partisan division in the TSE does not guarantee transparency in its functioning. On the contrary, it generates many doubts about its independence in evaluating cases and guaranteeing efficient decision-making, as in cases of violence or other violations of the Electoral Code.
· The TSE followed the same partisan standard in selecting personnel for the Electoral Project, where three of the five Magistrates divided the number of personnel along party lines (ARENA: 60, FMLN: 61, CDU: 33).
· Numerous internal problems and exchanges of accusations between the magistrates arose, due to the way in which resolutions are studied and developed and the use of partisan posturing in decision-making, creating a climate of instability in public opinion about the institution.[22] Again, the TSE President did not comply with the previously mentioned article from the Electoral Code, even more so when it forms part of the exchange of accusations due to some statements, which could be considered inopportune given the TSE's state of crisis at the time, in which he asked voters to resolve the election and choose the future President in the first round. This coincided with other similar signals from a particular political party.[23]
· It was to be expected that the behavior of the two Magistrates named by the Supreme Court would serve as a counterbalance to the partisan positions of the rest of the TSE Magistrates. In practice, however, their decisions have not served to facilitate the process. They have served more to stall it, since they have systematically demonstrated partisan postures.
6. General Functioning of the TSE
There is no doubt that the most negative part of the electoral process was the functioning of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the highest authority in electoral issues. The TSE failed to guarantee electoral justice in this year's elections, by not exercising their authority and by permitting disrespect for the Constitution of the Republic and the Electoral Code.
The denunciations put before the TSE were numerous, for which the TSE had a resolution proposal to suspend all illegal propaganda. When the vote came for the proposal, TSE Magistrates Mena Méndez and Bolaños abstained from voting, demonstrating a partisan political inclination that resulted in nullifying the functioning of the TSE, throughout the campaign.[24]
Of almost seventy-one denunciations that the political parties presented, in which ARENA and the FMLN accused each other of violations, the TSE fell into illegality for not taking action to resolve the cases. In the few cases in which the TSE did take action, it was untimely and there was no authority or mediation.
From the beginning there were violations, resulting in the Electoral Code serving only for administrative and logistical situations.
IV. PROPAGANDA AND VIOLENCE DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
The 2004 Presidential Elections were special for the massive voter turnout. The CIS mission did not observe fraud on a grand scale on Election Day. However, numerous violations of the Electoral Code and the Penal Code were observed before the elections, during the campaign. We decided to treat the two themes of propaganda and violence together: they are often intimately linked because the majority of violent acts are provoked by electoral propaganda like painting, putting up posters, or party rallies. Furthermore, electoral propaganda, which frequently transgresses the norms established by the Electoral Code, leads to verbal violence and can lead to physical violence.
This brief analysis is based on the study of propaganda and violence, beginning in January, 2004, in the media, especially in the written press. El Diario de Hoy, La Prensa Gráfica and the CoLatino are our principal sources of information. The media have a slanted role given that they have been the vehicle for dirty and illegal propaganda in an electoral campaign based on threats and fear. They also gave space to intellectuals and columnists who tried to reason the electoral process and presented the step-by-step process of voting in an educational way; they also published comments that spread a climate of fear.
In the climate of tension and aggression that characterized the electoral campaign, initiatives arose to pacify the verbal or physical confrontations between party militants. But the initiatives were clearly insufficient and the electoral campaign was marked by daily violence and fear. Electoral propaganda frequently violated electoral law and was not respectful of people’s honor. It fomented violence and fear and debilitated the electoral system.
Initiatives for an Electoral Campaign Respectful of the Law and the Strengthening of Democracy
Due to the climate of disrespect and violence that characterized the electoral campaign, some institutions and sectors of the population mobilized against the violations of the democratic process and made calls for peace and respect. These reactions against violence and dirty propaganda were meant to calm the electoral context and, even though they were insufficient, they show the commitment of sectors of the Salvadoran people to democracy.
We can point out the following examples:
· On February 11 the Legislative Assembly made a recommendation for a ruling against the Ministries of Health, Public Works and Governance to “stop pressuring their employees and workers to affiliate with the governing party in exchange for obtaining or maintaining their jobs.”[25]
· The proposal made by Julio Hernandez, Magistrate for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), backed by Magistrates Juan José Martell and Pablo Antonio Cerna, for:
…all communication media to abstain from publishing any type of publicity that constitutes political propaganda and is not backed by the contending political parties or coalitions, during the present electoral process.[26]
· The Human Rights Ombudsperson (PDDH) issued reports about respect for political rights during the campaign. In its second report, the PDDH denounced the violations of the democratic process:
We trusted that the political parties were not leaders in promoting shameful and serious acts of violence and absolute disrespect for their adversaries and that they adhered strictly to the Constitution, the Electoral Code and the other legal norms applicable during the electoral campaign. We also had the expectation that the institutions in charge of the development and control of the process, like the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Attorney General of the Republic, were more effective and efficient than in the past when faced with the multiple anomalies denounced in these months thereby generating greater credibility of the electoral process amongst the citizenry.
· On March 2, La Prensa Gráfica published a press release by the Deans of the University of El Salvador, the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA) and the Technological University to calm the electoral campaign:
With great concern we have agreed that the electoral campaign has taken an unexpected turn towards insults and psychological aggression, with which, as it grows, increases the risk of verbal confrontation that can serve as a prelude to greater confrontation which is not desired by the Salvadoran people… We want to remember that any violent or derogatory message is a threat that deepens fear and revives the fears of the past… This campaign, so plagued by insults and aggression, does not add anything to that value of democracy that is the trust of people in their institutions, their leaders and their future, nor does it give guarantees that we can act together to confront the still-serious problems of poverty, institutional weakness and low levels of social development… Candidates and leaders of the different political institutions of the country, we exhort you to:
Assume a more rational and more constructive posture, that can encourage citizen voting.
Strengthen the necessary Central American democratic coexistence to achieve an atmosphere of healthy and respectful understanding, that allows us to exercise our rights and find the paths that lead to unified efforts, in favor of peace and work.[27]
· On March 19, thanks to an initiative from the University of El Salvador, the Central American University and the Technological University, the four presidential candidates met to sign a non-aggression pact.
· Several organizations that protect human rights mobilized against the violent turn of the electoral campaign. For example, the Human Rights Consortium and other organizations such as CESTA, APROCSAL, FUNDASAL, and FESPAD denounced that:
…The early electoral campaign, the violence between the parties, the spread of fear and terror (in television spots), the partiality of some communication media, the economic waste by the official party and the lack of responsibility of the TSE are only some of the aspects that concern us in the strengthening of a culture of peace, that are costing more and more as March 21 [Election Day] approaches.[28]
· The Madeleine Lagadec Human Rights Promotion Center urged people to vote free of fear:
We regret that the present electoral campaign has been filled with acts of violence by the political parties and fueled by the media, affecting a sector of the population lacking education and objective information from the media… We call on the voting population to massively demonstrate, with the vote, their rejection of the campaign that seeks to sow fear, and to exercise their right to freely elect their government.”[29]
· A press release from the Technological University, entitled “Mr. President,” went one step further than a simple denouncement of the dirty electoral campaign and appealed for reforms to the electoral system to guarantee and strengthen democracy:
It is urgent to revise and propose a new electoral system, one that returns confidence and credibility to the institutions that guarantee the democratic process - the political parties and citizens…. Finally, it is imperative that the State guarantees the Rule of Law that gives sense and life to democratic society. Freedom, respect for legal norms, democracy, the legal transfer of power and social peace, are nourished with the law as a guide and practice and coexistence between the members of the political electorate…[30]
Sadly, all these calls were necessary because there were many violations of the electoral laws and numerous acts of violence. However, even though these calls did not have the desired effect, they show the sensibility of some sectors of the Salvadoran population with respect to the norms and rules of the democratic process. Violence
It is worth noting that the acts of violence concern, in most cases, the two major political parties, ARENA and the FMLN.
Violence was omnipresent throughout the electoral campaign. Violations of the laws that regulate the campaign constituted the first step toward violence. Verbal violence, like insults and threats, is another type of violence that is often confused with dirty propaganda.
Prevalent Electoral ViolenceNumerous confrontations between party militants arose throughout the electoral campaign, including destruction of party propaganda, damage to party offices and party militants being injured or killed. The political parties presented more than fifty denunciations to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) about cases of electoral violence and other violations of electoral laws.
The mean for the months of February and March is one violent act related to the electoral campaign every three days. The following table details the types of violence committed. The table is not comprehensive, and is based primarily on the acts of violence reported by La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy.
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